The new Islamic presence in Europe, which is the consequence of a massive and voluntary settlement of millions of Muslims in Western societies, owes its visibility partly to the Muslim missionary movements from South Asia, which have proven specific strengths in shaping the Islamic-religious fields in the Diaspora communities in European countries. The new Islamic movements Tabligh Jamā’at, Da’wat-e Islāmī, and Sunni Da’wat-e Islāmī share the characteristics of new religious movements in the sense that they have been transformed through the confrontation with globalization and modernity. These three movements share, in varying degrees, a Sūfī background, and preach a peaceful Islam. At the same time terrorists involved in the bombings in Europe since 2004 regularly visited mosques associated with these movements, especially the Tabligh Jamā’at. All three missionary movements invite their members to visit their world headquarters or participate in annual meetings in Pakistan or India. The “Islamic project” of the three movements is the “Sunnaization” - that is, the reshaping and reconstruction - of the daily routine and the individual markers of identity based on the examples of the Prophet and the Salaf as portrayed in the Hadīth literature. This so-called “apolitical” Sunnaization can be understood as the privatization or individualization of political re-Islamization. It focuses on the private sphere instead of the state, and engages with ahadīth rather than the Qur’ān. With a new tolerance of ambiguity, Sunnaization combines elements of Sūfism and Salafism.¹

Almost all Western European societies have undergone a seemingly irreversible process of secularization since the 1960s. Globalization dissolved the territorial boundaries of traditional Christianity and challenged Europe’s hegemonic claim to be the central Christian continent. Western Europe is no longer the centre of global Christianity, and most new Christianities, Pentecostalism for example, are in their dynamic aspects less and less European. By the beginning of the third millennium, the one thousand-year-old connection between Christianity and West European civilization had come to an end. In this respect one may proclaim the emergence of a post-Christian Europe.²

Globalization brought increasing connectedness between places. Trans-societal migration led to the emergence of Diasporas, which in turn caused the de-territorialization of religious values from their traditional local contexts.³ As was once envisioned in the Torah, we now see a single humanity sharing one global space.

By de-territorialization, Diasporas have become centres of a global transformation of religion: religion undergoes change and somehow adapts to the Diaspora. Those who constitute the
Diaspora community serve as catalysts in transforming the old religions in their civilizational homes and societies of origin. World religions now become “Americanized” in the same way as American Judaism has transformed world Judaism. In the context of mutual encounters between Islam and Europe, academics speak of two scenarios: the “Europeanization of Islam” and the “Islamization of Europe”.4

Islam is currently undergoing a transformation, confronted as it is by globalization on the one side and modernity on the other. Modernity is clearly visible in how a religious movement copes with surfing the wave of individualism. Migrants, who are sometimes forced to cope with the anonymity of metropolises, tend to prefer smaller religious groups,5 which enforce the tendency to prioritize religious identity over other chosen identities,6 and resemble migrants’ predominantly rural backgrounds in providing mutual social and emotional support.7

European legal systems guarantee the fundamental human right of religious freedom. Religious freedom in Europe implies the right to conversion and the freedom to proselytize. This has led to the emergence of pluralistic religious markets, with competing religious actors offering their salvation goods.8 Missionary activities are of the essence for new religious movements (NRMs), which are ideally adapted to the challenges of globalization. They usually take the form of small religious units.9 NRMs are often mistrusted by the public as they appear to threaten secularism.10 The differentiae specificae of NRMs are that i) membership is not predetermined by family background, ii) converts are recruited from a specific social sphere, mostly the new middle class, iii) a charismatic leader (in Urdu: amīr, negrān ) regulates all aspects of life (marriage, eating and sleeping habits, clothing and hair - especially beard - style), iv) the markers of belonging are clearly visible, and v) the organizational structures are characterized by a certain fluidity. NRMs have a high turnover rate, with people joining for a short time and then deciding for one reason or another to drop out. Members of NRMs, who are mostly young and relatively highly educated, are generally harmless, and should probably be left to practise their religion in peace. Membership usually consists of first-generation converts, called reverts or born-agains, who tend to be exceptionally enthusiastic, even zealous. In the Diaspora converts are mostly second-generation migrants who are disillusioned with the society that excluded them, mostly unemployed and as yet unmarried.11 This supplies NRMs with a steady flow of inexperienced but healthy members who are unencumbered by responsibilities. Their conversion is often a result of a long process in which a traditional heritage has lost its meaning. Shortly prior to
conversion, born-agains often experience a crisis or major transition in their lives. As they have also often suffered from social disintegration, sometimes even alienation, the functional social network in the NRM is a highly significant factor explaining the attraction of the movement. Charismatic groups are highly cohesive. As with other small groups of highly religious young men, the network is held together by a strong in-group love and not out-group hate. Indeed, social bonds and mutual social and emotional support are the crucial elements in the development of a common identity. In an atmosphere of unconditional acceptance and support, NRMs reward conformity and implicitly punish alienation. At the same time NRMs are generally disruptive at the family level and occasionally at the social level. As a rule, they reject prevailing religious beliefs. A common characteristic of strongly held belief systems is that they are relatively simple and straightforward – they tend to be painted in primary colours, without the messy grey areas that older religions have acquired. NRMs have charismatic leaders and preach sharp boundaries. Their identity markers are mostly simple, and they use plenty of them. The activities of the members are monitored closely by a designated observer or “caretaker” (negrān in Urdu). Besides social support and relief from personal anxiety, members experience the benefits of travel opportunities and health-promoting behaviours (strict prohibition of drugs, alcohol and sexual promiscuity).

Another characteristic is the relatively highly homogeneous age, geographical roots and place of recruitment. The new forms of religiosity are communitarian, exclusive in the sense that a clear line divides the saved from the damned, and inclusive in the sense that all aspects of life come under the aegis of religion. They are individualistic, very mobile, weakly institutionalized and anti-intellectual.

Many of the NRMs originated in India, with Hare Krishna and Osho being the most famous, also many other new Islamic movements emerged in South Asia.

In South Asian Islam two major schools of thought can be distinguished (apart from several minor ones). On the one hand is the reformist Deobandī School, based on a seminary founded 1867 in Deoband, which represents a “purified” version of Islam in the tradition of the founder generation of the religion (as-salaf). In 1926 this tradition gave birth to the missionary movement, Tablīghī Jamāʿat. On the other hand is the Barelwī School, a reformist counter-reformist movement, close to folk Islam and Sūfism, which emanated from Bareilly, a city not far from Deoband. This school of thought introduced the Islamic Mission, Daʿwat-e Islāmī (www.dawateislami.net), in 1981. In 1991 the Indian sub-branch of the Daʿwat-e Islāmī broke away to form its own transnational movement, called Sunni Daʿwat-e Islāmī.
The Dèobandī and Barelwī schools of thought and their respective missionary movements are opposed to each other. In a competitive race for numbers they compete for impact and political power. Although they appear at first glance to have different backgrounds (Salāfī/Wahhābī in the case of Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Sūfī in the case of the Daʿwat-e Islāmīs), both movements are reformist in the sense that they require their followers to be personally responsible for their own salvation. They stress the literal imitation of the life of the Prophet in all aspects of the daily routine, an Islamic project for which I suggest the term “Sunnaization” as this process of Islamization draws its arguments from specific commentaries on selected hadīth and focuses on the private sphere rather than the political. Despite their extremely militant judgement of contemporary societies and individuals, they are overwhelmingly non-violent movements for the repropagation of Islam, and, along with the takfīr and hijra groups, they constitute peaceful extremist movements in the taxonomy of Islamist movements (Al-Ahram Center 2007). Employing peer pressure, they impose a strict dress code on their adherents and are organized in extremely mobile small units of lay preachers (jamāʿat, madanī qafila, qafila), who invite for weekly and annual ijtimaʿs, congregations. The structure, organization and approach of the movements are similar. But what is the really novel aspect of the new religiosity is its increasing visibility.

Recent years have witnessed a growing number of young men on the streets, in the mosques and at the airports of Europe, all wearing the shalwār-qamīz, which is the traditional dress of Muslims in South Asia. The majority wear turbans (ʿimāma-sharīf), which are either white (Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Sunni Daʿwat-e Islāmī) or green (Daʿwat-e Islāmī). For the most part these young men travel in groups of between five and ten, visiting Muslims in their homes to invite them to the mosque (naikī kī daʿwat – invitation to the good), where they themselves eat and sleep on their journeys. The notion of organized lay preachers in the footsteps of the Prophet is a quite new phenomenon in Europe and North America. Since cultural wars have become intra-civilizational in response to Western modernity, the activities of both groups aim at the “inner mission”, bringing Muslims back to the “real” Islam and saving them from Western lifestyles.

From Radicalization to Spirituality

In classical Islam daʿwa-proselytization and hijra-Islamization go hand in hand with Jihad. In his work The True Emigrant, Ibn Taimiyya (1263-1328) cites the following hadīth: „,The emigrant (muhājir) is the one who flees that which God has prohibited. The warrior (mujāhid)
is the one who fights against himself for the sake of God.” To flee what God has prohibited is obligatory: Who believes, emigrates (hajara) and fights. The Prophet spread Islam from the hijra stronghold through da’wa and Jihad. Within the framework of this historical Islam religious leaders have constructed a universal hijra doctrine prescribing migration to the non-Islamic world in an effort to proselytize for Islam. Before non-Muslims could be attacked, they had to reject the call (da´wa) to embrace Islam. The religious doctrine of hijra, which implies a movement towards Madīna, that is a step into the Medinensean society, obliges migrants who share common spiritual values to depart together, isolate themselves from the milieu they come from, and settle elsewhere in order to proselytize. From this framework the concepts developed of the different missionary journeys of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat (for example, gasht as the biweekly preaching patrol in the neighbourhood, khurūj as a monthly foray to a nearby city, chillā as an annual journey to Pakistan or elsewhere) and the Da´wat-e Islāmī (weekly, monthly, or annual madanī qafila). Besides this “nostalgia” for Madīna the call to go on missions (al-khurūj fī sabīl illah) combines elements of pilgrimage, active sport tourism, and serious leisure and connects them to Sunna.

Tablīghī networks have become vulnerable to exploitation by various militant groups. A couple of Europe’s genuine and potential Jihadīs have been active in pietist movements. Some of the perpetrators of the bombings on 11 March 2004 in Madrid or 7 July 2005 in London, or prominent terrorists like the “American Taliban” John Walker Lindh were reported to have participated in Tablīghī activities. In India the Tablīghī scholar Sufyān Patangia was accused to have headed a terror cell, which allegedly killed former Gujarat Home Minister Haren Pandya; and two of the prime suspects for torching the Sabarmati Express, a train carrying Hindu pilgrims from Ayodhya, in February 2002, killing 58, had links to Tablīghī Jamāʿat institutions. Some observers (Howard et. al. 2006, Tarrés/Jordán 2007, Alexiev 2005) claim that these missionary movements radicalize young Muslims, who are subsequently sent to Pakistan on a missionary journey and probably make contact there with other, more militant groups, among them the Dēoband-affiliated Harakāt al-Mujahedin. Whether these missionary movements play an active political role or are used by militant members remains a matter for debate. Numerous Islamist groups attack the missionaries for their apolitical attitude, arguing that they have a calming effect on Muslims and divert them from Islamization. As a result both groups, Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Da´wat-e Islāmī, were tolerated and even supported by a number of governments in South Asia and other Muslim countries as they hoped to use them for countering militant groups.
meantime it seems that post-Islamist, conservative neo-fundamentalism, aimed primarily at Islamizing society from the bottom up via *da’wa*, has replaced Salafi Jihadism, whose goal was to Islamize society by seizing state power.\(^{31}\)

Islamization policy also made special use of *da’wa* as a tool for universalizing different Islamic identities and integrating them into common political action. Especially in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the growing impact of the Islamization policy lobby in government agencies is evident. Hence there is an increasing contradiction between the self-proclaimed apolitical character of these missionary movements and their transformation in modernity, which has loaded them with political impact and meaning.

![World-headquarters of the Tablighi Jama’at (left) at the Nizamuddin-shrine (right) in New Delhi, copyright: Thomas K. Gugler](image)

**Converting via Community**

With an estimated twelve million to fifteen million adherents, the *Tablīghī Jamāʿat*, with its world headquarters at the Nizāmuddīn shrine in New Delhi, is among the largest of the transnational Islamic movements. Its founder, the charismatic Dēobandī-trained *ʿālim* Muhammad Ilyās (1885-1944), attempted to turn members of Muslim tribes into lay preachers in order to make the transmission of religious knowledge an effective means to counter Hindu missionaries. The formation of the *Tablīghī Jamāʿat* in 1926 was a reaction against the *Shuddī* campaign in the early 1920s. This was a missionary campaign of the Ārya Samāj, a Hindu group founded in 1875, which tried to convert Indian Muslims, whom it portrayed as Hindu
victims of forced conversion to Islam. The Muslim lay preachers were sent to nearby villages to discuss and spread Islam and to deepen their own appreciation of their faith. The system basically works through a snowball effect: anyone who listens to a sermon and learns about Islam is requested to join a group (jamāʿat), to travel, to spread some knowledge about the basics of Islam and to call on new adherents to volunteer for missionary tours (tashkīl). Rewards in heaven (sawab) are promised for these efforts. Muhammad Ilyās developed a six-point (che bātein) programme which still serves as the principal guideline for all lay preachers: i) to understand the meaning of the kalima, ii) to perform correct and regular prayers (salāt), iii) to acquire religious knowledge (ʿilm) and actively remember God (zikr), iv) to respect all Muslims (ikrām), v) to purify one’s thoughts and intentions (niyyat), and vi) to be prepared to preach and invest time in the propagation of religion (nafr).

The lay preachers stay at the mosques and visit Muslim families in the neighbourhood inviting them to join in prayer. After the prayer one of the preachers delivers an inspirational religious talk (bayān), explaining the ideas and rules of the movement. They then urge people to register for a missionary journey (tashkīl). A basic preaching trip lasts three days. Longer missionary tours can last four weeks (chillā), four months (grand chillā) or a whole year. The annual congregations in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh draw between one million and two million people each, and are among the largest congregations in the Muslim world. Religious teaching focuses on a collection of hadīth, known as “Fazāʿil-e Aʾmāl” (Urdu: Virtuous Deeds), written by the nephew of the movement’s founder, Muhammad Zakariyā (1898-1982).
Rediscovering Roots

The Tablīghī Jamā’at began to expand globally in the late 1960s. In Europe the missionaries are particularly active in the UK. The European headquarters of the Tablīghī Jamā’at were established in 1978 in Dewsbury, and have included a Dēobandī seminary since 1981, which is attended by about 300 boys from all over Europe. The Tablīghīs maintain connections with about two dozen Dēobandī seminaries in Britain (for example, in Bury Holcombe since 1975). As early as 1969, Tablīghīs set up their own centre in France (l’Association Culturel Islamique). The example of France is important since the Tablīghī Jamā’at was obliged to overcome its focus on South Asian immigrants. From France, where Arab youth is the chief supporter of the movement, Tablīghī activities spread to North Africa. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia Tablīghī Jamā’at has seen an enormous increase in support during the last 10-15 years. Tablīghī Jamā’at has since spread from there to Spain, setting up the first markaz, the Masjid Tariq Bin Ziyād, in Barcelona in 1981 (Tarrés/Jordán 2007), being registered since 1992 at the Entidades Religiosas del Ministerio de Justicia under the name Asociación Annur. The example of Barcelona is quite interesting as Tablīghī Jamā’at shifted its Barcelona markaz in 1985 to the very same house in which the Communist opposition gathered against the Franco regime. At the Friday prayers, in which I participated during my fieldwork in Barcelona in November 2007, around 1,100 Muslims, mostly Arabs from Morocco and Algeria, recite namāz at the Tariq Bin Ziyād mosque, which is the biggest mosque in Barcelona. Barcelona is an important case in point, as many illegal immigrants from Pakistan enter Europe there, coming via Iran, Turkey, and Greece, where they are packed in containers and shipped to the port of Barcelona. Newspapers linked the Tariq Bin Ziyād mosque with planned bomb attacks on the Barcelona metro system in June 2007 and January 2008. The suspects, who were arrested in January 2008 on suspicion of planning suicide attacks in Spain and Germany, were described as Tablīghī activists. In 1975 the Tablīghī Jamā’at established itself in Belgium. In Israel/Palestine the movement owns seven marakaz. As yet it does not have its own centre in Germany. Germany’s estimated 500-full time members are organized in seven city circles, which are centred on mosques owned by other institutions. About 800 adherents congregated in the annual ijtemā’ during May 2006 in Berlin (An-Nūr mosque). Following disappointment with the Tablīghī work in Germany, the world shūrā from India decided that the Indian leadership will intensify its visits to Germany, and the inner-German congregation (mashwarā) has to take place every two months (instead of every four months as in 2005) to discuss the results of missionary activities.
Although the movement’s founder Ilyās had multiple Sūfī affiliations - Chistiyya, Suhrawardiya, Qādiriyya, and Naqshbandiya, into which Ilyās was initiated by Rashīd Ahmad Gangohī (1829-1905), one of the founders of the seminary of Dēoband; his main affiliation was the Sābiriyya-Chistiyya sub-order - and although their faith bureaucracy relies heavily on the Sūfī heritage, Tablīghīs preach a purified Islahī-Islam. They reject “later” rituals, in particular Sūfī practices, which they condemn as reflecting Hindu influence.

Reliving Madīna

The most important movement among their critics is the rival group Da´wat-e Islāmī. Their world headquarters is the Faizān-e Madīna (Spiritual Benefit of Madīna) in Karachi. The movement is linked to the Barelwī school of thought. The latter emerged around 1900 in response to the puristic dār al-`ulūm (seminary) in Dēoband to defend traditional Islam, which in South Asia is greatly influenced by Sūfī-, saint- and shrine-culture. As saint-culture and shrine-culture are accepted by a majority of South Asian Muslims, the Barelwī school of thought calls itself Ahl as-Sunnat wal-Jamā’at. While the Da´wat-e Islāmī copies the structure and activities of Tablīghī Jamā’at, its members differ in appearance mainly by their green turban. The green colour of the turban is regarded as their trademark and has led to their popular label “jannat ke tūte”, parrots of paradise. The lay preachers of the Da´wat-e Islāmī are bound to the founder and amīr of the movement, Muhammad Ilyās Qādirī Attar (born 1950) by a bay’a, an oath of allegiance. As Madīna and Muhammad Mustafā hold key positions, “madani” prefixes or complements several auspicious terms (for example madani burqa, fiqr-e madīna) to constitute a corporate identity. This corporate identity is centred on the ideal Islamic society of Madīna, which is meant to be set up within the transnational Sūfī brotherhood. “Madīna” also serves as a salutatory address to any adherent. The six points of action of the Tablīghī Jamā’at (che baaten) are elaborated into 72 directives, the Madīna rewards (madani in´amat). Each adherent is requested to fill in a form, the madani card, listing up the 72 madani in´amat, every evening. The chief book of the Da´wat-e Islāmī, written by its founder and amīr, also revolves around ahadith. Resembling the main book of the Tablīghī Jamā’at, “Fazā’il-e A’māl”, it is entitled “Faizān-e Sunnat” (Urdū: Spiritual Benefit of the Sunna) and is published in the movement’s press Maktaba tul-Madīna. It is not yet translated, although it has been through three slightly different editions. As a Sūfī movement, its glorification of the prophet (na´t) is a central part of the preaching program. After dars, the lesson, read from Faizān-e Sunnat by any lay preacher, the highlight of the
weekly *ijtemā* is the *fiqr-e Madīna*, the visualization of the tortures in the hell fires at the Day of Judgement, which is a means of daily repenting. For this practice the lights in the mosque are turned off and everybody starts crying – or if necessary at least pretending to cry. Every individual repents his sins and calls loudly on the beloved Muhammad Mustafā to save him. Though I never actively participated, I recall that even observing this ritual in Karachi, Multan, Bangalore and Barcelona, was an extremely intense emotional experience for me. After the *bayān*, the lecture given by an Imām, people are informed about missionary journeys for which they can sign up. The basic missionary unit is referred to as *madāni qaṭila* (Madīna caravan) and its slogan after the *bayān* is: “*qaṭila me calo*” (Urdū: join the caravan – which is the title of Abdullah Azzam’s famous 1987 book). The Da’wat-e Islāmī, as an organization connected to the Qādiriyya silsila (line of tradition), is proud to be able to present Ibn Taimiyya as a Sūfī of the Qādiriyya order. Unlike the Tablīghī Jamā’at, the Da’wat-e Islāmī has its own chain of madrassas, with more than a thousand in Pakistan alone.

On the margins of the movement a militant group emerged called Sunni Tahrīk (http://sunniteitreek.com.pk), which was formed in 1992 by the Da’wat-e Islāmī district leader (*negrān*) Salim Qadri (murdered in 2001) with the main purpose of taking control of Dēobandī mosques. The movement was connected to the Barelwī organization Zia ul-Qur’ān, then headed by Justice Pir Muhammad Karam Shah Al-Azhari (1918-1998) (http://www.zia-ul-ummat.com, http://www.zia-ul-quran.com). His Qur’ān translation Jamal ul-Qur’ān is available online on the Da’wat-e Islāmī homepages *Faizān-e Madīna* (English) and *Nafs-e Islam* (Urdū). Sunni Tahrīk was established by Barelwī Muhājir youth, especially after Muhājir Qaumi Movement (MQM) activists were forced to join other movements to escape persecution by the secret service after the military Operation Clean-Up in Karachi in 1996. Sunni Tahrīk became infamous for the systematic killing of Dēobandī scholars, among them Binori Town chief Yusuf Ludhianvi (1932 – 18 May 2000), and Shī`as, for example on *īd-e Milād an-Nabī* in 2005, as they resent the Shī`a practice of lighting fires to commemorate
important religious events. The movement was banned for several months in 2001 after Sunni Tahrīk were reported to have killed the brother of the then Home Minister, Muin ud-din Haider. Prior to this no Barelwī organization engaged in organized sectarian violence. The leadership of Sunni Tahrīk was wiped out in a suicide attack at Nishtar Park, Karachi, during an Ḣīd-e Milād an-Nabī celebration on 11 April 2006. This attack on a Barelwī gathering was the biggest-ever sectarian blow in Pakistan, killing immediately following an “incident”, which the Da´wat-e Islāmī interprets as an attack, in the Da´wat-e Islāmī headquarters Faizān-e Madīna in Karachi on 9 April, killing 29.

This seems to be the end of Sunni Tahrīk.

The markaz of Da´wat-e Islāmī in Barcelona is called Faizān-e Madīna. It was established in April 2007 and is located just a two-minute walk away from the Tablīghī mosque in El Raval, copyright: Thomas K. Gugler.

The Da´wat-e Islāmī has been in existence in the UK for no more than 15 years. The European headquarters is the Faizān-e Madīna in Bradford, where they currently establish its own seminary. Other centres of the same name can be found in Accrington and Birmingham. In Continental Europe the Da´wat-e Islāmī currently operates five centres (marakaz) in Greece and three in Spain. The Faizān-e Madīna in Barcelona was set up in April 2007, inaugurated during Ḣīd-e Milād an-Nabī by the Bradford-based negrān for Europe. In the following months the Barcelona Faizān-e Madīna opened subsidiaries in Valencia and Malaga, and took over another Barelwī mosque, the Centro De Cultura Jāmē Masjīd Ghulamāne Mustafā Catalunya (cultural centre “Congregational Mosque of the Lovers of Mustafa”) in Besos, a suburb of Barcelona.
In 1991 the negrān of the Indian branch of Da’wat-e Islāmī, Muhammad Shākir ʿĀlī Nūrī, split off to form the independent movement Sunni Da’wat-e Islāmī, which has its world headquarters in Mumbai. His commentary on selected ahadīth “Faizān-e Sharīʿat” is meanwhile officially named “Barakāt-e Sharīʿat” (Urdu: Blessings of the shariʿa), which the press of the Sunni Da’wat-e Islāmī, Maktaba-e Taiba, has partly published in English under the same title. The doctrinal affiliation of this movement is also Barelwī. The highlight of the weekly ijtemāʾ is the zikr-e Madīna, the call to the Beloved Prophet to save one from the tortures of hells. Besides the weekly ijtemāʾ on Saturdays at their headquarters, the Ismāʿīl Habīb Masjid in Mumbai, the movement has its European headquarters, Noor Hall, in Preston, UK, where adherents gather for an annual ijtemāʾ in May. Sunni Da’wat-e Islāmī organizes regular youth camps in Manchester at the North Manchester Jāmīa Mosque. Other centres are in Blackburn (Razā Masjid), Bolton (Madīna Masjid), and Leicester (ʿUsmānī Masjid).

Restoring “Islamic” Prominence

Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Da’wat-e Islāmī and Sunni Da’wat-e Islāmī stress the strict and literal imitation of the life of the Prophet; and although the approach of the three movements is anti-intellectual, their discourses have been extremely influential in shaping the Islamic religious fields in the modern world. They focus their teachings on their respective commentaries on a specific collection of ahadīth, namely, Fazāʾil-e Aʾmāl, Faizān-e Sunnat or Barakāt-e Sharīʿat. These “handbooks” teach how to Sunnaize the daily routine as well as the course of life and the individual markers of identity based on the example of the Prophet and the Salaf, the pious ancestors. They teach a very specific Islamic etiquette in drinking, eating, walking, greeting, sleeping, brushing teeth, combing the beard, etc; and I follow Roy (2005) in interpreting this as the privatization or individualization of traditional Islamic fundamentalism. It is apolitical in the sense that it focuses on the private sphere rather than the political. In this respect agents of fundamentalisms transformed by privatization are – as were Protestant movements in their time - paradoxically agents of secularization as they
individualize and thereby de-socialize religious observances (Roy 2007: 76). Furthermore, neo-fundamentalists draw their arguments from hadith or interpretations of comparable material, especially dreams in which the Prophet appeared, rather than from the Qur´ān – as did the Islamic fundamentalists. As they draw their arguments from a different fundament I find the term “neo-fundamentalism” problematic and probably misleading in the case of Islamic neo-fundamentalisms as I do the label “Islamization” for their “Islamic projects”. I would prefer to call their Islamic projects, that is, their virtual direction of change in society, “Sunnaization”, as it is a process that encourages people to establish the “Sunnas of the Prophet”, whereby every individual establishes deep ties to the Prophet in his personal spheres of daily life and thereby regulates his behaviour by either substituting norms of behaviour (for example, cutting instead of shaving a beard) or integrating additional essential parts into otherwise unchanged behaviour (for example, doing zikr - active remembrance of God by a specific auspicious mantra – while stepping aboard a bus with the right foot first). Sunnaization combines Sufi elements, as it connects all individual activities to the beloved Prophet Muhammad Mustafā, with Salafī elements, as it stresses the strict and literal imitation of the Salaf. And anybody talking to different kinds of fundamentalist will easily notice the completely different rationalities among the agents of either Islamization or Sunnaization. The killer argument of traditional Islamists is: “This is Islam”, “(…) we set as our criterion the book of God to which we all owe allegiance and to which we all turn, then we will be on agreed ground.” Meanwhile the lay preachers argue: “This is the Sunna of Our Beloved Prophet.” And this is why the movements focus on a virtual and translocal Madīna, the dar as-sunna (abode of sunna), instead of any state government. Yet these movements have an enormous political impact, which shines through in a statement in the British Barelwī magazine The Islamic Times (August 2006):

It is especially important to emphasise that the religious is the political when direct politics in so many Muslim countries has failed, or is very difficult due to nightmarish secret police persecution. (…) To change the World, all you have to do is to be religious.

Sunnaization has a special attraction for converts and Muslim youth, as it is a process in which anybody can autonomously generate symbolic capitals. Muslim youth and converts, who usually occupy an inferior role in the Islamic religious field, which is traditionally dominated by male elders, autonomously generate social, trust, and authenticity capital by visibly Sunnaizing their norms of behaviour and stage manage their imitation of the Salaf. In this respect Sunnaization is also a tool for social mobility, empowering those who traditionally are subordinated to Muslim male elders. Through Sunnaization anybody can
become a lay preacher and start to restructure the Islamic field in his neighbourhood, or, to use the metaphor of the pluralistic religious market economy:

(T)he commodity they are prompted to put on the market, promote and sell are themselves. They are, simultaneously, promoters of commodities and the commodities they promote (...) The test they need to pass in order to be admitted to the social prizes they covet demands them to recast themselves as commodities: that is, as products capable of catching the attention and attracting demand and customers. 

khurūj fī sabil illah

Islamic missionary movements in post-Christian Europe are often perceived as clashing with secularism. Tablīghī Jamāʿat and the Daʿwat-e Islāmīs generate broad visibility by occupying public spaces with their religious signs and symbols, which they use ostentatiously to construct and formulate their identity. Both groups have an obvious impact on how Islam is practised in their neighbourhood. This may contribute to the impression among the public that both movements are associated with radical groups. Yet the inner logic of missionary groups and the way in which both movements operate are not helpful in the recruitment processes of Jihādi groups. Indeed peaceful fundamentalist Muslim groups may help to promote a conciliatory message and repudiate terrorist violence. Their help could be essential to efforts to neutralize terrorist networks since they “fish in the same waters” as militant groups. They attract the same clusters of socially alienated and inexperienced young men, whose lack of responsibilities is combined with a love of adventure and a burning desire to save the world. The lay preachers provide them with a rather dichotomous world view, but a peaceful alternative. Having entered the mainstream of the new and transnational Islamization transformed through modernity, which more accurately should be named Sunnaization, the two movements attract opportunists, who join to operate under cover and escape police persecution. Although the movements have long followed the policy of not asking where their adherents come from (since everyone is supposed to repent, revert and be integrated), their professional and extremely bureaucratic organizational structure has in the last five years developed strict and bureaucratic procedures for checking the identity of potential members and limiting the infiltration of militant elements by other movements. This perspective reveals the overlap of different milieus – political, militant, social, cultural, and spiritual. Militant Jihādis now tend to look up to the missionaries and see daʿwa as the spiritual Jihad, the greater Jihad. Missionaries say the time for the smaller, militant Jihad has not yet come: people first have to reform and be educated in real Islam.
Western observers find it irritating that both movements are organized differently from Western institutions. It is almost impossible to find a written agenda, membership lists or fees, or a transparent management or institutional ownership structure. Although their organization is bureaucratic, they remain pietist movements that revolve around specific members and operate via informal, flexible and mutual face-to-face contacts. Although these movements spread Salafī symbols and values, they are organized as a Sūfī movement, i.e. there is no fixed membership and frequently a lack of clear-cut boundaries. Members enter the milieu of the missionary groups and leave it again. Muslim businessmen, students and traders are often merely seeking a spiritual break from the Western lifestyles. Migrants, who may lack language skills and are trapped in a village or a certain neighbourhood, discover a new mobility in these movements. It is difficult for the Western public sphere to begin dialogue with these movements: neither participates in public dialogue projects, and there is no official representative to act as a contact for journalists or politicians. Hence, the leaders of the movements remain behind the activism of lay preachers. Their property and institutions are mostly in private hands. In European countries, their schools are trust-owned, so that the movements themselves do not become legal persons.

As a rule modern societies become increasingly diverse and religiously pluralistic. Capitalist transformation of traditional communities and the global circulation of ideas by new media and the information technology have led to a situation in which people have had to find new modes of coexistence. As modernity comes with growing pressure to draw boundaries and formulate identities, globalization also brings a new ambiguity into Islamic interpretations, enabling them to integrate different Islamic identities. Just as Western societies were obliged to open up to the counter-milieu of the Green movement, they will now have to recognize and integrate new Islamic movements, be they pietist, post-Wahhābī, Sūfī-Islamist or neo-fundamentalist.
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3 Tibi, Bassam, 2006: Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: political democracy vs. cultural difference. In: Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (Eds.): Religion in an Expanding Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 204-224.


12 Bakker, Edwin, 2006: Jihadi terrorists in Europe - their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihadi: an exploratory study. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.


56 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\%04\%10\story_10-4-2006_pg1_1 (Jan. 2008). In an interview in November 2006 Ilyas Attar told me, that some of his female adherents had seen male hands of “dushman-e Islām” coming out from a burqa, pushing children to fall on the steps.
57 Interviews with the care-takers of that unofficial prayer site during my fieldwork in Barcelona in November 2007.