Living Islam in Europe: Muslim Traditions in European Contexts

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Reader
Section One:  
Islamic Actors and Institutions in Europe  

Panel 1: Islamic Mission  

Public Piety among European Diversity: The Tablighi Jamaat between Traditionalism and Transformation  
Dietrich Reetz (ZMO, Berlin)  

The paper argues on samples from field research in Britain, France, Spain and Germany that the missionary movement of the Tablighi Jamaat has successfully managed to carve out for itself a conservative space of public piety for Muslims in Europe. However contrary to conventional expectations and previous country studies the Tablighi missionary movement is far from uniform and homogeneous in its appearance and practice. It is no longer limited to Muslims hailing from South Asia where the movement was borne nor can it be solely understood as a diaspora or migration phenomenon. Its social and cultural parameters vary substantially not only between European countries but also between the regions of one country. Thereby it has proven its high adaptability which has not prevented it from confirming its doctrinal consistency. At the same time its social practice produced distinctly European and Western features responding to the legalistic, pluralistic and secular environment of local societies.  

Marketing Muhammad and Madinah: Competing Sunnah-brands on Post-Modern Islamic Identity Markets  
Thomas K. Gugler (ZMO, Berlin)  

The new Islamic presence in Europe, which is the consequence of a massive and voluntary settlement of millions of Muslims in Western societies, owes its visibility partly to the Muslim missionary movements from South Asia, which have proven specific strengths in shaping the Islamic-religious fields in the Diaspora communities in European countries.  
The paper tries to compare and analyze the production and marketing of symbolic Sunnah-systems, image- and behaviour-systems of an ideal Muslim so to say, on an increasingly pluralistic religious market applying the metaphor of Religious Economics. Freedom of religion has led to the emergence of increasingly deregulated religious markets, with competing actors offering their salvation goods in order to increase their market shares. Challenged by and coping with modernity and globalization, world religions have undergone a dramatic transformation during recent decades with consumers’ preferences of new religious goods and services shaping the religious change. Once a religious market is open to competition, more exclusivist and demanding groups create new religious products and practices, advertising their new way of life through semantics, which heavily rely on the cultural codes of individualism, experience, consumerism, and pragmatism. Under the condition of increasing consumer-autonomy religious actors cultivate corporate identity, establish brand names, by making the specific qualities of their salvation goods visible in public spaces. In a competitive race for numbers these religious actors compete for impact and recognition, marketing Muhammad and Madinah.
The Ahmadiya in Germany

Andrea Lathan (University of Halle)

Although missionary work plays a decisive role in the faith of the Ahmadiyya, both movements – the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at (AMJ) and the Ahmadiyya Anjuman-e Isha'at-e Islam Lahore (AAIIL) - which came into being after the split in 1914 have developed quite different strategies to implement their tabligh throughout the world. Depending on the socio-religious, political and economical setting of the respective society as well as their financial resources both groups draw on a variety of appropriate methods. The rejection the two folds have to face in some Islamic societies does not only set limits to the implementation of their tabligh-work, but even restrains them from acting as Muslims in the public sphere.

In consideration of the pan-topic of our project as well as the main emphasis of my own research I will focus on the missionary work of both Ahmadiyya-groups in Germany. After a short outline of the various missionary strategies developed by the AMJ as well as the AAIIL during the last century this paper will discuss presumed differences between both folds regarding their interpretation of tabligh, and related to this, its implementation. Due to their unusual complex structure and organisation, significant tabligh-institutions initiated by the AMJ are to be analyzed hereafter. On the other hand, the duty of every single member of the AMJ to act as a muballigh in his social environment shall not be left out. Finally the reaction of the German society by means of statements and initiatives of particular actors such as media, political parties, other religious groups and “locals” faced with establishment of mosques as a part of the missionary urge of the movement will be revealed. Complementary to the last aspect, motivations of German converts shall be mentioned in the context of the correlation of the secularization of societies and the revitalization of religion.

‘Taking Islam to the People’: Young Muslims UK, British Muslim - Youth and the ‘Islamization of Space’

Hamid Sadek (University of Chester)

Attempting to understand the present naturally requires a familiarity with the past. Contemporary Muslim activism in Britain cannot be understood without reference to religious trends and organizations that provided a context to current discussions around assertive Muslim identities and their engagement with the public sphere. Islamic youth movements in the 1990s were at the forefront of the efforts to promote religious revival among second generation British Muslim communities. Organisations such as Young Muslims UK, Hizbut Tahrir and JIMAS and vied with each other for the ‘hearts and minds’ of British Muslim young people, sometimes managing to achieve the ‘Islamisation of space’ through religious reform work. These organizations functioned as spaces for creating alternative ‘moral communities’ and were modeled on religious movements rooted in the Middle East or Indian sub-continent. This paper would outline the history and evolution of the Islamist British Muslim youth movement- the Young Muslims UK and discuss the factors that helped shape its impact on increasing youth religious practice. The Young Muslims UK movement’s mobilization strategies were for sometime able to set the agenda for Islamic mission and education of Muslim youth in Britain. However like other rival Islamic groups, it went through cycles of growth and fragmentation arising out of the pressure of competing claims of rival groups as well as the impact of international events and shifting religious discourses. Using original fieldwork data, the paper would also assess this groups recruitment strategies, explore internal dynamics and analyse the evolution post-Islamist rhetoric forced upon
it by socio-political change in light of debates around radicalisation, integration, citizenship, and the future of Islam in Britain.

‘Da’wa (the Call to Islam) in Contemporary European Islamic Thought’
Nina Wiedl (Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheva)

Da’wa means ‘invitation’ or ‘call to Islam’. It is often translated as ‘Islamic Mission’, although at least in theory it is slightly different in its aims and methods, at least from the Christian comprehension of mission. Many Islamic thinkers strongly emphasize this difference. Da’wa is a concept which is based, in part, on the Qur’anic Sūrat an-Nahl (16), verse 125: “Invite to the ways of your Lord with wisdom (ḥikma) and beautiful preaching and argue with them [non-Muslims] in ways that are best”. In modern times this verse and the following ones became one of the most cited Qur’anic descriptions for da’wa as: “Sūra 16:125 and the verses that follow put the gentlest face on the whole idea of da’wa”.

As many scholars describe that Muslims in Europe develop today “From Sojourners to Citizens”, there is a need to analyze if da’wa – a Qur’anic prescribed obligation for Muslims - is similarly developing towards a new form of ‘genuine European da’wa’. In this paper, I discuss the comprehension of da’wa in modern European Islamic thought, defend the thesis that a new form of genuine European da’wa already exists, and elaborate the main characteristics, ideological backgrounds, methods and aims of this new form of European da’wa in comparison to its roots, older da’wa-concepts as developed, for example, by Ḥasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949) for Egypt and the Middle East and by Abū’l A‘la al-Mawdūdī (1903-1979) for the area of British-India and later Pakistan.

I will concentrate on a discourse-analysis of the publications of the most important and most widely known Islamic thinkers in Europe regarding a new concept for da’wa: Khurram Murad (1932-1996), former leading member of al-Mawdūdī’s party, Jamā’at-i Islāmī and former president of the Islamic Foundation in Leicester; Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (*1926 in Egypt), the spiritual leader and prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who founded and presides several Islamic institutions in Europe and Tariq Ramadan (*1962), a native European, professor of Islamic Studies and grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949), who may be regarded as the main developer of a modern concept of European da’wa.

Although most Islamic thinkers agree that according to the classical Islamic principle of tartīb al-da’wa (the order of priorities in the spread of da’wa) in combination with modern strategies for the protection of Muslims in Europe against assimilation, da’wa to Muslims has priority over da’wa to non-Muslims, European Islamic thinkers and leaders of Islamic organisations in Europe recognized the importance of winning native converts in order to spread Islam in Europe. Especially in the writings of Qaraḍāwī, da’wa is also recommended as a means to win supporters among European decision-makers for the religious-political struggle of Islamic movements inside Islamic societies in Asia and Africa. Therefore Islamic thinkers developed new strategies, a new language and new methods for reaching out to the new target group of European non-Muslims, which will be examined in this paper. In the course of these developments and as a support of them, a new form of European Islam was developed, which considerably differs from older concepts. The ‘fiqh al-aqa lliyyat’ (Islamic jurisprudence for Muslim minorities), propagated especially by Qaraḍāwī; the new concept of dār al-shahāda (area of witnessing [Islam] for Europe), propagated, for example, by Tariq Ramadan and the call to refrain from addressing non-Muslims as ‘kuffār’ (unbelievers) are only a few of the elements relevant for this new development, which I will discuss in my paper.
Panel 2: Islamic Education

**Religious Authority at Islamic Institutions of Higher Education in Western Europe**

*Firdaous Oueslati (ISIM, Leiden)*

Islamic institutions of higher education are a relatively recent phenomenon in Western Europe. We have witnessed the emergence of these institutions from the nineties of last century onwards. Debates in and at these institutions are intense and focus on the following two questions: ‘What precisely is required to be a ‘good’ Muslim in general, and in Western Europe in particular?’ and ‘Who exactly is authorised to provide the outline for this purpose?’ Since Islamic education is characterised by a plurality of actors, institutions and ideas, answers to this question differ from institution to institution, from person to person and from country to country.

This paper aims to explore the way in which two institutions – the IESH (Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines) in Paris and the MIHE (Markfield Institute of Higher Education) in Markfield (UK) – provide an answer to these important questions. To be able to provide an answer to the main questions, we will also take a look at the following issues: the way in which the institutions (re)produce or construct Islamic knowledge, the role they assign to themselves in European societies, and the different ways in which they try to legitimize their claims to religious authority. At the same time this study takes into consideration the context the two different countries provide as a framework for these institutions to function within.

The relevance for the study of these institutions is obvious, since their graduates become individuals knowledgeable in their religious tradition holding intermediary positions relating religious communities to the rest of society. They might become imams and preachers in mosques, hospital chaplains and teachers of religion or government officials.

**Reflections on Muslim Extracurricular Religious Education in Germany**

*Jeannette Spenlen (Frankfurt)*

The perception of Islamic religious education in Germany is very complex. Since the 70ties it is feared that imams in Mosques lack the qualification to instruct properly and suitable to living conditions in Germany. A recent description of mosque education gives an insight into traditional teaching methods and contents. One of the main duties of imams is the teaching of religious duties and norms as Melanie KAMP found out. Moreover, since the 80ties the mosques in Germany opened their doors for female religious instruction and more women are becoming teachers and religious experts. My interest is to observe if and how religious education and the transmission of religious knowledge within in the family and within mosque organisations/Islamic centres implies reflections on traditional norms especially concerning gender. As Muslims in Germany experience not only German lifestyles but also variations of Islamic lifestyles and behaviours caused by religious interaction and exchange this may open the door for variations of Islamic religious knowledge. Moreover as self instruction through the media makes it easy to obtain 'ilm- religious knowledge. I explored interpretations and interpreters of religious knowledge on the micro – level: How do pious Muslim parents in Germany attain religious knowledge: From their families, in mosques, in study groups or from the media? Which Islamic norms and values did they learn and which values do they transmit to their children? Which positions do female teachers have in local mosques/ Islamic centres and what do they teach? Is religious knowledge related to the living situation in Germany? Are traditional
roles of women and men, girls and boys reflected and discussed due to obvious variations of Muslim traditions in Germany?

„Religious tradition is always in motion“ as PYE put it and this is specially true in the process of migration. The experience of a plurality of worldviews and a plurality of Islamic interpretations encourages new interpretations of religious education. I address these issues by drawing on the results of a field research in the Rhine area in 2008. The Islamic field in the Rhine area is marked by different Islamic organisations, languages and ethnic groups. Muslims with Turkish roots are the majority, Muslims with roots from Arab countries build also Islamic groups. New Islamic centres for religious instruction were opened recently which avoid the traditional language and ethnic affiliations. Moreover, since 2004 the network “The Lifemakers”, based on the teachings of the Egyptian Intellectual Amr Khaled, meets in Bonn and Leverkusen and offers new interpretations of Islam. These centres offer religious knowledge in order to shape an Islamic identity in the German Diaspora.

Interviews showed that parents connected to Islamic groups and teachers at Islamic centres regard religious instruction as essential even at a young age. Apart from an overall positive view towards religious instruction in the family a lot of parents believe that children can learn religious practice at the mosque organisation as this enables the children of being part of the umma. However, young children should not be forced to recite Koranic verses nor should they be forced to pray. Parents and teachers regard themselves as examples and roles models for the children trying to instruct appropriate for children. Living as a minority in Germany Muslim parents and teachers distinguish between “cultural traditions” and “Islamic norms”. They reflect the traditions and behaviour they learned from their parents and imans and transmit new aspects. Notably, gender norms are often reflected and a central point of negotiations. Parents and teachers are aware of their “difference” when they prefer a modest and religious lifestyle for their girls. Religious equality is another point of discussion. Whereas some Muslim communities accept female authority among women, other Muslim female communities have problems with listening to women reciting the Koran. The discussion of specific Islamic norms within the Muslim community shows the variety of interpretations of Islamic religious knowledge.

Islamic Schools in Europe: Religious Identity Formation and Democratic Citizenship

Inga Niehaus (University of Hamburg)

The existence of private Islamic schools in European countries has caused intense public debate and political controversies in the past few years. Critics argue that the schools make little integration efforts, are exclusive, lack modern educational standards and sometimes even promote Islamic fundamentalist ideologies. These accusations often overlook the diversity, the internal developments and discourses within Islamic school. Far from being an entity, Islamic schools in European countries differ considerably in size, structure, management, academic results as well as religious and pedagogical outlook. Private Islamic schools have mushroomed in European countries in the past two decades, with most of them being established in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

The paper investigates the institutionalisation, functioning and self-understanding of Islamic schools in Britain and the Netherlands in a comparative perspective. It intends to offer a critical assessment of the question whether Islamic schools promote processes of identity formation within a democratic society or whether they rather lead to disengagement from the wider society.
It explores the religious and educational discourses and practices within Islamic schools with special focus on the idea of ‘Islamisation of knowledge’ and the requirements to teach the national ‘secular’ curriculum which includes democratic citizenship.

**Teaching Islam and Interreligious Pedagogy and Didactics in Germany: A Comparison of Two Different Training Programmes for Adults**

*Melanie Kamp (ZMO, Berlin)*

In the middle of the 1990s a group of Muslim women established the Institut für interreligiöse Pädagogik und Didaktik (Institute for interreligious pedagogy and didactics) in order to develop a syllabus, textbooks and other teaching materials for religious instruction at public schools. In addition to this they created a pedagogical training course for Muslim students. Some years later in 2001 another institute, the Islamologische Institut (Institute of Islamology), started to offer Islamic studies courses. Both institutes developed in a similar context and have a similar target group: German speaking Muslims. However, they differ with regard to their background, as well as with regard to their aims, methods and contents of teaching. Based on the analysis of teaching materials and interviews with teachers and students of both institutes the paper investigates the background and development of the institutes, methods and contents of teaching and the motivation and aspirations of students to participate in these training programmes.
Pilgrimage to a Shrine: Recreation of a Sufi Lodge in the UK  
Mohammad Amer Morgahi (ISIM, Leiden)

The studies about institutional formation of Islam in Europe incline towards the reformist and Islamist groups than the popular Islam. Assumption is that the practices related with the popular Islam will disappear in diaspora context (Schiffauer, Geaves). The present paper challenges these suppositions through looking at the developments within the popular Islam and I will describe how the popular Islamic practices started marking places in their adopted homelands as centre of their devotional practices. I will do this through a study of the foundation of what could be called as the first sufi shrine in the UK near Coventry. It includes an analysis of an annual urs celebration of a sufi saint in Coventry UK. In presenting an account of the events at this shrine it was noted that through these events not only a recreation of a sufi tradition occurred, this recreation also involves introduction of novelties to the event in view of its celebration in a different social and geographical localities. One finds an eclectic mix of sufi rituals derived from different Sufi tariqa or orders thus marking shifts in the ritual practices of the urs: while the holders of the shrine follow a naqshbandi Sufi order, the actual celebration of the event exhibited a mix of Sufi and popular Islamic practices. Thus the event celebrated an inclusive religious and cultural patterns often associated with the saintly lodges.

The buried ‘sheikh’ in the tomb was not a descended or a khalifa or representative of any saintly order from Pakistan, but a ‘religious scholar’ turned a ‘spiritual saint’ (Werbner 2002) due to the social conditions in diaspora. Thus the paper will not only look at this process of charismatic transformations in diaspora but it will also make a note of religious expectations of followers, many of them came form Netherlands and Denmark, that underlie such transformations. Moreover it was observed that these spiritual orders differently appeal to youth followers and converts: more intellectual than spiritual. These transformations hint at the changes in patterns of religious authority in the context of diaspora.

Focusing on such issues this paper will show how more popular forms of South Asian Islam are recreated in a diaspora setting.

Forms and Elements of Islam in Europe: Muslim Women’s Groups and their Views on What an Islamic Marriage Should Be Like  
Nathal M. Dessing (University of Leiden)

In this paper, the conclusion of an Islamic marriage, i.e. a marriage in accordance with Islamic prescriptions as opposed to a civil marriage, will be used as an example of a Muslim tradition in a European context. It will be a starting point for a discussion of how Muslims deal with religious authority and what it means for the conceptualization of Islam in Europe. The paper raises questions about the interpretation of the religious sources and the application of it in daily life, and reflects upon internal discussions among Muslims on what it means to be a good Muslim.

First, I will show that the attitude of Muslim actors towards ijtihad or effort to understand the religious sources is much more ambivalent than often suggested. Whereas most of my interlocutors argued that ijtihad should be exercised only by a small group of specialists, in practice they extended the right to perform ijtihad much more widely. Daily life necessitates the believer to take decisions about proper Islamic behaviour for her- or himself all the time, i.e. without seeking the advice of religious
scholars. My second claim is related to the first. I will argue that even though the
meetings of Muslim women groups might offer religious inspiration and present women
with particular ideals, religious practice as such, be it devotional practices, good
manners or body styles, is regarded as an individual rather than a communal affair:
This paper fits within the third panel on “Islamic practice of organized Muslims” in the
the first section entitled “Islamic actors and institutions in Europe”.
This paper is based on current research among Muslim women’s groups in the
Netherlands and fits within a larger research programme on “Individualization,
Fragmentation of Authority, and New Organizational Forms among Muslims in
Europe”. This programme, funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO), consists of three projects investigating the interplay of the individual,
participation, and authority in three settings: institutions of Islamic higher education,
Muslim student associations, and Muslim women’s organizations.

The Reification of Ethnic Ties in an “Arab” Mosque and in Civil Society
Susanne Kröhnert-Othman (University of Bielefeld, Germany)

This paper will look into the transformation of tradition and reification of ethnicity as I
could observe it during field research in an Arab mosque community of the Western
German Ruhr Area¹. Against this background I will then suggest some generalising
arguments about the effects of boundary making in German secularised civil society and in
such small religious organisations on options of transforming the realm of tradition.
To my understanding religious tradition - if perceived as embedded in organisation - is not
only a chain of common memory within a group of people and a certain type of rooting
individual life-conduct in a transcendental frame of meaning but a matter of social ties that
bind individual believers towards others in (non-chosen) relations (Tilly 2005). The realm
of tradition according to my field observations at the mosque community may best be
characterised by the following features: family ties and competition between co-ethnics and
families of a similar history of labour migration, a strong rule of honour and shame framed
as Muslim and collectively reproduced by mutual observation at the mosque and in
neighbourhoods, a multi-polar and gendered distribution of power governed by the elderly
founding members, and an open door policy towards all Muslims that does not question
individual religious convictions.
These features of the realm of tradition are today challenged by demands for transformation
from within and without the small mosque community. Inside the mosque there is a new
generation – heterogeneous in terms of ethnic, educational and economic background and in
terms of personal ties towards the community – which seems to have a strong interest in an
organisational reform that would allow the younger generation to better express their needs
as German Muslims. The new generation could well become the avant-garde or a new type
of Islam of a non-traditional but at the same time anti-modernist - “evangelical” - outlook. It
could be perceived as an important actor in a process of diversification of Islam in Europe
beyond ethnic ties. However this diversification is hampered by the current boundary
making in German civil society which most recently reproduces Islam as a political religion
by making individual life-styles and social ties of people of Muslim origin relevant for
situating them inside or outside civil society. Classification separates secular from liberal
and from fundamentalist individuals and organisations. In the public sphere Muslim actors
are asked to exhibit civil compatibility – a procedure that other groups of religiously
committed immigrants or native citizens are exempted from. Since Islam in Europe is
rooted in a history of ethno-national-political group activity it allows for the reconnecting of
presupposed belief systems towards specific segments of the Muslim Diaspora, enforces

¹ Research is supported as a Post-Doc project by the German Research Foundation since March 2006 and
includes simultaneous and comparative field research at the “Arab” Mosque introduced here and an
“African” Pentecostal Church in the same region.
merging ethnic and religious labelling and produces ambivalent outcomes. It results in competitive chances of upward and downward mobility for pre-labelled groups of young people of Muslim origin inside the German (European) immigrant society and thus restricts the potential of the younger generation of Muslims to recognise each other and cherish the rich diversity of local traditions within Islam. A policy approach towards recognition of Islam would have to enhance the disconnection of ethnic background and religious belonging. The recognition of “evangelical” Islam as one out of a multiplicity of options within Islam would pave the way for substantial freedom of choice in social relations (Sen 2007).

**Ethnically German and Muslim: Religious Conversion and the Formation of Indigenous Muslim Communities in Europe**

*Esra Özyürek (University of California)*

Today unprecedented numbers of ethnic Germans are converting to Islam. At a time when many European politicians and intellectuals depict so-called “Islamic” and “European” values as mutually exclusive and contradictory, every day dozens of ethnic Germans are demonstrating that one can be ethnically German and religiously Muslim at the same time. Furthermore, ethnic German Muslims gain leadership positions in nationwide Muslim associations and serve Muslims of all backgrounds in Islamic organizations. In my paper I seek to understand the social, cultural, and political consequences of this unexpected phenomenon for the imagination of the German identity on the one hand and the politics and practice of Islam in the new Germany on the other. More specifically I ask what happens when Germans become Muslims. How do born-Muslims and non-Muslims relate to this new group of converted Muslims? In what ways do converts contribute to Muslim life in Germany? Do they build what can be termed an “ethnic German Islam” that is different from “immigrant Islam”? If so, do new Muslims in Germany have the potential to contribute to the formation of a “German” or “European Islam”? And finally, how does the increasing number of German Muslims shape the debates about the relation between the state and majority and minority religions in their country?

In the paper I focus on the public anxieties ethnic German Muslims stir among non-Muslim Germans and also the way converted Muslims transform the lived experience of being German and Muslim Germany. In order to do so I pursue two parallel sets of inquiry. The first is the public discussion about the changing role of Islam in Germany. Second, I focus on the everyday experiences of ethnic German Muslims, with a special attention on the way they become Muslim. In order to achieve this goal I analyze conversion narratives I collected during ethnographic research in Berlin in 2006-07, in which converts describe how they first meet and then embrace Islam and how this decision transforms their lives. Understanding the way converts are acquainted with Islam will allow me to recognize the ways in which Muslims and non-Muslims become personally involved with each other and how each group perceives its relational space at this particular moment in Germany.
Section Two:  
On the European and Translocal Character of Islamic Mobilisation

Panel 1: European Nation-States and their Modes of Governance of Islam

Reframing Islam and Muslim Identities: Neoliberalism, Minority Governance and Welfare State
Tuomas Martikainen (Åbo Akademi University, Finland)

The paper argues that the emergence of neoliberal global economy has transformed the ways in which European welfare states have reformed their minority policies since the 1990s. The paper draws attention to the fact that current developments regarding Muslim organization, relationship to the state and collective identities cannot be understood without taking into account broader economic and political changes that have affected the cultural and religious sectors of society – now framed as “civil society”. Neoliberalism has entered minority policy through its concerns of a predictable labour market, supply of labour and social peace, whereby the notions of “integration”, “minority empowerment”, “security” and “social cohesion” have come to define the contemporary European Union’s ethos of a future, graying and increasingly multicultural continent. Major instruments in this process have been inter-governmental co-operation in immigrant integration and – to a growing extent – security. The roots of neoliberal current are in global business as well as in international and interstate (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Union) organizations that have helped to implement its logic mainly through promoting privatization of welfare services and various funding instruments (e.g. European Social Fund).

Neoliberal ideology moves the responsibility of the collective to the individual level, be it a question of educational success, personal health or moral obligations. Whereas this individualisation of responsibility is often recognized, a less obvious development has been the reification of collective identities. Even though Samuel Huntington might have explained the root causes of the “clash of civilizations” perversely, he nevertheless correctly observed that conflicts are increasingly defined along ethnic and religious lines. Hence, both consumerist individual and essentialized collective identities can be related to the over-arching neoliberal currents. Counter forces to neoliberalism include global and national NGOs, religious fundamentalism and social democracy, each of which criticizes the ideology from different viewpoints.

The changes have been taking place simultaneously with the growth of Islam-based political opposition and radicalism first in the Muslim countries and later globally. Especially the emergence of Islamically motivated terrorism in the West has given an unexpected boost for religion to be seen as major force in contemporary world. Spiced with the difficulties of socio-economic integration of many Muslim-majority immigrant groups in Europe both national and international political elites were to rethink their views on minority polity with an era of growing Europeanization and globalisation.

The paper draws its empirical evidence from Finland, a Nordic, social democratic, liberal and corporativist welfare state that has experienced a growing migration of Muslims simultaneously with the restructuring of the welfare state since the early 1990s. The creation of local Muslim associations, the founding of the Islamic Council of Finland and the activities of the Finnish Secret Service in minority policy and
combating religious radicalism are examples of the multiplicity of ways in which local and national authorities attempt to govern Muslims in the country, while simultaneously empowering their role in civil society. The paper draws inspiration from current theoretical debates in political science, sociology, religious studies and social policy.

**France, the Veil and Religious Freedom**  
*Melanie Adrian (Harvard University)*

In 2004, France banned ostentatious religious symbols – most notably the Muslim veil – from public schools across the country. French lawmakers believed this ban would encourage integration and help the country understand itself in light of increasing religious and ethnic diversification. As the riots of October and November 2005 so aptly demonstrate, however, tensions remain high, particularly in certain neighborhoods. This calls the law into question not only in terms of its social repercussions, but also in light of its compliance with human rights law more generally.

In part one of this paper I examine the history of the debate around religious symbols in public schools and look at the deliberations of the Commission called to study laïcité in a “new France,” the same Commission which recommended a law be crafted. I argue that the veil is but a symbol of a larger complex of issues that have to do with the dynamics of low income, high crime areas that are bounded spaces. In this situation, the veil takes on such varied meanings that may or may not resonate with those who wear them. Those outside of these areas understand the veil as showing an unwillingness to integrate into the “French way of life” and take on the traditional meanings of equality and citizenship.

In part two I look at the law banning religious symbols within the framework of human rights law. I show that the right to religious manifestation is a long-standing, consistently articulated norm that has recently been limited in its scope through a wide understanding of the limitations clause. Since France based its own decision on the advice and judgments of the European Court, I look at, and ultimately call into question, these decisions using two cases, *Refah Partisi v. Turkey* and *Sahin v. Turkey*. I show that states are given too wide a margin of appreciation and that the judgments have been driven by a narrow and incorrect view of Islam.

**Italian Secularism Revisited? Muslims Claims in the Public Sphere and the Long Struggle Towards Religious Equality**  
*Annalisa Frisina (University of Padova)*

Pure and simple secularism doesn’t exist. The sociologists Modood and Kastoryano (2006) showed how interpretations and institutional arrangements of secularism in Europe diverge according to the dominant national religious culture and the differing projects of nation-state building. Moreover, they stated that the public claims of Muslims, who are today citizens or long-term residents, challenge in different ways these historical compromises in each European country.

Our aim is to analyse the Italian case starting from this theoretical framework. Muslim population in Italy is composed by almost one million people today. The majority are labour migrants who live where it is easier to find a job: mainly, in the Northern part of Italy and in big centres. They come from a wide range of countries, among the most significant ones: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt; Senegal; Pakistan and Bangladesh. As many migrants, they suffer of a weak socio-economic position and of a precarious juridical status (see Immigration Law “Bossi-Fini”), but more than other migrants they are under the social pressure of a negative collective representation. In fact, especially after 9/11, the dominant frameworks for Muslim presence in Italy are
based on security issue (where Muslims are suspected to be dangerous terrorists) and on culturalism/neo-orientalism (where Islam is the Radical Other to West). Muslims often serve as a screen against which some Italians project themselves as a unity, as a “Catholic country”, and imagine Italy to be “modern and secular” by opposing “their traditionalism and their incapacity to separate religion and politics”.
The structural factors are linked to the history of a plural country which remains marked by profound regional differences, above all between “the North and the South”. Catholicism was the “romantic idea” (Pace 1998) to build the national self-definition, but among Italian Catholics too we find a strong internal diversity.
In the last years new social actors entered the public sphere to contest the collective representation of Italy as a Catholic country. We will analyse who are the public Muslims actors in Italy, what are their agendas and why generation and gender are particularly important dimensions.
Our paper will show how different actors (in the larger Italian society and among Muslim communities) challenge or reinforce the social construction of Islam as the Dangerous/Radical other.
Moreover, we will question Italian model of secularism analysing the role of mass media and educational system. Finally, we will illustrate why pluralism and religious equality are still far from being practiced in Italy, focusing on freedom of worship and the difficult building of mosques.

‘Muslim Students’ Associations in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands: Producing Better Muslims, a Comparison Between Two Cases
Loubna el-Morabet (ISIM, Leiden)

This paper is based on extensive fieldwork conducted for my PhD project entitled: ‘Individualization, Fragmentation of Authority, and New Organizational Forms among Muslims in Europe: Muslim Student Associations’. My focus in this project is on religion as experienced, articulated and debated by Muslim students in Europe, comparing their situation in the Netherlands, the UK and France.
Muslim student associations are a relatively new phenomenon in Dutch society. Students with an Islamic background started to organise themselves in the nineties in associations based on ethnicity. However this began to change due to the growing importance of their Islamic identity. This change is most clearly visible in the fast growth of Muslim student associations which explicitly identify themselves as Islamic. While the position of Muslim students and their organizations in the UK has been a strong one for several decades. This is best illustrated by the foundation of the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) in 1962. This is an umbrella grouping of most major Islamic societies in the UK and Ireland.
My aim for this paper is to investigate two cases of two Muslim students associations namely: LSE Islamic Society (LSE Isoc) at LSE in London and Muslim Studenten vereniging Nijmegen (MSV) at Radboud University in Nijmegen in the Netherlands. The two organizations stand in different traditions regarding both the cultural reality of the Universities in which they are located as well as the societies in which they are active. Yet they share the same project: catering for Muslim students and by doing so ‘producing’ better Muslims.
My focus in this paper will be on how LSE Isoc and MSV try to achieve their goals. How do they function as Muslim organizations? I will discuss their activities such as weekly or monthly circles but also debates and interfaith events. In addition to this I am looking at how these efforts are perceived by the attending Muslim students. Here I am interested in how Muslim students in both contexts express their religiosity in practice as well as in their discourse.
In this paper I draw strongly on data gathered during intensive fieldwork among both associations without neglecting the existing literature on Muslims in Europe in general and Muslim students in particular.

Muslim Women and Traditional Norms of Married Property: Divorce, Property and the Role of Religious Law in Australia

Malcolm Voyce (Macquarie University, Sydney)

Since the World Trade Centre attacks and the Bali bombings the role of Islam in Australian society has been the subject of much debate. As part of the wider issue of women’s rights in Australia have been the issue of gender equality, planning permission for Muslims schools and the issue of Shari law. Many Australian Muslims feel that the media has vilified their community as the use of ethic labels has stirred up racial tensions.

Australian society is based ostensibly on a number of important values, such as a ‘fair go’; parliamentary democracy and the rule of law; being an open and friendly place, especially to visitors, together with the freedom to question and debate issues. Muslims are expected to subscribe to these values given that they are part of Australian society. However some Australians believe that Muslims cannot and will not fit into Australian society.

When it comes to divorce in Australia there is one nationwide system of law and no forms of legal pluralism in the area of personal laws as regards divorce. In other words Shari law is not recognized.

The Family Law Act 1975 in Australia is supposed to be a progressive law in guaranteeing gender justice. The principles of no-fault divorce and settlements of property usually allow for equal sharing of property under this law. This sharing of the resources of the marriage is subject to a recognition of the respective financial, and homemaking contribution of the parties. In many cases women have received a more than 50 percent share of the property on account of their custody of children and their lack of earning capacity.

Muslim women however are in a different situation. Islamic law even though not officially relevant informs the ideas and conduct of Muslim communities. A dominant idea in Islamic law is that in divorce settlements matrimonial fault should be taken into account and that the men should receive the larger share of the property. Many Muslim couples’s also complete pre-nuptial agreements where the larger share of the property is settled on the man should the couples divorce.

Family Law Act encourages private settlement and it is important to find out how customary norms are thus facilitated by the mainstream State Family Law.

Recently, in response to the problem that there were two ‘legal systems’ in conflict over how property should be divided a Mosque in Sydney set up a Islamic Council to hear complaints from disputants over property.

The paper will report on interviews which reveal the extent of legal pluralism in family arrangements. The paper will then using the Foucault notion ‘genealogy’ track the formation of ideas on traditional married property. The paper will then trace how different cohorts of immigrants have absorbed and transformed Australian ideas on an equal share of matrimonial property.
Panel 2: (Trans)Nationality, Immigration and the Securitization of Islam in Europe

Muslim Migrant Organizations and the Security Discussions in Germany after 9/11 - a Neoinstitutional Perspective
Kerstin Rosenow (Ruhr-University, Bochum)

This research project focuses on a period of transition, which took place in Germany regarding its migration regime and security related discussions since the turn of the 21st century. The focus of this paper lies on the reactions of four Muslim umbrella organizations in Germany towards the security discussions after 9/11. It closes a research gap regarding the analysis of organizational strategies of Muslim migrant organizations towards changes in their environment. While most studies on migrant organizations focus on their contribution to the integration process, this approach enables an analysis of the institutional changes from the point of view of the Muslim organizations, whereby shedding light into the organizational “black box”.

Embedded in the neo-institutional theory, which focuses on the concept of legitimacy while analyzing the link between institutions and organizations, the research tries to map organizational strategies towards the conflict between institutional expectations and member interests. It is assumed that the organizations at first comply with institutional expectations at the level of their external affairs, which eventually might lead to changes at the internal level.

Regarding the organizational strategies, DiMaggio’s concept of isomorphism as well as Meyer-Rowan’s concept of decoupling will be discussed and empirically evaluated. The empirical methodology includes a qualitative analysis of organizational press statements regarding the security discussions between 2001 and 2008, which is combined with expert interviews with high-ranking representatives of the organizations. The detailed case studies aim at an analysis of recent changes within the organizations. This includes a focus on the processes that led to the recent creation of the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany in 2007.

The emphasis on the reactions towards the security discussions serves two needs that are addressed in the conference. On the one hand, the fears and needs of the Muslim community can be derived from their press statements. On the other hand, the same statements can be interpreted as indicators of organizational strategies to receive legitimacy. Preliminary interpretations already reveal encountered difficulties to fulfill the diverse and sometimes contrasting expectations, which are raised by the political level and the members towards the organization. This dilemma is solved in some cases, through an ambiguous phrasing of press statements. At the same time, the claim to speak for all Muslims in Germany is underlined through the use of a collective “we” and phrases such as “us Muslims”, or “the German Muslims”.

In my regards, the proposed paper fits to the panel on emerging governance and organizational structures within the second section of the conference. It summarizes first results from my ongoing Ph.D. research.

Religion, Immigration, and the Turkish Government in Germany
James Gibbon (Princeton University)

The Turkish-Islamic Association for Religious Affairs (DITIB) was founded in Germany in 1984 to help meet the religious needs of Turkish immigrants. It has over 870 member associations across the country that manage mosques, offer folklore, Turkish, and German classes, and provide university scholarships to the children of
Turkish immigrants. DITIB resembles many other social service organizations serving migrant communities, but it stands apart because most of its staff are imams funded and appointed by the Turkish government. Trained in religious high schools and seminaries across Turkey, more than 530 imams have been sent to Germany on four-year assignments to lead prayers and provide religious services. Drawing on participant-observation in DITIB mosques and interviews with DITIB personnel in Berlin and Cologne and religious officials in Ankara, I explore the implications of this transnational activity for the integration of Turkish immigrants and examine how German institutions constrain certain religious projects. My paper demonstrates that religious transnationalism is not solely a grassroots phenomenon, but can also involve state actors who liaise between civilians and the government. Although it is hard to know the number of Turkish immigrants affiliated with DITIB, survey data suggest it is the most popular Turkish religious organization in Germany: 18 percent of Turkish immigrants identify as DITIB members and 63 percent attend a DITIB mosque at least once a year. DITIB's brand of Islam is very attractive to many Turkish immigrants, especially those of the first generation, because it avoids politics, rejects radicalism, and celebrates the Turkish homeland. Another factor contributing to DITIB's success is the very thing that initially appears troubling vis-à-vis immigrant integration, namely its connection to the Turkish state. This connection reinforces the national ties of DITIB members and, I argue, reassures German politicians that DITIB’s religious leaders will remain moderate: imams sent to Germany are employees of Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet), are vetted before being sent abroad, and must stay out of trouble in order to resume their careers in Turkey after their assignments.

While the cooperation of German authorities has been critical for DITIB's continued operation, the Diyanet is prevented from wholly transplanting its organizational structure of muftis, assistant muftis, and preachers to Germany because Islam is not a state-recognized religion and German regulations treat DITIB as a cultural association. While visas are granted to imams, other personnel who play key roles in the provision and regulation of religious services in Turkey are not offered the same opportunity. To compensate, the Diyanet has begun a program to bring German-born descendents of Turkish immigrants to Turkey for training in divinity schools. The goal is to groom religious leaders who will return to Germany better able to address the needs of immigrant communities, serve as liaisons with Germans, and possibly create the institutions necessary to produce the next generation of Muslim leaders within Germany.

A final section of the paper shows how DITIB imams and officials challenge accusations that Muslim immigrants do not want to integrate by arguing that Europe has much to learn about religious toleration from Turkey's Ottoman past and the millet system. This is an attempt to turn the tables on "liberal" Germans who illiberally resist certain public expressions of Islamic faith.

Piety, Loyalty and Integration: Turkish Islamic Associations in Germany
Ahmet Yükleyen / Gökçe Yurdakul (University of Mississippi / Humboldt University, Berlin)

Transnational Islamic organizations negotiate between the concerns of their followers and the expectations of state authorities. We compare the two largest Turkish Islamic organizations – Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği and Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş – in Germany to challenge the dichotomous categorization of Muslim organizations as “good” or “bad” Muslims. On the one hand, we explore how the Turkish state supports Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği which promotes Islam in private
life as a source of individual piety and loyalty to the Turkish state. On the other hand, we show how Milli Görüş which originally supported political Islam in Turkey is now working to gain public recognition of Islam in Germany. Perhaps paradoxically, although Dİyanet İşleri has collaborated with German authorities, Milli Görüş is seen as an “extremist” organization threatening German society. Relying on extensive fieldwork data and interviews with the executive members of these two organizations, we conclude that a comparative approach to their views on immigrant integration in general and the headscarf debate in particular shows that they both have ambivalent approaches to Muslim incorporation in Europe.
“Religion” is gaining terrain in contemporary Sweden. Only a decade ago Swedes would embody the “secularization thesis” – the decline of religion in modern societies. Today, however, there is an affirmative curiosity for one’s own religious heritage as well as for other faiths. Especially Islam is emphasized as a phenomenon worth knowing better, which results in extensive media coverage and guided tours in mosques. The interest in religion, however, involves processes of identity constructions, nationalism, and “othering”. This means that the attention paid to Islam is not only a matter of “affirmative curiosity”, but also of exclusion and repression. Consequently, Muslim actors pursue and confront different aims, needs, and fears in the public arena. This paper will highlight the controversial field of gender and sexuality. The analysis draws on an extensive fieldwork among women activists in Sunni-Muslim youth associations in Sweden. More specifically it concerns nine women who were initially 18 to 25 years old and still unmarried. They were all born in countries in West Asia, North and East Africa, to parents of different social backgrounds, who in one way or another identified themselves as Muslims. Coming to Sweden during childhood (four to eleven years of age), the women went to public school and speak fluent Swedish. The aim of the paper is to illuminate the young women’s Islamic activism in relation to the secular state, or, more specifically, in relation to the tension between freedom to or from religion, between women’s rights and minorities’ rights, and between different feminist positions including postcolonial critique of neo-imperialist civilizational projects. As a central example, I will present the reporting of a new mosque in Stockholm to the government agency The Ombudsman Against Discrimination. The reporting was made by a non-Muslim woman politician with the intention to challenge the gender-separating order in the mosque with its exclusive entrance and balcony for women. The analysis will focus on the response from Muslim women activists. It further links to the examination of possibilities and hindrances for their agency when enrolling in Muslim youth associations. Specific focus will be on their construction of both a “public” and a “private” pious femininity relevant to them as representatives of a young Swedish-Islamic subject position. This includes attention to their adaptation to local norms as well as the search for legitimation and religious authority under new conditions. Ultimately the paper aims at developing the understanding of how negotiations on gender are inextricably linked to perceptions of sexuality, “race”/ethnicity, religion, and nation.

The Genesis of a Muslim Consciousness in Germany

Riem Spielhaus (Humboldt University, Berlin)

In recent years, politics concerning Islam in Europe have been shaped both by the demand for representatives of Islam and a strive of diverse actors for recognition in the sphere of politics and civil society. A vital debate arose around the question who can speak for Muslims (beyond) the boarders of the community, addressing issues of belonging as well as issues concerning the mandate to proclaim political and social demands in the public sphere. Based on interviews and participant observation in both public and non-public events this paper is taking a closer look on the development of a spokes body on the regional level, the Schura Hamburg, and the creation of an
association with the aim to unify the main Islamic umbrella organisations in Germany on the federal level, the Council for the Coordination of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland).

This paper argues that the institutionalisation of Islam in Germany is lead by the idea that a political representation of Muslims is needed and that therefore the differences of regional origin like language, ethnicity or even religious orientation can be overcome. Here we can observe two developments which only seemingly contradict each other: the diversification of Islamic associations concerning gender, age, migrational background and religious orientation, to mention only some, and the unification and formalisation of representative bodies on the political level.

The establishment of Islamic organisations only succeeded when conflicts from the countries of origin were symbolically fought out in the German public sphere and thus overcome. Although during the last decades differences in cultural heritage and origin were emphasized on the local level of mosques the category of religion finally superseded other categories of belonging in the representation towards society. However, the accounts for the creation of Islamic organisations are referring to a variety of linkages from the very local to the European level and beyond, thereby unfolding different stories of identification, victimization and communalisation. By analysing them we are enabled to notice how some transnational links are devaluated while national and supranational links surface.

The institutionalisation of Islam on regional and federal level in Germany is illustrating that religiosity has on the one hand become the dominant marker for identity as a sense of belonging and representation. On the other hand the emerging Islamic organisations can be characterized rather as political lobby groups than as actual communities of shared religious practice. The shift in the German discourse on migration from a dominance of ethnic towards religious terminology has intensified this development.

**Gendered Islam under State Surveillance. The Case of Milli Görüş in Germany**

*Schirin Amir-Moazami (Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder)*

Current developments in state approaches towards Muslims in Germany reveal significant shifts from a “laissez-faire” attitude towards an active involvement in regulating the institutionalization of Islam and Muslim’s religious practice. Parallel to enhanced security measures increasing efforts have been taken to “integrate” Muslims into society – both socially and culturally. In this latter domain the enactment and regulation of norms generally, and of liberal gender norms have gained a crucial role.

Engaging Foucault’s notion of governmentality, I will look at the technologies of power at stake in these current interventions, and analyze how the goal to “integrate” Muslims is articulated, framed and circulated, and what kinds of Muslim (female and male) subjectivities are required and produced in this process. I will discuss examples like co-educative sports and swimming classes in state schools, headscarf bans or measures against forced and arranged marriages, and look in particular at ways in which freedom functions as a normative ideal, which not only generates coercive methods, but which is also and foremost concerned with the production of liberal subjects.

In a second step, I will look at the actors targeted through these politics by concentrating mainly on the Turkish-Islamic organization Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG) which figures as one of the most mobilizing and at the same time highly contested Muslim organizations in Germany. I will argue that IGMG actors, at
least on a leadership level, engage in complex processes of subjectivation and resistance.

**Islamism in the Post-Secular Age: A Case Study of the “Union of Islamic Organizations of France”**

*Frank Peter (Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder)*

The UOIF emerged out of a long process of divisions and mergers between Muslim associations in the French immigrant student milieus of the 1970s and 1980s. Activists from the Tunisian *Harakat al-ittijah al-islami* (later *Harakat al-Nahda*) and from the Lebanese *Al-Jama’at al-Islamiya* were particularly influential at the time of the setup of the organization in the 1980s. Today Moroccan activists are very influential in the upper echelons of the Union’s leadership. Through their close relationship to Yusuf al-Qaradawi and their membership in the *Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe* the UOIF is part of an Arabic-speaking transnational space which links Europe to the Middle East and North Africa.

While this transnational network is often referred to in order to substantiate the characterization of the UOIF as ‘ikhwani’, less attention is paid to studying how the discourses circulating inside this network and its various activities relate to the UOIF’s work inside France. In fact, in the course of the past two decades, the UOIF has become deeply embedded in the social space of the French Republic. Through the creation of a structure of affiliated groups and institutions, whose number is unequalled among French Islamic Federations, through its significant presence in youth milieus, and, last but not least, its close cooperation with State authorities as a representative of France’s mosque associations, the UOIF’s activities have become entwined in complex ways with French society and contribute to reconfigure it. This paper explores the mutual transformation of the UOIF and the French Republic by reference to the debate on the transformation of secularism/post-secularism.