Leibniz–Zentrum Moderner Orient

New Directions in Research 2017–2019

Muslim Worlds – World of Islam?



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Muslim Worlds – World of Islam?

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

Preface

Ulrike Freitag

This book invites you to consider some of the results of the research programme "Muslim Worlds – World of Islam? Conceptions, Practices, and Crises of the Global". The programme was conducted at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient between 2007 and 2019. As a multidisciplinary research centre that focuses on fundamental enquiries into the past and present of Muslim majority societies and their neighbours in Asia and Africa, we pursued this programme in order to investigate the role played by the Muslim faith in various pertinent fields of life. These fields informed the research units that structured our enquiry, namely "Progress: Ideas, Agents and Symbols", "The Politics of Resources", "Trajectories of Lives and Knowledge" and "Cities as Laboratories of Change".

Within these diverse research units, researchers investigated specialised topics such as Afghan refugees' access to basic services in Pakistani cities, translocal activism by Muslim politicians, changing land use in Iraqi Kurdistan, or attempts to shape the "body of the modern nation" by introducing new types of sports and other corporal practices linked to a 'sound body of the nation' in Ethiopia. Through debates in the research units and among all researchers, individual enquiries were regularly linked back to our main question. Overall, the research has shown that, while Islam creates bonds of solidarity or is used to invoke such bonds, these are not standardised to create one "world of Islam" but rather are linked to specific interpretations, religious organizations, ethnicities and so on. Furthermore, while religious ethics might influence decisions in particular instances or inspire organised approaches – for example to welfare – political or economic interests and orientations might, in specific situations, be far more decisive for individual or collective decisions and behaviour than faith. Secular and at times agnostic or atheist trends have made inroads in supposedly "Muslim" countries, even if – perhaps – to a lesser degree than in the Global North. The seemingly banal recognition of the importance of the specific context and time in discussion of the past and present of Muslim societies is nevertheless important to emphasise in view of widespread tendencies to generalize by using adjectives such as "Muslim" or "Islamic". This raises questions concerning the coining of terminology and concepts. These are necessary to facilitate academic communication, but – if too general – they can obscure important specificities. Hence, reflection on key concepts forms an important part of the more general academic enquiry at ZMO.

Apart from abstract findings such as these, I hope that this book whets the appetite for the results of source-based and empirical research conducted at ZMO. The thematic sections allow glimpses into the work conducted there, while the connecting themes highlight issues of importance beyond single research units. They reflect many of the lively discussions conducted not only in workshops and seminars, but around the kitchen table or in the ZMO garden. Such exchanges, in which our many guests are included, are often constitutive of directed activities or new research questions and regularly inform the written output. The nature of research in often difficult circumstances is as much a topic in these conversations as the conditions for researchers from countries at the centre of our inquiry. ZMO emphasises close cooperation with colleagues abroad, and regularly hosts them for shorter or longer periods.

ZMO prides itself in reaching out to audiences beyond academia. “In Dialogue with Society” reflects on the importance of knowledge transfer and showcases some of the activities conducted by researchers in this field. Although the nature of a book means that only written and pictorial evidence can be presented, many of these activities are highly interactive – from discussions with film directors to interviews and expert consultations.

We thank the State of Berlin, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research as well as the Joint Funding by the Federal Ministry and the German States in the context of the Leibniz-Association for supporting this work.

Die Umgebung der Explorationen in Bahi in Tansania

Research at ZMO

Progress

Progress: Ideas, Agents, Symbols

Katrin Bromber

Commencing in 2014, this research unit approached the overall topic of the research programme through the lens of progress. Building on African and Asian case studies of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,[1] it investigated ideas that aim to improve the individual and society, and at the concepts which underpin them. It looked at the social actors who try to implement concrete visions of progress and the semiotic materiality that represents them. As elaborated in a programmatic text of our ZMO-online series,[2] progress is understood as a horizon of possibilities, a temporal blank screen upon which visions of reality can be projected by given actors and which can, potentially, be brought about through a set of transformative actions.

During 2017–19, our unit studied the widespread features of progress-related projects intended to order, master and/or embrace uncertainty, and more generally to govern the production of possibilities in two directions. Historians explored the category of the "new man", with an explicit emphasis on reception history (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) and social history. We asked how the new/modern/progressive man/woman was framed in the languages and contexts of our empirical projects, and by whom. What were the points of rupture? What was explicitly considered as not modern or progressive? How was the future seen in alternative ways? Which definitions were used at that time?

We observed that progress was not only defined against the negative foil of backwardness, but that both terms (*backwardness and progress*) lacked clear definition – allowing them to be used as empty signifiers, as containers that served as a repository for whatever was thought to be backward (negative) or progressive/modern (positive). Progress was framed as "moving with the times/being up to date". Arguably, young people are always already modern because they are of the present generation and training is only able to develop certain

1 In particular Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, India, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Syria and Turkey.

2 Katrin Bromber, Paolo Gaibazzi, Franziska Roy, Abdoulaye Sounaye and Julian Tadesse, "'The Possibilities are Endless': Progress and the Taming of Contingency", *ZMO Programmatic Texts* No. 9, https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201503161449.

Emperor Haile Selassie I speaking on the radio which linked all the Empire in 1933, stamp published on November 2nd, 1971 to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the first telephone call between Emperor Menelik II and Ras Makonnen in Harrar in 1897

character traits which make them more responsible and manageable. Modernity has to be authentic, though, which often brings religious aspects into the progress debate.

In the Algerian case, the idea of the modern/progressive was (although not always explicitly so) a synonym of Islamic progress plus "Western" modernity. Whereas this discourse of blending in Algeria was still strong in the 1950s, in India it was most prominent in the 1920s and 1930s. It defined for India a superior and hence "tutelary" position in the world. In Ethiopia, from the 1940s to the 1970s, Emperor Haile Selassie was depicted as a gift from God who brought about progress. Thus, festivities centred on him (coronation day, his birthday etc.) were opportunities for demonstrating progress in a developmental sense. Here, as in other cases, the "new man" is the loyal and responsible citizen (stressing duties more than rights). In a similar way to other examples, progress in this case is not brought about by revolution but by renaissance, reform and education within a nation-building process.

Examples from Afghanistan (1980s), Algeria (1950s) and Turkey (1930s–1950s) reveal how the concept of the "new woman" became an (ideal) topic with which to discuss progress through a strong emphasis on the industrial life and women's service in the army. In the case of Algeria and Afghanistan, Islam (in its respective variations of reform) was portrayed as a liberating force for women. On the other hand, the process of nation-building that was pertinent to most examples can also be considered as an ideological constraint to a radical change toward women's self-determined lives (as in the Turkish example). The bodies of the new woman and the new man played an important role: there was a shift from a fragile to a strong physique (especially women), or from weak and degenerated to fit and defensive (in combination with a weapon). In September 2017, our conference "'New Man' in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Practices, Networks and Mobilization, c. 1910–1960" discussed these issues in a broader forum. The resulting contributions, both from the conference and the collaborative work described above, are published in the special issue "Shaping the 'New Man' in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Practices, Networks and Mobilization (1940s–1960s)".[3]

In November 2017, the international workshop "The Production of Possibilities: Living and Governing Potential Futures in Africa" explored the proliferation of discourses on possibility and potentiality throughout Africa. Participants examined different sectors of politics, economy, society and culture in which horizons of possibility are emerging and sought out similarities across them. Obviously, discourses on potentiality are a source of hope, speculation or

3 Katrin Bromber and Jakob Krais (eds.), "Shaping the 'New Man' in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Practices, Networks and Moblization (1940s–1960s)", *Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 28(5), 2018.

career building, as well as a tool for governing people – most notably unemployed youth. More interestingly, the link between failures of progress and new narratives of possibility shows that despite similarities between old and new ideas of progress in Africa, the current predicament of possibility is that it is less inclusive and more unstable, reflecting the unequal and volatile nature of the global economy. At the same time, it is doubtful if the current proliferation of possibility discourses can be simply described as an epitome of neoliberalism. Furthermore, what is the status of possibility as both an object of study and an analytical category? Arguably, possibility constitutes a more neutral category than 'the future', 'hope' or 'uncertainty' in terms of its facility to access discourses, sentiments and actions directed at open-ended presents and futures. Paolo Gaibazzi has explored this conceptual line of thought in a systematic way in his innovative studies on migration and deportability of Gambians in Angola's boom economy and the Mediterranean.[4]

Looking more closely into the 1970s and 1980s is necessary to understand transformations between the early postwar/Cold War years, with their attempts at self-improvement and the transformation of society to current forms of entrepreneurial practices and large-scale social transformation. Conceptually, this approach links to a central question about the afterlife of high modernism: how long did it last and when did it stop? Since our own research largely omits these decades we decided to invite scholars from outside the research field for conversations, such as Margaret Litvin who addressed important questions about the changing role of students as agents of internationalism. The focus on students as agents of progress and our broad definition of progress itself has enabled us to discuss areas as different as the leftist student movement in Ethiopia (1960s) together with the students at the University of Kabul who experienced the end of the monarchy in the 1970s, then the Soviet–Afghan war in the 1980s until the beginning of the war of the Mujahidin in the 1990s. They all searched for training for a good life. Since July 2018, this topic has been systematically explored in Abdoulaye Sounaye's research group Religion, Morality and 'Boko' in West Africa: Students Training for a Good Life, which is funded by the Leibniz Association (through the Leibniz Competition).

The question of whether higher learning institutions prepare people for a good life connects us to broader conceptual ideas on progress and preparedness, a category that we understand as a set of concrete practices that set out to generate the conditions for transformation in order to implement projects of progress or to maintain the status quo. Discourses about being "unprepared" for progress generate concrete practices of moulding bodies, minds and environments. Intelligence is one gateway through which to view this topic. Sophia Hoffmann's research group "Learning Intelligence: The Exchange of Secret Service Knowledge between Germany and the Arab Middle East 1960–2010", funded by the Volkswagen Stiftung Foundation within the "Freigeist" programme since July 2017, explores whether the international relations between Arab (Egypt, Iraq and Syria) and German secret services resulted in a mutual exchange of knowledge.

4 Paolo Gaibazzi, "West African Strangers and the Politics of Inhumanity in Angola", *American Ethnologist* 45(4), 2018: 470–81. DOI: 10.1111/amet.12702; Paolo Gaibazzi, "From Expulsion to Extortion: Deportability, Predatory Policing and West African Migrants in Angola", *Citizenship Studies* 21(8), 2017, 969–83.

Learning Intelligence

The Exchange of Secret Service Knowledge between Germany and the Arab Middle East, 1960–2010

Sophia Hoffmann

Honorary badges for the 20th, 25th and 30th anniversaries of MfS (Ministry of State Security) of German Democratic Republic

Since July 2017, the ZMO has hosted Dr Sophia Hoffmann as a "Freigeist Fellow" funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. The Freigeist initiative provides post-doctoral scientists from all disciplines with a substantial grant to break new empirical and theoretical ground with challenging new projects. Dr Hoffmann's project "Learning Intelligence: The Exchange of Secret Service Knowledge between Germany and the Arab Middle East, 1960–2010" investigates the long-standing relations between German and Arab intelligence agencies. The goal of the project is to understand whether these relations included an exchange of knowledge about how to set up and develop intelligence agencies, and thus to contribute to a general theory about the role that intelligence agencies play for modern statehood and international relations. Running for five years, the project will look at both East and West German services' relations with Iraq, Egypt and Yemen. The project will include at least one PhD student, starting in May 2019, and, depending on a further grant proposal, possibly a second PhD student.

My project seeks to explain why most modern states possess intelligence agencies and how knowledge about how to set up and run intelligence agencies spreads internationally. One obvious possibility is that states simply exchange such knowledge, both through direct cooperation and by covertly acquiring information about each other's intelligence methods. By focusing on the two German states and the Arab republics of Yemen, Iraq and Egypt, I investigate if and how such an exchange of knowledge took place between these states in the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. My primary goal is to develop a general theory about intelligence agencies as highly internationalized actors, whose actions form a global layer of international governance.

This project will run for five years and the second year has just started. After spending the first year reading academic literature about intelligence and deciding on how to approach this large topic in terms of research and analysis, I am now conducting six months of research on the GDR's Ministry of State Security (MfS or Stasi), followed by six months each on the FRG's BND and domestic intelligence agencies (Verfassungsschutz) and on Iraq's, Yemen's and Egypt's intelligence agencies. As I am currently "mining archival gold" in the MfS Archives, readers may forgive me that the empirical examples of this text draw mainly from the MfS and its relations with the intelligence and security agencies of the Arab world.

Between 1969 and 1971, the MfS received delegations from the Iraqi, the Egyptian and the Sudanese intelligence and security agencies, all requesting the MfS' help to become more

effective through the training of officers and improved surveillance technology. The protocol of the Iraqi delegation's 1969 visit is fascinating: beyond detailed discussions about specific aspects of investigative and surveillance work with senior MfS officers, the Iraqi guests toured the entire structure of the MfS apparatus, not only visiting the Berlin headquarters, but also receiving presentations at regional and municipal offices. In a 1970s discussion between the then Sudanese Interior Minister Faruk Hamdallah and the head of the MfS Erich Mielke, the latter himself takes on the educator's role, urging, among other things, the immediate development of a large network of informers in Sudan. Archival documents show that the MfS operated a vast international program of training foreign intelligence cadres both at home and abroad, sending MfS experts on missions to friendly agencies and providing, for free and against payment, surveillance technology (both GDR- and Western-made).

The security organs of states are commonly understood as highly national institutions that aim to further specific national security interests, often to the detriment of other states. Existing theories of intelligence agencies mirror this concept: agencies are understood to jealously protect their knowledge from the prying eyes of rivals, mobilising sophisticated protection measures to guard their secret knowledge. What my research aims to show is that, in fact, intelligence agencies must also be understood as thoroughly *internationalized*, not just in terms of their investigative reach, but also in terms of the way they perceive themselves, and thus act, as members of an international network, highly aware of each other's work. Intelligence agencies form a layer of international knowledge exchange, which may create internationally homogeneous understandings of threats and how to address them. Let me provide another example.

In the early 1980s, the Soviet intelligence agency provided the Stasi's department for counterterrorism (Terrorabwehr) with information from their Czechoslovak partners. The Czechoslovaks had found out that Syrian intelligence had planted an agent inside a Palestinian group of activists meeting in Prague. This group was planning an assassination campaign against some of its Palestinian rivals across Europe and the Middle East. The Stasi was kindly requested to find out whether any of these targets were resident in the GDR. What does this document reveal about international knowledge exchange between intelligence agencies? Think about it.

Of particular interest to me is also the way knowledge collected from enemy agencies is obtained and processed. For example, information that Soviet agencies collected in the 1980s at NATO headquarters about the way NATO intended to handle anti-terrorism activities was translated into German and became part of the Stasi's stock of knowledge. Here we can see that "exchange of knowledge" between intelligence agencies occurs also indirectly, beyond measures such as training or technology provision.

Yet grasping the practicalities and meaning of such indirect forms of knowledge transfer remains a challenge to me. For example, the MfS archives show that a significant number of Arab citizens were MfS informers; some also maintained contact with their national intelligence agencies. How did such persons contribute to an (indirect) exchange of intelligence knowledge? Sometimes, a person emerges as a veritable intelligence "entrepreneur": providing information to a host of agencies, frequently also working as an agent for weapons or smuggling goods, passports and people – it appears to me that shining a light on certain biographies could also be a way of explaining aspects of my argument.

A Global History of Political Thought at Kabul University, 1964–1992

Kyara Klausmann

When talking with people who studied at Kabul University during the late 1960s and 1970s one of their first sentences usually is: 'It was a golden time – maybe even the best years of my life!' Back then, Kabul was not dominated by high concrete walls and barbed wire as it is now. Former students remember a vibrant small city with a diverse population. In 1964 King Zaher Shah had signed a new constitution, creating a new parliament and indirectly stimulating the emergence of several political parties, most notably the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Maoist Shola-ye Javid, and the Islamic Party. Looking back, many describe Zaher Shah as the king who did not care: He tolerated protests without addressing the country's economic and social problems. In 1973 he was overthrown by his former prime minister, Daoud Khan, who tightened control and tried to implement his own ideas of a modern Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the Cold War competition between East and West, the government of Afghanistan depended on financial aid from abroad, as did Kabul University: Each faculty was sponsored by a foreign country. With this support, the capacity of the university grew quickly and an increasing number of students came to Kabul from the provinces.

During this time, several social and political conflicts dominated daily life of students at Kabul University. They not only developed ideas of democracy within an authoritarian regime and confronted increasingly nationalist rhetoric in a country dominated by foreign powers; they also faced an international environment with conflicting ideals of communism and capi-

Graduates from Kabul University

talism, secularism and religion. The students from the provinces experienced profound differences between life in Kabul and their own villages. Due to the political and economic situation in Afghanistan, many students also faced limited career opportunities despite having diplomas from an internationally respected university. Some dealt with discrimination based on their family background and clashes between their own and their parents' conceptions of life and society. Challenged with such conflicts, many students joined political parties. Others refrained from labeling their political positions but still engaged in demonstrations and discussions, making Kabul University the center of political protest in Afghanistan.

In 1978 this atmosphere changed abruptly: With the so-called "Saur Revolution", the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan took power. Students of the late 1970s told me that, at first, they were hopeful this new government would bring about a positive change. But they were soon disillusioned: Party leaders not only began to purge each other, but students and professors disappeared as well. Soon, life at Kabul University was dominated by the fear of "Khadists" – people working for the secret service. Students had to organize their activities very carefully and sometimes ended up in prison. And yet, they continued to imagine a progressive future for Afghanistan.

By conducting interviews with former students of Kabul University – both political activists and observers – I try to reveal the individual stories behind the developments mentioned above. My interview partners remember how they copied political pamphlets by hand for distribution to peers, how they sneaked off to the cinema during a demonstration they were forced to attend, how they scribbled revolutionary slogans on the blackboards, how they continued to pass around banned books hidden in a false cover, and how they dreamed of becoming doctors, engineers, or judges. These experiences were part of daily life and yet reveal much about the students' political and social aspirations. The aim of my project is to collect and analyze these memories and show that the ideas behind these stories were an important element of the wars during these decades. Placing the stories into the global context, my research shows how transnational discourses affected political thought of students in Afghanistan, how these students dealt with the local implications of the Cold War and how they used external influences for their ambitions.

Afrika und der Wettlauf zum Mond

Pressestimmen und Erinnerungen an die bemannte Mondlandung 1969

Katrin Bromber

Die Verbindung des Themas bemannte Mondlandung im Juli 1969 mit Afrika bzw. dem globalen Süden erscheint zunächst etwas weit hergeholt. Die meisten afrikanischen Staaten hatten in den 1960er Jahren gerade erst die nationale Unabhängigkeit errungen. Die portugiesischen Kolonien kämpften noch darum. Gleichzeitig versuchten die ehemaligen Kolonialmächte, vor allem aber die keineswegs einheitlich handelnden politischen Blöcke an Einfluss zu gewinnen. Der Blick aller Akteure war, so könnte man meinen, in eine verheißungs- oder sorgenvolle Zukunft gerichtet, statt nach oben in Himmel und Weltraum. Wenn man jedoch davon ausgeht, dass die Landung amerikanischer Astronauten auf dem Erdtrabanten ein globales Ereignis war, das überall auf der Welt wahrgenommen, diskutiert und instrumentalisiert wurde, dann lohnt sich ein Blick auf den afrikanischen Kontinent.[1]

Der Kampf zwischen den USA und der Sowjetunion um die Vorherrschaft im Weltraum war ein wichtiger Faktor im Kalten Krieg. Technische Überlegenheit sollte „Ansehen" generieren, das im internationalen Machtkampf vor allem jene Entwicklungsländer überzeugen sollte, die hinsichtlich ihrer politischen Orientierung als „unentschieden" galten. Deshalb wurde jeder Sieg lauthals verkündet und international diskutiert. Die sowjetischen Fortschritte in der Raumfahrt – insbesondere der erste erfolgreiche Versuch einen Satelliten auf die Erdumlaufbahn zu schicken (Sputnik 4. 10. 1957) – verunsicherten die USA über die Maßen. So mutmaßte die *New York Times* vom 5. 10. 1957 in ihrem Leitartikel, dass „neutrale Nationen" möglicherweise zu der Überzeugung gelangen könnten, „die Zukunft sei russisch".[2]

Auch Juri Gagarin und Alan Shepard, die ersten Männer im All, äußerten sich zu Afrika und seinen Bewohnern – allerdings auf sehr unterschiedliche Weise. Während Gagarin, als er Afrika überflog, des „harten Schicksals der Unterdrückten und Freiheitskämpfer" gedachte, verunglimpfte Shepard die afrikanische Bevölkerung als „ignorante Eingeborene, die gar nicht wüssten, was eine Rakete sei".[3]

Neben propagandistischen Großoffensiven, die sich wie bei German Stepanowitsch Titow – dem bis heute jüngsten Raumfahrer und ersten Menschen, der im August 1961 volle 24 Stunden im Orbit blieb – in einer Geißelung imperialistischer Afrikapolitik aus dem Welt-

1 Ich danke Rakiya el-Matine für die Recherche und Zusammenfassung von Beiträgen aus der ägyptischen Zeitung *al-Ahram* und Thomas Ripper für die Transkription der Titel. Sonja Hegasy und Gamal Abdelnasser Ibrahim machten auf den Zusammenhang zwischen Mondlandung und politischer Situation in Ägypten aufmerksam und teilten wichtige persönliche Erinnerungen mit mir. Herzlichen Dank dafür. Mein verehrter Lehrer, Seyoum Mulugeta, überprüfte nicht nur meine Übersetzungen ins Amharische, sondern befragte seine Freunde und Bekannten, ob und wie sie sich an die Mondlandung erinnern. Norris Lineweaver schrieb mir wunderbare Details zur Rezeption der Mondlandung im YMCA in Addis Abeba. Alle Übersetzungen aus dem Swahili stammen von der Autorin.

2 James Donovan, *Apollo 11. Der Wettlauf zum Mond und der Erfolg einer fast unmöglichen Mission*. München: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 2018, 23.

3 Klaus Gestwa, „‚Kolumbus des Kosmos'". Der Kult um Juri Gagarin, *Osteuropa*, 59(10), 2009, 121–151, hier 146.

raum heraus an Afrika richteten[4], ging Entwicklungshilfe oftmals mit konkreter militärischer Einflussnahme einher. So gestattete beispielsweise Äthiopien den USA den Betrieb einer militärischen und geheimdienstlichen Abhörstation bei Asmara, der Hauptstadt der damaligen Provinz Eritrea, die geostrategisch so günstig gelegen war, dass die Amerikaner nicht nur die arabischen Staaten, sondern auch die sowjetischen Mondmissionen ausspionieren konnten.

Afrika ist ein Kontinent mit mehr als 50 Nationen und jede einzelne würde eine genauere Betrachtung verdienen. Allein ein Blick auf die Briefmarken, die viele Staaten anlässlich der bemannten Mondlandung drucken ließen und die im Jubiläumsjahr 2019 in Umlauf gebracht werden, verdeutlicht das Bestreben nach Einbindung in das globale Ereignis. Aufgrund der sehr unterschiedlichen politischen Kontexte kann dieser Beitrag nur einen kleinen Ausschnitt des Spektrums beleuchten und beschränkt sich exemplarisch auf vier Länder – Äthiopien, Ägypten, Tansania und Südafrika – die für sehr unterschiedliche politische Entwicklungsrichtungen stehen.

Äthiopien war zum Zeitpunkt der Mondlandung ein Kaiserreich, dessen Staatsoberhaupt Kaiser Haile Selassie I das Land zu einem einflussreichen Akteur auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent und innerhalb der nicht paktgebunden Staaten gemacht hatte. Ägypten, das sich unter Gamal Abdel Nasser stark an die Sowjetunion anlehnte, befand sich im Juli 1969 in einem der schwersten Konflikte mit Israel und hegte zunehmend Zweifel an der Verlässlichkeit sowjetischer Berater. Tansania hatte begonnen unter der Führung seines charismatischen Präsidenten Julius Kambarage Nyerere ein egalitäres, antiimperialistisches Gesellschaftssystem aufzubauen, ohne sich dem sozialistischen Lager zu verpflichten. Südafrika, wiederum, versuchte durch eine strikte Abschottungspolitik nach außen sein Apartheid-System aufrechtzuerhalten.

Äthiopien, die Mondlandung und die Politik des Ausgleichs

Äthiopien hatte sich bis auf die italienische faschistische Okkupation (1935–41) einer Kolonisierung erfolgreich widersetzt. Unter Haile Selassie I waren seit den 1920er Jahren umfangreiche Modernisierungsmaßnahmen eingeleitet worden. Der Kaiser selbst hatte nicht nur ein großes Interesse an einer schlagkräftigen äthiopischen Luftwaffe, sondern war selbst ein begeisterter Mitflieger.

Im Medienbereich verfügte Äthiopien ab den 1950ern über eine ausgebaute Presselandschaft, Radio und seit 1964 auch über einen nationalen Fernsehsender. Während das Radio recht verbreitet war, besaßen nur wenige Haushalte ein Fernsehgerät. Wenn überhaupt, verfolgten Äthiopier die Mondlandung über das Radio. Es ist jedoch zu vermuten, dass die Nachricht der bemannten Reise zum Mond hauptsächlich durch mündliche Berichte (die Alphabetisierungsrate lag 1969 bei etwa 7%)[5] oder Zeitungsmeldungen von verbreitet wurde.

Obgleich sich das Land nie einer bestimmten Nation oder politischen Richtung verpflichtet fühlte, nahm der US-amerikanische Einfluss auf allen Gebieten stetig zu. Allerdings

4 Ich danke Sven Grampp für den Hinweis, dass Titow bei jedem Überflug über den afrikanischen Kontinent auf das schärfste Kritik an neo-imperialistischen Ausgriffen nach Afrika übte.

5 Ministry of Education 1990, Basic Education in Ethiopia, Challenges and Prospects, 27. Zit. aus Klaus Wedekind, *Alphabetisierung und Literalität in Äthiopien, in: Jürgen Baumann et al. Schrift und Schriftlichkeit. Ein internationales Handbuch internationaler Forschung* Vol. 1, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 1994, 814–824.


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"Die Fahne des Mondes", Bericht in der äthiopischen Tageszeitung *Addis Zämän* am 13.7.1969

war auch die Sowjetunion im Bereich Bildung und Kultur stark präsent. Insbesondere das bereits 1945 eröffnete, hervorragend ausgestattete sowjetische Kulturzentrum in Addis Abeba entwickelte sich zu einer viel beachteten Bildungsstätte. Ausgleich nach allen Seiten war also oberstes Gebot der äthiopischen Außenpolitik.

Die Berichterstattung über die bemannte Mondlandung, die sich faktisch auf die Nachrichtenagenturen Reuters und AFP stützte, begann in *Addis Zämän*, der wichtigsten amharischsprachigen Tageszeitung, am 18. Juni 1967. Sie informierte über technische Details, Übungsprogramme für die Astronauten oder den zeitlichen Ablauf der Apollo-11-Mission. Gleichzeitig teilte das Blatt Seitenhiebe gegen das sowjetische Raumfahrtprogramm aus, die unter der Frage „Wer wird führen?", die Unterlegenheit russischer Raumfahrtprogramme propagierten.[6] Am interessantesten liest sich allerdings ein Leitartikel vom 13. Juli 1969, der sich um Ausgleich bemühte.

Unter der Überschrift „Die Fahne des Mondes", diskutiert der Beitrag, ob das vorgesehene Hissen der amerikanischen Flagge gleichbedeutend mit der Kolonisierung des Mondes sei. Eine durchaus relevante Frage, da die Mondlandung in die späte Dekolonisierungsphase Afrikas fiel. Die ohnehin große Symbolkraft, der Flaggensetzung wird in diesem Zusammenhang um eine historische, afrikaspezifische Komponente erweitert. Der Artikel geht explizit auf diesen Sachverhalt ein. „Während der Kolonialzeit, war die Fahne der Kolonialherren, die sie vom fernen Westen bis nach Afrika in jedem Dorf flattern ließen, keine Dekoration." [7] In einem großen argumentativen Wurf, der zivilisatorisch-technische Errungenschaften der Menschheit benennt, aber auch die literarisch vorweggenommene Vorstellung einer Mondlandung von Jules Verne diskutiert, verneint der Autor den amerikanischen Besitzanspruch auf den Mond. Die Astronauten und die Fahne, die sie hissen, stünden vielmehr stellvertretend für den Genius der gesamten Menschheit.

Wer aber verfolgte die Mondlandung tatsächlich *live*? Nur wenige Haushalte besaßen einen Fernseher und selbst *expatriates* mussten auf das Radio zurückgreifen. Norris Lineweaver,

6 „Man yəqädmal?" [Wer wird führen?], *Addis Zämän* 27 Sene 1961 [4. 7. 1969], 2. Alle Übersetzungen aus dem Amharisch und Swahili von Katrin Bromber.

7 „Yäčäräqa sändäq alama" [Die Fahne des Mondes], *Addis Zämän* 4 Hamle 1961 [13. 7.1969], 2.


مشى على القمر !
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الجمهورية

"Er lief auf dem Mond", Schlagzeile der ägyptischen Tageszeitung *Al Gomhouria* am 22. 7. 1969

der in den späten 1960er Jahren als Freiwilliger für den Christlichen Verein Junger Männer (YMCA) in Addis Abeba arbeitete, konnte eine Kopie des 16-mm-Farbfilms über das Ereignis erwerben, den die NASA über den United States Information Service allen US-Botschaften und Konsulaten zur Verfügung gestellt hatte. Auf das Angebot, den Film in den Räumen des YMCA zu zeigen, reagierte die äthiopische Leitung der Organisation zunächst zurückhaltend. Da für die äthiopische städtische Jugend sowohl Juri Gagarin als auch Al Shepard Helden des Alls waren, wollte sich das von den USA unterstützte YMCA inmitten des Kalten Krieges und der antiimperialistischen Studentenproteste in Addis Abeba nicht der Verbreitung amerikanischer Propaganda verdächtig machen. Als der Film einige Wochen später doch vor Ort gezeigt wurde, waren die Reaktionen sehr unterschiedlich. Wie auch andernorts, meinten einige, dass es sich um einen fiktiven Hollywoodfilm handele, während andere fragten, was eigentlich erforscht werde und vor allem warum; wieso man sich nicht den drängenden Problemen widme, sondern Geld auf diese Weise verschleudere? Das YMCA war ein Ort, wo man solche Dinge offen ansprechen konnte. Zudem zeigte die Einrichtung zu dieser Zeit allabendlich

die neuen Folgen der Fernsehserie *Star Trek*. Die am YMCA präsentierten NASA-Filme holten Norris Lineweavers Meinung nach die Erforschung von Neuland aus der Fantasie in die Wirklichkeit.[8]

Andere erinnerten, dass die bemannte Mondlandung die interessierten Hauptstädter in zwei Lager spaltete. In Anlehnung an das heutige *public viewing* soll sich die begeisterte Jugend in den *bira bet* – den Trinkhäusern – getroffen haben, um die Mondlandung zu verfolgen. Im Gegensatz dazu versammelten sich orthodoxe Gläubige in den Kirchen, um das Ende der Welt zu erwarten. Sie waren verwirrt, denn der unter dem Begriff *səmənтəñao ši* auf 8000 Jahre nach ihrer Entstehung berechnete Untergang der Erde schien noch nicht an der Zeit.[9] Angesichts wesentlich drängenderer Probleme, wie die Studentenbewegung, mangelnde Versorgungslage und Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen Eritreas, geriet das Thema Mondlandung jedoch schnell wieder in den Hintergrund.

Die eingangs erwähnte amerikanische Abhörstation Kagnew Station in der Nähe von Asmara, der heutigen Hauptstadt Eritreas, war seit den 1960er Jahren äthiopische Provinz. Der Kaiser hatte den Amerikanern bereits 1953 auf 25 Jahre hinaus Kagnew als militärische Abhörstation vermietet. Hier wurden vor allem geheimdienstliche Informationen über den arabischen Raum gesammelt. Die günstige Lage auf demselben Längengrad wie Jewpatorija, der Sende- und Empfangsstation für kosmische Fernverbindungen auf der Halbinsel Krim erlaubte auch die Ausspionierung von Mondmissionen der Sowjetunion seit Luna 5 im Jahr 1965. In der Nähe von Asmara errichtete das amerikanische Militär mit *Stonehouse* eine zweite Abhörstation, die sich vor allem um die sowjetischer Molniya-Kommunikationssatelliten „kümmern" sollte.[10]

Der gewaltsame Sturz von Kaiser Haile Selassie I 1974, beendete die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem nun sozialistisch orientierten Äthiopien und den USA. Auf militärischem Gebiet kooperierte man nun mit der Sowjetunion.

Ägypten, die Mondlandung und der wachsende Zweifel

Ägypten, das unter Präsident Gamal Abdel Nasser eine antiimperialistische Politik betrieb und mit der sozialistischen Staatengemeinschaft auf vielen Gebieten zusammenarbeitete, gehörte mit Sicherheit zu den Staaten, die von *Kagnew Station* aus ins geheimdienstliche Visier der USA genommen wurden. Zum Zeitpunkt der Mondlandung befand sich Ägypten im Konflikt mit Israel.

In seinen 2012 veröffentlichten Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, schreibt Nubar Aroyan, zu diesem Zeitpunkt Soldat der ägyptischen Armee, folgendes:

„At about 11 p.m. lying on the sand and listening to Voice of America on a transistor radio, we looked at the full moon and welcomed the Americans landing on it at the same moment. It was exhilarating. But the moon landing was extremely shocking and an almost incomprehensible event to some soldiers of Muslim faith, they could not believe it, they thought it

8 „The NASA films shown at the YMCA took exploration of the frontier from fantasy to current real time reality." Email Norris Lineweaver an Katrin Bromber, 28. 4. 2019.

9 Ich danke Seyoum Mulugeta für diese Auskunft.

10 Sven Grahn, The US Deep Space Intelligence Collection program, https://www.kagnewstation.com/documents/deepspace/index.html, eingesehen am 10. 4. 2019.

was a hoax because for a devote Muslim the moon is something close to divine. It cannot be violated. Muslims profess that Muhammad once split the moon in half which proofs to them that Muhammad was capable of performing miracles, just like Jesus, and thus was a true prophet. The moon appears as a crescent on the flag of many Muslim countries." [11]

Im Gegensatz zu dem ungläubigen Staunen unter muslimischen Soldaten der ägyptischen Armee, brachen in Somalia am Tag nach der Mondlandung regelrechte anti-westliche Unruhen aus. In den Moscheen der Hauptstadt Mogadischu brandmarkten Prediger die Landung auf dem Mond entweder als Lüge oder Gotteslästerung.[12] Auf der anderen Seite teilte eine Somalierin in einem Hörerbrief an *Voice of America* mit, dass sie ihr elftes Kind Apollo genannt habe.[13]

In Ägypten wiederum war die Landung der amerikanischen Astronauten und eben nicht der sowjetischen Kosmonauten auf dem Mond mit anderen Gefühlen und Betrachtungen verbunden. Gamal Abdelnasser Ibrahim, 1959 geboren und nach dem damaligen Staatspräsidenten genannt, erlebte die Reaktionen auf das Ereignis im ländlichen Ägypten und erinnert sich an ein Gefühl der Ernüchterung, angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Sowjetunion, also der wichtigste militärische Partner Ägyptens, den Amerikanern (technisch und militärisch) unterlegen war.[14] Die Landung der Amerikaner auf dem Mond schien eine Bestätigung der Zweifel an der sowjetischen Stärke und Verlässlichkeit zu sein, die sich vor und besonders nach dem 6-Tage-Krieg 1967 entwickelt hatten. Im Mai 1967 begann Ägypten für Israel den Zugang zum Roten Meer zu schließen. Es stockte seine Truppenkontingente im Grenzgebiet auf und forderte Syrien, Jordanien, Saudi-Arabien und den Irak auf, Gleiches zu tun. Als sich die Lage zuspitzte, ermahnte der sowjetische Botschafter den ägyptischen Präsidenten noch am Morgen des Kriegsausbruchs explizit zur Zurückhaltung. Die Folgen des israelischen Erstschlages gegen Militärflughäfen in Ägypten, Syrien und Jordanien waren verheerend und lösten nach der militärischen Niederlage eine politische Krise in Ägypten aus. Gamal Abdel Nasser bot seinen Rücktritt an, wurde jedoch im Amt bestätigt.

Bereits am 18. Juli 1969 berichtete *al-Ahram*, die älteste und wichtigste ägyptische Tageszeitung, über die Vorbereitung der Apollo-11-Mission. Deren Ergebnisse würden, so die Autoren, der Erstellung neuer astronomischer Karten zur Erde dienen, das medizinische, agrotechnische und meteorologische Wissen erweitern, aber auch militärstrategisch für den Vietnamkrieg nutzbar sein. Die Leserschaft wurde aber auch über die Verbindung des US-Militärs zu Wernher von Braun, und dessen Raketenforschung während des Zweiten Weltkriegs informiert.[15] Bei diesem Beitrag handelte es sich um Teile einer Meldung der Nachrichtenagentur Reuters, deren englische Version auch in Äthiopien und Tansania abgedruckt wurde.[16] Drei

11 Nubar Aroyan, *Diary of a Soldier in the Egyptian Military: A Peek inside the Egyptian Army*. Bloomington: Westbow Press, 2012, 49-50.
12 Aidan Hartley, *The Zanzibar Chest: A Story of Life, Love, and Death in Foreign Lands*. New York: Grove Press 2004.
13 Alan L. Heil, *Voice of America. A History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, 237.
14 Ich danke Gamal Abdelnasser Ibrahim für diese Erinnerungen.
15 „Natā'ğauwal riḥli-l-insān fauq al-qamar" [Die Ergebnisse der ersten Reise des Menschen zum Mond], *al-Ahram* 21. 7. 1969.
16 Inwiefern die ägyptische Leserschaft mit dem deutschen Raketenforscher und dessen Federführung bei der Entwicklung der V2-Rakete im nationalsozialistischen Deutschlandvertraut war, bleibt zu hinterfragen.

View of earth, showing Africa, Europe and Asia taken by Apollo 11 crewmember, 1969

Tage später berichtete die Zeitung unter der Überschrift „Laufen auf dem Mond" ausführlich über den Verlauf der Apollo-11-Mission – dem menschlichen Wunder, das vollbracht worden sei, indem der Fuß eines Menschen die Oberfläche des Mondes berührt hätte.[17]

Ein interessantes Detail ist im Zusammenhang mit der Mondlandung und Ägypten erwähnenswert. Die Person, die den genauen Ort der Landung errechnet hatte, war der ägyptisch-amerikanische Forscher Farouk El-Baz. Er nahm an einem NASA-Training der Astronauten und der Planung der Apollo-11-Mission teil. Da sein Vater an der al-Azhar Universität in Kairo lehrte und sich explizit mit interstellaren Religionen im alten Ägypten befasste, befeuerte dies okkulte Deutungen bezüglich der Unternehmung. So wurde den Astronauten die Mitgliedschaft in Freimaurerlogen unterstellt und Verschwörungstheorien entwickelt.

Tansania, Antiimperialismus und Ujamaa

Ein Land, das im Rahmen der Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen erst mit Ägypten kooperierte, nach dem gewaltsamen Umsturz auf Sansibar 1964 aber zunehmend auf Distanz ging, war Tansania. Im Juli 1969, also zum Zeitpunkt der Mondlandung, feierte die Regierungspartei Tanzania National Union, ihr 15-jähriges Bestehen. Im offiziellen swahilisprachigen Presseorgan *Uhuru* erschien eine Vielzahl von Berichten über die positiven Entwicklungen seit der formalen Unabhängigkeit von Großbritannien 1961. Unter der Führung des charismatischen Präsidenten Julius Nyerere sollte eine egalitäre, antiimperialistische Gesellschaft aufgebaut werden, die unter dem Begriff *Ujamaa* bekannt wurde. Außenpolitische Berichterstattung konzentrierte sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt auf den Biafra-Krieg in Nigeria, den Vietnamkrieg und

Anzunehmende Langzeitwirkungen nationalsozialistischer Propaganda in den Nahen Osten rücken diese Annahme durchaus in den Bereich des Möglichen. Die Begegnung der arabischen Welt mit dem Nationalsozialismus, dass in Deutschland vor allem auch am ZMO betrieben wurde, hat sich in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten als wichtiges Forschungsfeld etabliert.

17 „Mašā ʿala ʾl-qamar" [Laufen auf dem Mond], *al-Ahram*, 21. 7. 1969.

die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen im Nahen Osten. So erfolgte die Ankündigung der bemannten Reise zum Mond vergleichsweise spät, nämlich erst am 18. Juli, und auch nicht als selbständiges Ereignis. Vielmehr berichtete das Blatt immer im Zusammenhang mit der sowjetischen Luna-Mission, die zeitgleich ein unbemanntes Fahrzeug zum Mond geschickt hatte, und der drohenden Gefahr, dass sich Luna 15 wohl Apollo 11 in den Weg stellen könnte. Die englischsprachige Zeitung *The Nationalist* sprach gar von einem „Astronauts and Robots Moon Duell".[18] Hier schlugen sich die Autoren keineswegs auf die sowjetische Seite. Tansania fühlte sich nämlich weniger der Sowjetunion als China verbunden, das bereits in den 1960er Jahren großen politischen Einfluss in Afrika ausübte.

Am 22. Juli informierte *Uhuru* ausführlich über die Landung. Interessanterweise widmete die Berichterstattung Neil Armstrongs Entschuldigung über die etwas verspätete Landung besonderer Aufmerksamkeit. *Adabu* – Anstand und Zurückhaltung – ist ein wichtiges Merkmal des Helden der Swahili-Kultur und im Rahmen dieses Ereignisses wurden tatsächlich Helden produziert. Luna 15 kreiste währenddessen auf der Mondumlaufbahn, schlug aber erst unsanft auf dem Mond auf, nachdem die Astronauten der Apollo 11 den Erdtrabanten wieder verlassen hatten.[19]

Während im All alles friedlich blieb, traf das auf die Erde keinesfalls zu. So mahnte die Zeitung, dass man trotz Freude und Stolz auf das Erreichte nicht die Kriege in Vietnam, Nigeria, dem Nahen Osten und die sich abzeichnenden Konflikte in Lateinamerika vergessen dürfe. Auch der Kampf gegen den Hunger müsse weitergehen. Damit band *Uhuru* die Mondlandung wieder in das lokale politische Geschehen ein: den Kampf gegen die Unwissenheit, den Hunger und die Armut – *Vita dhidi ya ujinga, njaa na umaskini*, wie es in der Swahiliübersetzung heißt. Obgleich Präsident Nyerere die Mondlandung in seiner Radioansprache am 21. Juli als ein „Wunder" bezeichnete, das alle Tansanier aufmerksam am Radio verfolgt hätten, und er dem Präsidenten der USA entsprechend gratulierte, gehörte Nyerere zu jenen Politikern, die das Raumfahrtprogramm als pure Verschwendung betrachteten. Auf einem Seminar mit schwedischen Entwicklungshelfern bekräftigte er diese Haltung mit deutlichen Worten. Die Wahl, das Geld für die bemannte Raumfahrt oder für die Bekämpfung von Armut auszugeben, stünde gar nicht zur Debatte, sondern eher die Entscheidung zwischen Raumfahrtprogramm oder weiterer Finanzierung des Vietnamkriegs.[20] Obgleich sich die wichtigste englischsprachige Zeitung *The Nationalist* eher an eine internationale Leserschaft richtete und wesentlich ausführlicher über die Mondmission informierte, wurde Nyereres kritische Haltung auch hier abgedruckt.[21]

A commemorative postage stamp on man on the moon, 20-7-1969, India

18 „Apollo yaendelea na safari" [Apollo setzt seine Reise fort], *Uhuru* 18. 7. 1969, 1; „Mtu atua mwezini" [Der Mensch landet auf dem Mond], *Uhuru* 21. 7. 1969, 1, „Astronauts and Robots Moon Duell", *The Nationalist* 18. 7. 1969, 2.
19 „Wananga wanarejea duniani" [die Astronauten kehren zur Erde zurück], *Uhuru* 22. 7. 1969, 1–2.
20 „Safari ya anga ni ‚maajabu'" [Die Reise in den Weltraum ist ein „Wunder"], *Uhuru* 22. 7. 1969, 1.
21 "Mwalimu says: Moon venture ‚terrific'", *The Nationalist* 22. 7. 1969, 1.

Schließlich konnte die auf Antiimperialismus und Fortschritt ausgerichtete Swahilipresse dem ganzen Unternehmen doch noch positive Seiten abgewinnen. So zeige die Mondlandung, dass bei entsprechendem Willen alles möglich sei. Die Leistung der drei Astronauten sei somit Vorbild für den Aufbau der tansanischen Nation.[22]

Dieselbe Ausgabe berichtet noch einmal umfangreich über den Ablauf und ein Detail befasst sich in besonderer Weise mit der Mondlandung als medialem Ereignis. Der Leitartikel vom 23. Juli betont:

„Neil Armstrong war beinahe gestürzt, aber er wurde noch rechtzeitig von seinem Kollegen Edwin Aldrin gewarnt. Ohne es zu bemerken, hatte Armstrong seinen Fuß sehr nahe an das Übertragungskabel gesetzt. ‚Neil', rief Aldrin über Funk, ‚Du verwickelst dich im Kabel.' ‚O.K.', antwortete Armstrong, nachdem er von Aldrin aufmerksam gemacht worden war. ‚Setze Deinen Fuß etwas nach rechts, denn Dein Daumen ist noch gefangen'. Und nachdem Armstrong seinen Fuß nach rechts gesetzt hatte, war die Unfallgefahr vorüber." [23]

Anschließend berichtet der Beitrag, dass Moskau die Mondlandung live übertragen habe. Anders in China, wo der bemannten Mondlandung gar keine öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt worden sei. Stattdessen, so zitiert *Uhuru* eine Pressemitteilung aus Hongkong, habe Radio Peking umfangreich über die Errungenschaften der Arbeiter aus einem Betrieb in Shanghai informiert. Der sowjetisch-chinesische Kampf um die ideologische Vorherrschaft in der sogenannten „Dritten Welt" spiegelte sich auch in diesem Detail. Mit dem Maoismus bot China während der Kulturrevolution eine für afrikanische Staaten durchaus interessante kommunistische Alternative zum als schwerfällig und korrupt wahrgenommenen sowjetischen Modell an.[24]

Südafrika, die Mondlandung und Risse im „Abschirm"

Südafrika versuchte die Apartheids-Politik unter anderem durch größtmögliche Abschottung nach außen inklusive eines ‚TV ban' während der 1950er und 1960er Jahre durchzusetzen. Insbesondere der potenzielle Empfang internationaler Nachrichten per Satellit verängstigte die weiße Minderheitsregierung über die Maßen. Mit dem Motto „Fernsehen macht gleich!" argumentierte der damalige Minister für Post und Fernmeldewesen, Albert Hertzog, vehement gegen die Einrichtung des Fernsehens im Apartheid-Staat. Premierminister Hendrik Verwoerd verstieg sich gar in einen Vergleich von Fernsehen mit Giftgas oder der Atombombe.[25] Informationen über den Kampf gegen Rassismus, der in den 1960er Jahren an Fahrt aufgenommen hatte, waren für das Apartheidregime zur realen Bedrohung geworden.

Der ‚TV ban' wurde allerdings auch zur Waffe in der Hand der Opposition, insbesondere der United Party, die bereits 1966 dessen Aufhebung forderte.[26] Die Mondlandung 1969

22 „Msafara mwingine mwezini" [Eine weitere Reise zum Mond], *Uhuru* 23. 7. 1969, 1.
23 Ebd.
24 Zur Anziehungskraft des maoistischen Gesellschaftsmodells auf Befreiungsbewegungen der 1960er Jahre siehe Yinghong Cheng, *Creating the New Man: From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'I Press.
25 Rob Nixon, "Apollo11, Apartheid, and TV. When the only way to watch was to line up in front of a purple velvet curtain", *The Atlantic* July (1999), 1.
26 Martha Evants, "Events Envy. 'South Africa's Exclusion from the Media Events of the '60s, 70s, and 80s'". In: *Broadcasting and the End of Apartheid. Live Television and the Birth of New South Africa*, I. B. Tauris, 2014, 30.

gab dieser Dynamik noch einmal zusätzlichen Schub. Der Ausschluss der gesamten südafrikanischen Bevölkerung von diesem Medienereignis löste vor allem unter einem großen Teil der weißen Minderheit enorme Kritik aus.

Um das Ereignis live verfolgen zu können, entwickelte sich ein regelrechter „Mondtourismus" nach London. Die Zeitung *Rand Daily Mail*, die sich für die Einführung des Fernsehens einsetzte sowie das elektrotechnische Unternehmen Tedelex, boten über Wochen kostenlose Filmvorführungen von der Mondlandung an. Allerdings nur für Weiße und im Wesentlichen auf Johannesburg und Pretoria beschränkt. Zwischen 70- bis 100 000 Personen sollen auf diese Weise das Ereignis gesehen haben.[27]

Einige Monate später, als die Regierung dem Druck nicht mehr standhalten konnte, wurde ein 15-minütiger Zusammenschnitt der Mondlandung im Planetarium in Johannesburg gezeigt. Rob Nixon, damals noch im Teenageralter, erinnert sich:

„The turnout was immense. Policemen with German shepherds and Dobermans straining at the leash patrolled the line. After hours of waiting I entered a barricaded enclosure and joined twenty other people seated on collapsible metal chairs. A sullen moustached man tugged a sash, a purple velvet curtain slid back, and a television was revealed. For fifteen minutes I witnessed a lunar landing that seemed no stranger than the unearthly presence of that black box in the room. Then the curtain was closed again and we filed out, abandoning our seats to the next twenty people in line." [28]

Ein wichtiges Argument der weißen Opposition gegen das Fernsehverbot war, wie Nixon weiter ausführt, dass die Abwesenheit eines solch fortschrittlichen Mediums Südafrika insgesamt extrem rückständig aussehen ließ. Rückständiger sogar als andere afrikanische Staaten. Das wiedersprach natürlich nicht nur dem weißen Selbstverständnis, sondern auch Südafrikas wissenschaftlich-technischen Leistungen. Pikanterweise landete mit der „Eagle", also der Mondlandekapsel, auch ein Stückchen südafrikanischer Erfindergeist auf dem Mond. Anfang der 1960er Jahre hatte George Pratley, Gründer von Pratley Manufacturing and Engeneering in Kruegersdorp, einen speziellen Dichtungskitt entwickelt, den die NASA für die Mondlandekapsel benutzte. Diese konkrete Beteiligung Südafrikas an der Apollo-11-Mission wurde eher marginal wahrgenommen und eine Würdigung erfolgte erst Jahrzehnte später.

Die bemannte Mondlandung als historisches Brennglas

Die Beschäftigung mit der bemannten Mondlandung im Juli 1969 als global wahrgenommenes Ereignis bietet also die Möglichkeit ganz konkrete lokale Perspektiven freizulegen, die in den großen historischen Szenarien des Kalten Krieges weniger Beachtung finden. Wie die vorgestellten Beispiele Äthiopien, Ägypten, Tansania und Südafrika zeigen, waren bei der medialen Diskussion konkrete Zukunftsentwürfe von Bedeutung, die die wirtschaftliche, aber auch militärische Zusammenarbeit während der Dekolonisierungsphase beeinflussten.

Obgleich Kaiser Haile Selassie I anfangs auf die Stärke der Amerikaner setzte, um sich gegen eine drohende britische Bevormundung zu wehren, suchte er als Chef-Diplomat Aus-

27 Ebd. 31.

28 Rob Nixon, Apollo11, Apartheid, and TV. When the only way to watch was to line up in front of a purple velvet curtain. *The Atlantic* July (1999), 2. (https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/07/apollo-11-apartheid-and-tv/377681/, eingesehen am 5. 8. 2019).

gleich nach allen Seiten. Die offizielle Berichterstattung über Apollo 11 folgte dieser diplomatischen Linie, indem sie die bemannte Mondlandung nicht als Errungenschaft einer der führenden Mächte darstellte, sondern in die Menschheitsgeschichte einband. Für Ägypten, das sehr eng mit der Sowjetunion zusammengearbeitet hatte, war die amerikanische Mondlandung ein weiteres Zeichen für die wachsende sowjetische Schwäche. Tansania gratulierte den Amerikanern zwar zum Erfolg, nahm jedoch in seiner antiimperialistischen bzw. antiamerikanischen Haltung kein Blatt vor den Mund. Das Apartheid-Regime in Südafrika wiederum verweigerte sich gegen das Fernsehen und somit auch gegen eine Live-Übertragungen globaler Ereignisse. Offenbar war innenpolitisch hiermit eine Grenze überschritten worden, die vor allem weißen Regimegegnern Argumente für eine Reform des Apartheid-Staates in die Hand gab.

Erinnerungen an die Landung der beiden amerikanischen Astronauten auf dem Mond zeigen konkrete religiös motivierte Reaktionen auf das Ereignis. Sowohl orthodox-christliche als auch islamische Gemeinschaften standen dem Fakt, dass Menschen den Erdtrabanten betreten skeptisch bis kritisch gegenüber. Während der technikbegeisterte Westen die Mondlandung als einen „großen Schritt für die Menschheit" feierte, sahen orthodoxe Christen in Äthiopien in demselben Ereignis das Ende der Menschheit. Obgleich der bemannte Flug zum Mond in der islamischen Welt aus theologischen Gründen heftig kritisiert wurde, setzte er unter islamischen Gelehrten auch konstruktive Diskussionen frei, die sich mit der Vereinbarkeit von Religion und wissenschaftlich-technischem Fortschritt auseinandersetzten.[29] Konkret stellte sich in diesem Zusammenhang die Frage mondbezogener Koraninterpretationen.[30] Solche Diskussionen fanden zudem Eingang in Projekte zur Erforschung des Weltraums, die in der arabischen Welt begonnen wurden.[31] Hier spielte übrigens der bereits erwähnte ägyptische Wissenschaftler Farouk El-Baz eine zentrale Rolle.

Dem 50. Jahrestag der Landung von Menschen auf dem Mond und der 60. Jahrestag der Landung eines menschgemachten Objektes auf dem Mond wird weltweit gedacht. Die Erinnerungen an diese Ereignisse befeuern die Fantasie zu neuen Mondmissionen, z. B. mit afrikanischer Beteiligung. Wissenschaftliche und populärwissenschaftliche Einrichtung, wie die Ethiopian Space Science Society, die regelmäßig zum *moon gazing* einlädt, tragen zur lokalen und kontinentalen Debatte bei. Ein afrikanischer Mensch im Weltraum oder auf dem Mond erscheint nicht mehr unmöglich.

29 Shaykh Hamza Yusuf – Muslim Scholars Response to First Moon Landing (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-sO0DthqNrzA, eingesehen am 5. 8. 2019).

30 Ein Beispiel für Ostafrika beschreibt Kai Kresse, *Philosophising in Mombasa: Knowledge, Islam and Intellectual Practice on the Swahili Coast*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press for the International African Institute 2007, 99.

31 Jörg Matthias Determann, *Space Science and the Arab World: Astronauts, Observatories, and Nationalism in the Middle East*, London: IB Tauris 2018.

Resources

The Politics of Resources

Katharina Lange

This research unit has been investigating the processes through which specific substances or materials (such as land, water, minerals, forests etc.) are "turned into" resources: when and how are they re-valued, how do they acquire economic significance and how do such resources generate power, wealth, influence and meaning?

In the context of the ZMO research programme "Muslim Worlds – World of Islam?", our perspective is specifically informed by an interest in the political shifts and social differentiations and inequalities involved in resource-making. We scrutinize the ways in which the social actors engaged in these processes perceive, deal with, accommodate, welcome or resist processes of resource extraction or commodification. Furthermore, how do resource-related socio-economic transformations engender, affect or express changes in social and political relations in a given locality? The cosmological and spiritual implications of such transformative processes are a second focus. Which normative frameworks are articulated in debates or conflicts around resource use, and how are these linked to ethical frameworks rooted in specific religious or ideological traditions?

In the period 2017–19, the group consisted of six researchers in the main programme, two of whom were doctoral candidates. They were joined by six affiliated researchers who participated in the group for periods lasting between four years and two months. The researchers represented the disciplines of history, anthropology, geography, sociology and cultural studies.

Over the past three years, the group has reached out to the academic community and to the wider public through a variety of means, such as publications, visual media and teaching. It contributed to ZMO's final conference (addressed in a separate section of this report) with a panel on "The Moral Economies of Resource Valuation and Extraction".

Issues scrutinized by researchers in this unit are of concern to broader audiences, who have been addressed through media and publications of a non-academic nature. A key example is the urgent question of climate change. Geographical areas covered by researchers at ZMO are among the most severely impacted by the effects of global warming. In September 2017, Ali Nobil Ahmad curated the film festival *anthropoSCENE: Film and Climate Justice in Asia and Africa*, supported by ZMO and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, and screened at Movie-

mento Cinema in Berlin-Kreuzberg. Featuring screenings, podium discussions and commentaries by ZMO scholars, the festival created a public space to feature and discuss African, Middle Eastern and Asian cinematic perspectives on climate change.

Another example is the Uranium Atlas (*Uran Atlas*) to which Patrick Schukalla contributed in the section on uranium mining in Africa, published in 2019 by the Nuclear Free Future Foundation, the Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and *Le Monde diplomatique*. Uranium – the raw material for any nuclear programme – is hardly ever discussed in public. However, the technology to split the atom plays a role on the global political stage, from the unsettling return of nuclear deterrence rhetoric to the industry's attempt to portray itself as a "climate-neutral alternative". The Uranium Atlas illustrates the global dimension, the risks, the resistance to uranium mining and nuclear energy alongside the needs of the whole fuel chain.

An important means by which the debates of the group were projected to the scholarly public was a series of three conferences focusing on different aspects of resource issues in the Middle East and North Africa. Human appropriations of natural resources in this region date back millennia, calling into question notions of "pristine nature" and informing perceptions of the MENA as a deeply "cultural" region. Although empirically grounded research on the MENA is thus in an excellent position to speak to current scholarly debates on "second nature", "nature/culture" and human–environment relations more generally, research on environmental transformations and their repercussions in the MENA region is still surprisingly scarce compared to that for other regions of the Global South.

In January 2018, a two-day conference, organized at ZMO with the support of the German Research Council, addressed "Appropriations, Representations, Productions: Engage-

ments with 'Nature' in the MENA Region from the 19th Century until Today". Participants from ten countries, including the USA, France, Canada, Israel, Morocco and Oman, discussed the repercussions of shifts in legal, political and economic regimes, as well as technological innovations and also new conceptual frameworks such as environmentalism. The conference showed how "nature" has been conceptualized simultaneously as a commodifiable, potential source of prosperity and wealth and as a realm redolent with powerful, resistant and threatening more-than-human properties. The publication of the conference proceedings as an edited volume is currently under way.

In September 2018, a second conference, focusing specifically on North Africa, addressed processes of appropriating control over land, as well as rural resistance and the social and political protests that these processes have generated since the nineteenth century. Conducted in French, English and Arabic, the conference "The Land Question in North Africa in an Era of Global Resource Grabs and Ecological Crisis" explicitly aimed at stimulating a dialogue across and beyond Anglophone and Francophone traditions of research, which often still lack mutual acknowledgement. The contributions demonstrated that from the nineteenth century onwards, processes of land grabbing from Algeria to Libya involved states as well as international firms, indicating how processes of economic integration overlapped with relationships of domination. In the contemporary period, we see new forms of land grabbing at work in North Africa. These are partly driven by local small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs, and partly by international or national actors that legitimize this appropriation of land, forest and so forth with ecological arguments, claiming to protect or save the environment through enclosing and commodifying specific areas or plots while excluding local populations and traditional forms of use ("green grabbing"). These diverse (partly violent) processes of appropriation have, in particular contexts and instances, generated practices of protest and resistance which have partly been articulated in the context of larger protest movements, such as the wave of unrest referred to as the Arab uprisings. A selection of conference papers on these themes is forthcoming in the *Review of African Political Economy*.

A third conference, linking the MENA region to neighbouring regions across the Mediterranean, was organized in cooperation with the University of Cologne (where it was hosted) as well as three regional groups of the German Anthropological Association in May 2019. Titled "Rurality and Future-Making: Comparative Perspectives from Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean", it explored how rurality is achieved, marked and (de-)stabilized in these regions. The presentations showed that rural locations that are often imagined as discrete, remote or isolated spaces are not only contingent on an urban Other, but on closer scrutiny usually form part of larger, interconnected, often transnational spaces and regionalities. Widespread associations of "the rural" with nature/naturalness and authenticity/autochthony continue to provide powerful images and expectations. In many cases, however, these are contradicted by practical developments related to economic shifts and structural change, the industrialization of agriculture and the increasing significance of tourism or extractive industries. This tension between, on the one hand, material, economic and social transformations in many rural locales and, on the other, the trope of the rural as a repository of temporal stillness, may fuel diverse types of political action as well as intellectual and artistic production, ranging from xenophobic or far-right movements to debates about the rights of migrant labourers.

Asche zu Asche – Staub zu Staub!?

Von der Uranexploration zum nuklearen Kreislauf in die Sackgasse

Patrick Schukalla

Von der Uranexploration bis zur Steckdose ist es ein weiter Weg. Die ersten Schritte der nuklearen Brennstoffkette entziehen sich häufig unserer Wahrnehmung, sind aber eng mit Technologiegeschichte und Politik der Atomkraft verwoben, was sich am Beispiel Tansanias gut nachvollziehen lässt.

Ob für die Bombe oder für Atomstrom: Der Grundstoff eines jeden Atomprogramms ist das chemische Element Uran. Trotz dieser maßgeblichen materiellen Grundbedingung erfährt die eigentliche Urangewinnung vergleichsweise wenig Beachtung. Gerne ist dabei, z. B. auch von der Internationalen Atomenergie-Agentur IAEO, beschönigend vom Brennstoffkreislauf die Rede, also vom Euphemismus des Zyklischen, dem Kreislauf vom „ungenutzten nuklearen Material aus der Natur“ bis zur Endlagerung des „aufgebrauchten Brennelements in der Natur“ – also: Asche zu Asche, Staub zu Staub!?

Doch bevor Uran abgebaut werden kann, müssen zunächst geologische Daten über Lage, Qualität und Ausbeutbarkeit erkundet werden. Es müssen Lizenzen und Genehmigungen erteilt und die benötigte Mineninfrastruktur sowie Transportwege gebaut werden. Bereits die Suche nach Uran und die Schätzungen über weltweite Lagerstätten sind eng mit der Technologiegeschichte und Politik der Atomkraft verbunden. Am Beispiel Tansanias lässt sich das gut nachvollziehen.

Uranabbau: das Zielgebiet Tansania

Nur etwa drei Jahre nach der Gründung der United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), die mit dem Aufbau eines zivilen Atomprogramms betraut war, richtete diese noch 1957 ein Büro im damaligen britischen Mandatsgebiet Tanganjika ein. Gemeinsam mit Geologen der UKAEA explorierte der „Geological Survey of Tanganyika“ nach Uran. Zu einem Abbau sollte es angesichts anderer Quellen vorerst nicht kommen. Von der Annahme ausgehend, Atomkraft sei die Energiequelle der Zukunft, stiegen die Ausgaben für Exploration in den 1970er- und 1980er-Jahren jedoch wieder enorm an. Ein Zielgebiet war auch Tansania. Diesmal finanziert mit staatlichen Mitteln der BRD explorierte die Uranerzbergbau GmbH, Bonn, von 1978 bis 1982 im gesamten Land nach Uran. Aufgrund schlechter Wachstumsaussichten wurde jedoch erneut kein Abbau angestrebt.

Renaissance der Uranexploration

Erneut ins Visier von Ressourcenspekulationen kamen die tansanischen Uranvorkommen in den 2000er-Jahren. Ausschlaggebend hierfür war der enorm gestiegene Preis für Uran und die geradezu imaginierte, zukünftig zu erwartende Nachfrage nach Uran der weltweit betriebenen, vor allem aber im Bau befindlichen und geplanten AKW. Die Atom-Lobby propagierte nämlich wieder eine „nukleare Renaissance“, sprich die „glorreiche Rückkehr“ der Atomkraft als vermeintlich CO2-neutrale „saubere“ Quelle.

Mit dem Interesse, also an Orten zu explorieren, an denen Umwelt- und Sozialstandards geringere Hürden und Kosten verursachen, wandte man sich nun unter anderem den Uranvorkommen in Bahi in Zentraltansania und dem Mkuju River-Vorkommen im Süden des Landes zu. Noch kurz vor der AKW-Katastrophe in Fukushima Daiichi im März 2011 erwarb das dem russischen Staatskonzern Rosatom gehörende Uranbergbauunternehmen Uranium One das „Mkuju River Uranium"-Projekt. Seither wird der Abbau von Uran in Tansania vorbereitet, angesichts geringer Uranpreise seit 2011 allerdings sehr schleppend. Dies führte auch bei den lokalen BefürworterInnen in der von kleinbäuerlicher Landwirtschaft geprägten und an das Wildtierschutzgebiet Selous angrenzenden Region für Unmut.

Profit für wenige auf Kosten aller

„Schon seit über 10 Jahren heißt es: Forschung und Exploration. Was uns bleibt, ist unsichere Beschäftigung für nur wenige und für den Rest der Staub, den die Autos und LKW aufwirbeln. Sie sollen hier endlich wirklich investieren – oder verschwinden", fasste Ibrahim*, ein Bewohner des Dorfes Likuyu, zusammen. Mit der Hoffnung auf verbesserte Infrastruktur und Arbeitsplätze ließ sich zeitweilig einige Zustimmung erwirken. Widerspruch kam zunächst von anderer Seite. Internationale Protestnoten richteten sich etwa gegen die 2012 beschlossene Herauslösung des geplanten Bergwerksgeländes aus dem Wildschutzgebiet Selous, das von der UNESCO als Weltnaturerbe geschützt wird. Explorationen in Zentraltansania riefen früh andere Reaktionen hervor. Hier fanden sie an Orten statt, die als Felder und Weidegründe von zentraler Bedeutung für die Bevölkerung sind, wie ein Bauer darlegte: „Wenn ich denen, die hier nach Rohstoffen suchen, etwas ausrichten könnte, ich würde ihnen sagen, sie mögen uns in Ruhe lassen. Wir führen ein einfaches Leben und seit wir unsere Felder ordentlich bewässern können, geht es uns gut. Wir und unsere Familien haben hier eine Zukunft. Wir wollen ihr Gift nicht und wir lassen uns unser Land nicht wegnehmen", sagt Said* aus Bahi Makuru. Angesichts des wachsenden Widerstands wurden die Bohrungen zeitweilig unter Polizeischutz durchgeführt – ein vorläufiges Ende bereitete ihnen jedoch erst der Preiseinbruch für das radioaktiv strahlende Uran.

In Plastiktüten verpackte Bodenprobe

Kampf um die Deutungshoheit

Während tansanische und internationale NGO, Menschenrechts- und Umweltbewegungen auf die schädlichen Folgen für Mensch und Umwelt und insbesondere auch auf die enormen Folgekosten des Abbaus hinweisen, geben sich staatliche Behörden und Betreiber alle Mühe, Uran als unproblematisch darzustellen. „Was Uran genau ist und was man damit macht, kann ich nicht wirklich sagen. Wir bekommen hier alle möglichen Antworten auf diese Frage. Ein Rohstoff mit dem man Energie erzeugen, Bomben bauen kann, andere sagen es ist Gift. Es heißt, man würde davon krank, andere sagen das sei Unsinn. Wem soll man glauben?“, beschrieb ein Bewohner von Mtonya, einem Dorf in der Nähe des Mkuju River-Projekts, seine Verunsicherung.

Keine Entwarnung

Wenn auch mit den schlechten Aussichten der Atomindustrie seit 2011 viele Uranexplorations- und Bergbauprojekte eingestellt oder verschoben wurden, eine Entwarnung kann nicht gegeben werden. Mit schwankender Akzeptanz und Unterstützung hat die Atomindustrie nicht zum ersten Mal zu kämpfen. Und gerade gegenwärtig erscheint die Mär von der „sauberen“ Energiequelle zur Bekämpfung des Klimawandels wieder vermittelbar. Die Verlockung gründet dabei aber auf dem Trugschluss, dass so tiefgreifende wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Veränderungen umgangen werden können. Atomkraft als Retterin des Wachstumsparadigmas, so lautet die hintergründige Botschaft. Die radioaktiven Abraumhalden des Uranbergbaus, die Landnahme und damit einhergehenden wirtschaftlichen wie sozialen Verwerfungen, welche der Uranabbau mit sich bringt, fallen hierbei vor allen anderen Problemen der Atomkraft unter den Tisch. Der langsame und immer wieder unterbrochene Prozess von der Exploration bis zu einer Mine bedeutet den einen Unsicherheit, Landnahme und Wartestellung, den anderen einen Datensatz über eine Ressource in der Hinterhand. Auch diesbezüglich ist die Atomenergienutzung Ausdruck und Bestandteil globaler Ungleichheit.

*Namen geändert

Ein Arbeiter im „Mkuju River“–Projekt

Climate Change and ZMO Research

Katharina Lange, Ali Nobil Ahmad

Between 6 and 17 November, 2017, the city of Bonn received over 20,000 participants of the UN Climate Change Conference, hosted by the Republic of Fiji and organized by the Federal Republic of Germany. In the conference build-up, climate change once more became a prominent and fiercely contested theme of public debate, as the current US government threatened to reverse earlier steps towards a more climate-friendly policy amidst an increasing number of extreme, often catastrophic weather phenomena.

The geographical areas covered by researchers at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient are among the most severely impacted by the effects of global warming. A 2016 report published by the Max-Planck-Institute of Chemistry and the Cyprus Institute predicted that extreme heatwaves and rising temperatures could make large parts of the Middle East and North Africa virtually uninhabitable in the 21st century. South Asia, too, is threatened by extreme heat and humidity, which could affect up to 70% of the population by 2100. India, Bangladesh and Pakistan are expected to see ever more catastrophic levels of flooding, while Africa already suffers from increasing floods, droughts, and disrupted rainfall patterns.

In Germany, media reports on the effects of climate change make general reference to these predictions – frequently with an undertone of alarm regarding an increase of migratory flows from the global South likely to be induced by climate change. However, African, Middle Eastern and Asian experiences, perspectives and voices addressing the severe effects of global warming are largely underrepresented in mainstream debates on today's environmental crisis.

Thank You For the Rain
(2017, dir. Julia Dahr/Kisilu Musya)

At ZMO, historians, anthropologists and geographers in the research area 'The Politics of Resources' who are working on countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, the Bukharan Emirate and Tanzania have been exploring different facets of human engagement with the natural environment since 2014. Individual projects investigate local perspectives on changing agricultural practices, contested strategies and policies of energy generation, or on provisions of and responses to resource scarcity and natural disasters.

Within this field, ZMO research fellow Ali Nobil Ahmad has explored the use of visual media to communicate his research findings about the disastrous repercussions of the 2010 floods in Pakistan, for instance through his 2015 documentary film, *Waseb*. In September 2017, Ahmad curated a film festival to bridge academic research and public debate through visual and cinematic means. Co-sponsored by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung and ZMO, the festival titled *anthropoSCENE: Film and Climate Justice in Asia and Africa* created a public space to feature and discuss African, Middle Eastern and Asian cinematic perspectives on climate change. The title was derived from a cinematic pun on a contested term that has influenced academic research, art, and philosophy since being popularized by the atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen in the early 2000s: in this literature, as well as numerous conferences, exhibitions, and art projects, *anthropocene* refers to the most recent epoch in the history of the Earth, an era of dangerous ecological instability caused by human-induced climate change and pollution.

The festival programme of short and feature length films brought together the work of artists, filmmakers, activists, journalists and academics who tackle climate change in the global South. Many screenings highlighted the agency of affected populations. A cluster of films directly addressed the consequences of changing weather as experienced by individuals and communities. Another explored the less obvious impacts of global warming by scrutinzing forms of energy considered antidotes to the problem of carbon emissions (water, wind and atomic power). A final strand drew attention to the modern history and contemporary reality of natural resource exploitation, framing the climate crisis as part of a broader struggle for environmental justice in the global South.

The final day of screenings coincided with Germany's parliamentary elections. As the last post-screening discussion brought the festival to a close, the first election results were already coming in. At the time of writing this editorial, the next German government is yet to be formed; the Bonn Climate Conference has ended, and the issue of climate change remains as pressing as ever. Encouraged by the high attendance rates and positive resonance to the screenings, organizers are considering a second edition of the festival.

„Der Klimaterror muss blockiert werden“

Interview von Juliane Schumacher mit Patrick Bond

Patrick Bond ist Professor für Politische Ökonomie an der Universität von Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, Südafrika, und einer der bekanntesten Aktivisten und Analysten der globalen Bewegung für Klimagerechtigkeit. Nach dem Ende der Apartheid arbeitete er von 1994 bis 2002 in Nelson Mandelas Regierung mit, von 2004 bis 2016 war er Direktor des Zentrums für Zivilgesellschaft der University of KwaZulu–Natal in Durban.

Warum ist es so schwer, Kämpfe um soziale Gerechtigkeit und Klimagerechtigkeit miteinander zu verbinden? Und wie können die Proteste gegen den Klimawandel an Schlagkraft gewinnen? Ein Gespräch mit dem südafrikanischen Politikprofessor und Klimaaktivisten Patrick Bond.

Im März hat der Zyklon Idai Simbabwe, Malawi und Mosambik getroffen, große Zerstörung angerichtet und viele Menschen getötet. Wie wurde das in Südafrika diskutiert? Bringen die Menschen das mit dem Klimawandel in Verbindung?

Patrick Bond: Auf jeden Fall. Wissenschaftler sind sich einig, dass dieser Sturm wegen des Klimawandels so heftig war. Die Temperatur des Indischen Ozeans vor der Stadt Beira in Mosambik lag zuletzt zwei Grad höher als normal, das hat den tropischen Sturm sehr viel stärker gemacht, als er sonst gewesen wäre. Inzwischen gehen die Regierungen von 1.078 Toten aus, mehr als zwei Millionen Menschen haben ihr Hab und Gut verloren, und es besteht weiterhin die Gefahr von Cholera. Dass der Zyklon Idai und der Klimawandel zusammenhängen, sehen alle in Südafrika, die ein soziales Gewissen haben. Unsere Regierung hingegen hat vor allem Militär und Techniker geschickt, um zu helfen, die Stromversorgung wieder herzustellen.

Weil Mosambik Strom fürs Südafrikas Industrie liefert?

Genau. Wir hatten lange Stromausfälle in der Woche, als Idai die Küste traf. Der Zyklon hat uns gezeigt, wie furchtbar verwundbar unsere Region ist. Wir haben eine andauernde Dürre in Südafrikas wichtigster Agrarregion, und die jüngste Wasserknappheit in Kapstadt hat dazu geführt, dass kaum noch Wasser aus den Hähnen kommt. Als Mosambik gerade dabei war, sich von dem Zyklon zu erholen, machte Südafrikas wichtigste Fernsehtalkshow – die SA Broadcasting Corporation’s Big Debate – Idai zum Thema einer zweistündigen Debatte über Energie. Denn 90 Prozent der Energie, die Eskom, Südafrikas halbstaatlicher Energiekonzern, produziert, stammt aus Kohlekraftwerken. Darunter sind die beiden größten der Welt, an denen derzeit gebaut wird und die jeweils 4.800 Megawatt Leistung bringen sollen.

In der Region wurde auch über die Klimaschuld« der reichen Länder diskutiert …

Das Center for Natural Resources Governance in Harare hat dazu eine Erklärung veröffentlicht: „Der Klimawandel, ein Effekt der unablässigen Emission von Treibhaus-

gasen, vor allem durch die reichen Industrieländer, ist verantwortlich für die Katastrophe in Simbabwe, Mosambik und Malawi – in Ländern also mit den weltweit niedrigsten Emissionsraten. „Fast 50 Prozent der weltweiten Kohlenstoffdioxidemissionen werden von nur zehn Prozent der Weltbevölkerung verursacht– ein Zeichen, wie extrem die Klimaungerechtigkeit geworden ist. Das bedeutet auch, dass die reichsten Südafrikaner eine „Klimaschuld" haben und damit haftbar gemacht werden sollten für die Schäden, die Idai angerichtet hat – vor allem, weil weniger als drei Dutzend multinationale Konzerne, die hier tätig sind, wie BHP Billiton, Sasol, Anglo American, Arcelor Mittal und andere, 40 Prozent der Energie im Land verbrauchen. Nicht nur die USA und Europa, die historisch gesehen die höchsten Emissionen haben, müssen anfangen, ihre Schuld anzuerkennen, sondern auch unsere eigenen, südafrikanischen Bewohner des „Globalen Nordens" – mich eingeschlossen, ich fliege zu viel. Vor allem aber betrifft das die großen Unternehmen. Wir müssen Wege finden, sie zu Entschädigungszahlungen zu verpflichten, wie es das Verursacherprinzip vorsieht, und zum anderen die hohen Emissionen sofort zu stoppen.

In Deutschland haben Aktivistinnen in den letzten Jahren eine starke Anti-Kohle-Bewegung aufgebaut. Auch in Südafrika gibt es Proteste gegen Kohle – wer sind die Akteure dort?

Die Kämpfe gegen Kohle in Südafrika, die sich auf Klimagerechtigkeit beziehen, werden von drei Kräften getragen: von NGOs, Anwälten und den Gemeinden in den Kohleabbaugebieten. Die lokalen Aktivisten sind nicht so militant und schlagkräftig wie es Ende Gelände in Deutschland ist, auch weil die Gesellschaft schlecht über den Klimawandel und seine Folgen informiert ist. Daher hängen Erfolge oft davon ab, ob es uns gelingt, Druck auf die Geldgeber auszuüben oder juristisch gegen Projekte vorzugehen.

Sind die Akteure international vernetzt?

Ein Teil sind internationale NGOs: Greenpeace zum Beispiel macht wichtige Studien und organisiert immer wieder direkte Aktionen; 350.org richtet sich vor allem an die Geldgeber der Kohleindustrie. Allerdings ist in diesen Organisationen der Flügel, der für Klimagerechtigkeit streitet, nur sehr schwach. Teils weil sie sich ihrem Ansatz nach nur auf ein Thema konzentrieren, oder weil sie nicht sensibel genug sind für die herrschenden Ungleichheiten, ob es nun um Hautfarbe, Klasse, Geschlecht oder anderes geht. Zu den Gruppen, die sich an Klimagerechtigkeit orientieren, gehören lokale Organisationen mit Partnern in den Gemeinden. Die bekannteste ist Life after Coal, zu denen Earthlife Africa, groundWork und die Anwälte des Center for Environmental Rights gehören, die häufig auf sehr kreative Weise juristische Einsprüche gegen Projekte einlegen.

Gibt es auch größere Proteste?

Der letzte wirklich große, mit über 10.000 Teilnehmern, war 2010, als in Durban die Klimakonferenz stattfand. Aber der Gegengipfel war ein großes Chaos. Dort wurde der Riss in der Klimabewegung deutlich: Auf der einen Seite gibt es die Forderung

nach Klimagerechtigkeit, damals vertreten durch die Democratic Left Front, die sich inzwischen aufgelöst hat, auf der anderen nach Klimaschutz, vertreten von Mainstream-NGOs wie dem WWF.

Gab es Versuche, beide Ansätze in einem gemeinsamen Bündnis zusammenzubringen?

Ein breiteres Bündnis hat sich als schwierig herausgestellt. Manchmal kommen beide Bewegungen zusammen, zum Beispiel als es darum ging, den Rand des Hluhluwe-iMfolozi-Reservats gegen Kohleabbau zu verteidigen, oder aktuell, Öl- und Gasbohrungen vor der Küste Südafrikas zu verhindern. Aber es fehlen Verbindungspunkte, um eine erfolgreiche landesweite Bewegung aufzubauen, wie es sie im Kampf um günstige generische Aids-Medikamente gab.

Was wären solche verbindenden Punkte?

Etwa, dass wir Klimawandel auf eine neue Art fassen. Naomi Klein hat 2014 gesagt: Der Klimawandel verändert alles. Das heißt, wir müssen uns in alle möglichen Kämpfe begeben, die Klimawandel mitverursachen, Kämpfe um Energie, Transport, Landwirtschaft, Produktion, und bei jedem Schritt auf eine gerechte Politik bestehen, die Arbeiterinnen und Arbeitern ohne finanzielle Einbußen den Übergang in saubere Jobs ermöglicht und die sensibel ist für geografische Unterschiede.

In Deutschland hat es sich als schwierig erwiesen, mit Gewerkschaften oder Kohlearbeitern zusammenzuarbeiten. Teils haben diese gegen die Kohleproteste demonstriert.

Das ist in Südafrika nicht anders, auch weil Greenpeace, das da nicht besonders sensibel war, immer wieder mit zwei großen Gewerkschaften aneinandergeraten ist, der National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) und der National Union of Mineworkers. Beide kämpfen seit den 1970er Jahren für höhere Löhne in Kraftwerken, Autofabriken, Minen und anderen Sparten der Schwerindustrie, und ihre Stärke hat entscheidend zum Ende der Apartheid beigetragen. Die Vertreter von Numsa haben sich früh für erneuerbare Energien eingesetzt. Aber aktuell führen sie einen Kampf gegen Klimaschutzaktivisten wegen der über 10.000 Megawatt privater Wind- und Solarkraftanlagen, die fast alle von europäischen Konzernen errichtet wurden. Der stellvertretende Numsa-Vorsitzende Karl Cloete hat erklärt: „Das Ziel von erneuerbaren Energien muss es sein, eine sichere Stromversorgung zu bieten, die Bedürfnisse aller zu erfüllen, Energie nicht mehr als Ware zu betrachten und die Gewinnanteile den Gemeinden und den Arbeitern zukommen zu lassen, die diese Energie produzieren und verbrauchen.“ Viele Gewerkschaften haben einen engen Fokus, sie wollen nur Arbeitsplätze verteidigen, aber bei Numsa ist das nicht so. Die neue Revolutionäre Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei, die aus Numsa entstanden ist, hat vielleicht das Potenzial, eine breitere postkapitalistische Vision zu entwickeln.

Es geht also weniger um die Frage, was die verschiedenen Akteure wollen, sondern eher um das Wie?

> Die Streitpunkte zwischen Arbeitern und Klimaschutzaktivisten betreffen fünf Dimensionen: wie schnell, wie tiefgreifend, wie umfangreich und wo die Veränderungen stattfinden sollen, und daneben die Frage, wie man sich auf den Staat bezieht.[1] Die Gewerkschaften, vor allem Numsa, wollen einen langsameren Übergang zu erneuerbaren Energien, weil sie Angst haben, dass der Staat ihre Arbeitsplätze nicht schützt. Sie denken im nationalen Rahmen: Energieproduktion und -verteilung sollen auf der Ebene des Staates erfolgen, nicht in dezentralen Anlagen, wie es die Vertreter eines neoliberalen Klimaschutzes wollen. Denn diese machen eine großräumige Umverteilung der Energie von reich zu arm schwieriger. Auch die Frage, wo die Transformation stattfindet, ist heikel – denn die sonnigen, windigen und wellenreichen Küstengebiete Südafrikas, wo sich leicht erneuerbare Energien erzeugen lassen, überschneiden sich nicht mit den Kohlefördergebieten im Inland. Schließlich gibt es verschiedene Ansichten, was die Rolle des Staates betrifft, besonders den staatlichen Energiekonzern Eskom. Numsa und andere Gewerkschaften wollen Eskom wieder explizit in den Dienst der Gemeinschaft stellen und einer sozialistischen Politik verpflichten, während viele Aktivisten den Konzern wegen seiner Korruption und seiner Nähe zur Kohle längst aufgegeben haben.

In Europa haben viele das Pariser Abkommen als wichtigen Schritt gefeiert, auch Klimaaktivisten. Du hast das Abkommen in vielen Artikel scharf kritisiert, es als „Klimaterror" bezeichnet.

> Schon 2009 in Kopenhagen haben die Staatschefs der USA, Chinas, Indiens, Brasiliens und Südafrikas den UN-Prozess sabotiert: Sie haben ein Abkommen miteinander geschlossen, in einem kleinen Raum am Rande des UN-Gipfels. Seitdem haben sowohl die dominierenden westlichen Staaten als auch die BRICS-Staaten jedes Jahr aufs Neue gezeigt, dass sie nicht bereit sind, irgendwelche verbindliche Regelungen zu akzeptieren. Gleichzeitig haben die Staaten in Paris ausgeschlossen, dass die Kosten für Schäden und Verluste, die durch den Klimawandel verursacht wurden, als „Klimaschuld" eingeklagt werden können. Sie haben durch die Hintertür den Kohlenstoffdioxidhandel wieder eingeführt und sich darauf geeinigt, mehrere der wichtigsten Verursacher von Kohlenstoffemissionen beim Abkommen außen vor zu lassen, darunter das Militär, Flugzeuge und Schiffe. Und sie haben sich für diesen Deal auch noch gefeiert.

Wie können Klimaaktivisten sich Gehör verschaffen?

> Es hilft nichts, zu resignieren und das Abkommen als „ersten Schritt" in die richtige Richtung zu sehen. Wenn wir den Pariser Vertrag legitimieren, ermutigen wir die Regierungen, genau so weiter zu machen, die Dringlichkeit zu ignorieren und den

1 Im englischen Original: "speed, scale, scope, space and the state".

> Umbau unserer Gesellschaften hinauszuzögern, der nötig ist, um Überleben und Gerechtigkeit möglich zu machen. Wenn oben Lähmung herrscht, müssen wir unsere Anstrengungen verdoppeln und eine Bewegung von unten aufbauen. Es gibt schon viele spektakuläre Aktionen, die zeigen, wie klimaschädliche Praktiken blockiert und verhindert werden können, von Ende Gelände über Extinction Rebellion bis zu den Standing-Rock-Protesten – eine Philosophie von „Blockadia", wie Naomi Klein es genannt hat wird an vielen Orten aufgebaut und kann jede Unterstützung gebrauchen.

In den letzten Monaten haben weltweit junge Menschen begonnen, genau gegen diese Untätigkeit der Politik auf die Straße zu gehen.

> Die junge Generation zeigt den Älteren, was sie von ihrem Nichtstun hält: Sie haben keine Legitimität mehr, sie sollen Platz machen. Für uns, die ältere Generation, ist Selbstkritik nötig. Wir sind gescheitert, als es darum ging, eine globale Bewegung für Klimagerechtigkeit zusammenzuhalten. Diese Chance gab es 2007, als die führenden Aktivistinnen den Bali-Gipfel verließen, weil es keine Fortschritte in den Verhandlungen gab.

Climate Justice Now, das Netzwerk, das es damals gab, ist zerbrochen.

> Es hat uns an Visionen und Mut gefehlt. Aber es ist nicht zu spät, sich Gedanken zu machen, wie man die unzähligen Kämpfe verbinden und auf eine andere Ebene heben kann. Und dabei neben den bestehenden eine neue Dimension der Ungerechtigkeit aufzunehmen: die zwischen den Generationen. Die jungen Menschen haben alles Recht der Welt, davor zu warnen, dass der Klimastreik nur der Anfang ist, wenn sie laut sagen: „Ihr stehlt uns unsere Zukunft!"

People displaced by flooding caused by the Idai cyclone at Bangula evacuation camp in Nsanje, Malawi, 12 March 2019

Trajectories

Trajectories of Lives and Knowledge

Heike Liebau

How do lives and knowledge intersect, in respect to the diverse ways by which people are located in, subjected to, creatively inhabit and otherwise move through historical contexts and institutional frameworks? This was the main question of the research unit Trajectories of Lives and Knowledge, which began its work in in 2014. Emphasis was placed on "trajectories" in order to consider existential pathways and retrospective accounts of moving in and passing through particular social, political and intellectual settings. This manifold sense of the trajectory relates to knowledge as both constraining and enabling, implicating and at the same time challenging conventions of association and normative categories of representation. By following the lives and works of, for example, intellectuals, politicians, journalists, writers or soldiers, individual projects within this research unit tracked the worldviews, visions of different futures and self-positioning within multi-layered historical contexts of these various individuals.

This field of interest was approached through different perspectives: Combining methods of biographical studies with an intellectual history approach helped us to understand the positions, practices and possibilities of translocal actors with regard to large-scale conflicts or international development. Researchers followed the practices of individuals in their relation to history, their expressions of self-representation and, in so doing, identified intersections between fields of power and personal trajectories. Looking at various milieus or sites of knowledge production was another pertinent angle. For some of the individuals studied here, such as Arab or Indian intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century, the state of exile meant a decisive period in their life trajectory. Moreover, we explored specific practices, modes, aims and conditions of knowledge production as well as social and legal conditions. A third perspective brought together discussions on practices and methods of historical knowledge gathering on the one hand alongside practices used by us to collect, recontextualize and reorder sources in accordance with their functionality for – and the requirements of – our research questions. This included discussions on the ethnography of our sources, the historicity, intentionality and logics of archives or collections and how they inform research interests, as well as the figure of the *Zeitzeuge* (contemporary witness) as bearing witness to a specific time period or historical event.

One of the main results of the work within this research unit was the publication of a special issue of the journal *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (3/2019) titled "Relational Lives: Historical Subjectivities in Global Perspective" and edited by Nils Riecken and Heike Liebau. Its contents reflect the interdisciplinary and transregional research architecture of the unit, whose members are based in history, anthropology, literary studies or Islamic studies. Particular case studies deal with Morocco, South Africa and Tanzania, Alexandria in Egypt, and India. The contributions thus traverse colonial geographies and national boundaries, as well as colonial and national historiographies.

Lunchbreak at the group workshop "Understanding the logic(s) of data collection", 30 June 2017

Among the monographs that have been published by members of the research unit, Antía Mato Bouzas's, *Kashmir as a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Belonging across the Line of Control* (Amsterdam University Press, 2019) should be given special mention. At a moment when the territorial conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region is escalating, this book provides not only important background information but also heavily draws on the experiences of people living in these territories, such as divided families, traders and cultural and social activists.

The ZMO Studie 36 (2017) *Geschichte als Ressource: Politische Dimensionen historischer Authentizität* (edited by Barbara Christophe, Christoph Kohl and Heike Liebau) was based on a conference held at ZMO in 2016. The main question of this volume concerns when, how and through whom history becomes a political resource; how historical events and developments are authenticated into fixed narratives; who controls these processes and who is active therein? Empirically, it concentrates on transformation processes and crisis situations in post-colonial, post-imperial and post-socialist countries of Asia and Africa. Conceptually, the study contributes to the entanglements between local, national and transnational levels and analyses the connections between production and reception of historical authenticity.

Among the conferences, panels and workshops organized by group members, the conference "Islam as an Epistemic Field: Imperial Entanglements and Orientalism in the German-Speaking World since 1870" (Berlin, ZMO, 11–12 October 2018) stands out. It was organized by Nils Riecken and Larissa Schmid (now Staatsbibliothek Berlin). Its main aim was to historicize knowledge production about Islam, by debating the status of Islam in German history and politics with a focus on Germany´s imperial and transregional connections. The central question was how Islam was produced as an epistemic and thus political object of debate and intervention in a specific historical period. In 2019, Tika Ramadhini and Thiago Pinto Barbosa, together with the Forum Transregionale Studien, conceived and organized the

workshop "Women and the Transregional Circulation of Knowledge, from 1800 to 1950" (Berlin, Forum Transregionale Studien, 20–22 June 2019). This exploratory workshop aimed at discussing new concepts and approaches in order to understand knowledge production by women in the field of transregional mobility, considering the complex relations between interconnecting actors, sites, contexts, standpoints and/or situatedness. Participants reflected on historical cases of women who moved transregionally and engaged in practices of knowledge production.

Several third party-funded projects continued working within this research unit: the ERC project "Domestic Servants in Colonial South Asia" lead by Nitin Sinha (ZMO) and Nitin Varma (HU) was one of them (2015–2018). The temporal scope of this project covers the period from the mid-eighteenth to mid-twentieth century. The history of domestic servants and service in South Asia is an under-researched field and has not been given much attention in historiography. Therefore, the project aimed at exploring the history of this subaltern group, which is generally marginal in accounts on South Asian history, and through this lens contributed to social, cultural and labour histories of South Asia. In terms of output and knowledge transfer, the project has exceeded its original goals. A number of publications mark future reference points in researching the history of domestic servants. The main publication is a two-volume edited collection: *Servants' Pasts: Sixteenth- to Eighteenth-Century South Asia* and *Servants' Pasts: Late-Eighteenth to Twentieth-Century South Asia*. Both volumes are published by Orient Black Swan, Delhi (2019), and will be available open access by the end of 2019.

The DFG-funded project "Modernes Indien in deutschen Archiven 1706–1989" (MIDA) has reached a major goal too. In the fifth year of its existence, this long-term project celebrated the launch of its online research portal (*Rechercheportal*; https://www.projekt-mida.de/rechercheportal/). MIDA started out in November 2014 and – provided it leads to successful applications – is planned for a maximum of 12 years, that is, until 2026. The MIDA online research portal consists of three parts: a Database, an Archival Reflexicon and Thematic Resources. The database contains systematic information about collections related to modern India in German archives. The Archival Reflexicon is an ongoing collection of essays on historical or methodological themes and on India-related holdings in German archives. Anandita Bajpai (ZMO/HU) and Heike Liebau (ZMO) are the editors responsible for the Reflexicon (https://www.projekt-mida.de/rechercheportal/reflexicon/). The Thematic Resources rubric provides research data generated within MIDA, including, for example, a list of all successfully completed India-related PhDs at German universities between 1783 and 2013.

Two MIDA conferences were held during the period reported. The first, "Entangled Archives: Perspectives from Modern India in German Archives", took place in September 2018 at the Department of South Asian Studies, Institute for Asian and African Studies at HU Berlin. This conference presented archival and research findings from the first phase of the MIDA project as well as bringing together other scholars in the field of Indo-German entangled histories. The second conference, organized by Anandita Bajpai, was held at the same location in December 2018. Titled "The Politics of 'Doing Culture': Entangled India and the German Democratic Republic during the Cold War", it looked at multiple sites of "doing culture" that actively contributed to producing an interface between state-led cultural entanglements, cultural diplomacy, participatory democracy and the politics of resistance.

Nitin Sinha, Nitin Varma, Pankaj Jha (eds.): Servants' Pasts, Sixteenth to Twentieth Century, 2 vols (Orient Blackswan, 2019)
The two volumes take a concerted look at the issue of domestic servants and service through a combination of historical, linguistic and sociological perspectives. At a time when state and non-state agencies are struggling to determine the nature and extent to which the working conditions of domestic worker can be regulated, the rich corpus of essays in these volumes will prove indispensable for policy-makers as well. This is a must read for anyone trying to make sense of the ubiquitous and invisible class of service providers in modern India.



Anandita Bajpai: Speaking the Nation. The Oratoriacal Making of Secular, Neoliberal India (Oxford University Press, 2018)
Untangling the logical, lexical, and semantic patterns of the multiple official speeches of Indian prime ministers, Speaking the Nation gauges how the Indian state has been projected by different governments in different times, in the face of challenges from internal and external actors that put pressure on its leaders to safeguard their status as legitimate elites in power. It analyses how Indian nationhood is consistently reshaped and reaffirmed by invoking its secular ethos and practice, as well as the experience of market liberalization. The book calls for serious engagement with political oratory in India. A close reading of speeches since 1991 – from Narasimha Rao to Narendra Modi – captured how, through these crosscutting topics, the prominent 'authors of the nation' and the 'vanguards of the state', speak India into being.

The Swallowed Fish Bone

Personal Information Form 812–813

Anandita Bajpai

Description

This story narrated by the Indian soldier Faijaz Ali, born in Rawalpindi (now in Pakistan), was recorded on 30 March 1917 in the Wünsdorf camp. It tells of a sick king, who has a fish bone stuck in his liver. A doctor tells him that the only cure is by feeding on the liver of a beheaded boy, the latter who should be the only son to his parents. Through the character of the boy, Ali's story communicates the simultaneous feelings by a POW: of pain on leaving his homeland; and of disappointment in one's own family and king, with God being the ultimate solace.

Context

Approximately 1,000 soldiers from South Asia, sent to war on behalf of the British army, were captured in Europe and became prisoners of war in German camps. One such camp was in Wünsdorf, where the voices of several soldiers were recorded by Wilhelm Doegen (Director of the Sound Department, Prussian State Library) and his team in several South Asian languages such as Hindi, Hindustani, Urdu, Bengali, Nepali, and Pashto. Faijaz Ali, whose voice is recorded in these files (PK 812–813), was non-literate but could speak Hindustani and Punjabi. Stories such as this one were often preselected and translated, as well as transcribed. Interestingly, however, while speaking, some of the soldiers utilised the spontaneous moment of the recording as an opportunity to communicate other messages or simply some phrases which were not transcribed. For example in this file, Ali ends the story by giving his coordinates (saying 'Prisoner Faijaz Ali, Indian Punjab') and then striking a chord of familiarity with a perceived German speaking audience by saying 'Guten Abend'.

Installation from the exhibition *Digging Deep, Crossing Far_ 3rd Encounter: Berlin*, 2016

“Race” and Science between Germany and India

The Circulation and Transformation of Knowledge in the Work of Anthropologist Irawati Karvé

Thiago Pinto Barbosa

In the late 1920s, the Indian anthropologist Irawati Karvé (1905–1970) started her scientific career as a “race” researcher at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics in Berlin. My PhD project centres on her life and work and explores how knowledge in physical anthropology has been scientifically produced and transformed through circulations in time and space – namely from the 1920s onwards in and between Germany and India.

Linked to the context of modern colonialism, anthropology as a scientific field emerged in the 19th century and, after the turn of the 20th century, became an established academic discipline for studying the Other and the Human. The German *Anthropologie*, especially, established a strong focus in research on “race” as a way to study and classify human differences, and was often linked to research in the field of eugenics, coming to play a decisive role in National Socialist population policy. In this sense, an emblematic place for scientific research and political consultancy in this field of knowledge was the well-known Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics (KWI-A). Located in Berlin-Dahlem, the KWI-A (1927–1944) concentrated large numbers of German and international researchers as well as of international human remains for research.



Measurement points in “The Normal Asymmetry of the Human Skull”

Ever since the emergence of anthropology, knowledge about “race” has been further transformed and circulated in and between various sites of scientific praxis through an increasingly global network. Although the period after the Second World War and during the ensuing anti-colonial struggles seemingly marked a general rejection of the biological idea of “human races”, “race” itself has persisted, not only as a social category, but also as scientific object in different fields of research, for example in population genetics. Moreover, methodologies (such as anthropometry) and research technologies (for example the anthropometer), once developed to study “racial attributes”, have persisted in the study of the human and the other humans.

The Indian case is especially significant: racialized understandings of human difference, intertwined with the socially and scientifically constructed notions “caste” and “tribe”, played a key role in debates in the subcontinent. Historically, “race” became an important topic of research by scientists working in colonial India, among British scholars and national scientists. In this scenario, Indian anthropologist Irawati Karvé is emblematic. Karvé came to Berlin in the

late 1920s to undertake her PhD studies and developed research on the topic of racial differences in human skulls under the supervision of leading German anthropologist and "race" expert Eugen Fischer, who was the director of the KWI-A. Her findings went in a direction different from that expected by her supervisor and KWI-A colleagues: she concluded that there is no correlation between "race" and skull shape. Yet, the knowledge and the methodologies that she became familiar with during this research stay continued to accompany Karvé after her return to India.

Back in Maharahstra in 1930, Karvé made a major contribution to the establishment of anthropology and human genetics in her home country. As the lead of the Deccan College`s department of anthropology and sociology in Pune, Karvé used different anthropometric methods to identify "the racial" in several (sub)castes and tribes, and laid the foundation for linking up anthropology and genetics. One of Karvé's most important legacies was the conceptualization of the idea of endogamous groups, on which one should rely on in order to select a population for any genetic and biological anthropological research. That is, Karvé formulated a framework for the selection and categorization of groups in Indian society for genetic studies. Having written over 100 publications and commented on different political debates, Karvé left a legacy in physical (but also social and cultural) anthropology in India that is not to be dismissed, even today.



Irawati Karvé (1905-1970)

Thus, based on multi-archival and multi-sited ethnographic research, I am trying to understand this key connection in the global network of physical anthropology and racialized knowledge, namely the one between the KWI-A in Berlin and research institutions in India. From a perspective of critical science, technology and society (STS), my gaze focuses on the circulation of the materials (human remains, tools and methodologies) used in Karvé's scientific practice, as well as her trajectory and legacy, allowing me to understand how this knowledge was produced, how it was transformed as it travelled, and how it has influenced further developments in Indian physical anthropology. Thereby, my research aims to contribute to our understanding of the as yet under-researched themes of the international impact of the KWI-A as well as the transformation of knowledge in physical anthropology by scientists and their research technologies in India and beyond.

“I did not forgive him. But after many years, I allowed myself to accept his apology.”

A Report on the Conference Circumstances from Post-Apartheid South Africa

Sonja Hegasy

From 5 to 9 December 2018, the international conference “Recognition, Reparation, Reconciliation. The Light and Shadow of Historical Trauma” was held at Stellenbosch University (SU), hosted by Prof. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela. Prof. Gobodo-Madikizela is herself a former member of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). She has an education in Clinical Psychology, and is the author of *A Human Being Died That Night: A South African Story of Forgiveness* about her encounter with Eugene de Kock, one of the notorious killers of the South African secret police, also called ‘Prime Evil’. She currently holds the Chair of Historical Trauma and Transformation at Stellenbosch University, which initiated this international meeting with nearly 400 participants, 128 presentations and numerous round tables. People from very diverse fields, among them researchers, practitioners working on conflict resolution, social workers, mediators, civic rights activists, community organizers, artists, first-hand witnesses of severe violence, children and parents of murdered South Africans, but also perpetrators, came together. In several sessions, perpetrators were themselves present and ready to engage about their past informally in the breaks as well. Thus, the conference was a site with very difficult expectations to manœuvre.

This report does not deal with the remarkable array of presentations given; rather it is about the circumstances of this meeting and how they unfolded: what struck me from the opening was the emphasis on praxis and positionality. When speaking of loss and embodied trauma at this gathering, it made sense to bring in one’s own physicality for a change. The conference started off with three practical workshops to prepare for the up-coming lectures on genocide, disappearance, rape, racism, war crimes and political terror. One group worked with collages to shift perspectives on memories of injustice. A second used systemic constellations work to approach the topic. I joined a third group that offered contemplative mind-body exercises to make yourself aware of your positionality and the social conditioning everybody brought along. Each workshop addressed in different ways one’s own awareness of a personal or social injustice and how to connect to one another. Mindfulness was a recurrent theme throughout the conference, I found. In the course of my session, a group of people previously completely unknown to me became a bit familiar – actually more than that, because questions of guiding and following each other through the room, being in direct contact and supporting each other physically with complete strangers is an experience of its own. These people did not come together to experience a joint ›family constellation‹ or the like. They/we were in an academic setting (more on the difficulty of the place below) to present research papers. Now, after the first workshop, I unexpectedly had people to greet throughout the next five days, to share coffee with and sometimes to extend getting to know each other beyond a usual conference setting, as we had shared a tiny bit about our background – a nano-bit in terms of

everybody's actual trajectory, but a huge facet in comparison to a typical academic scenery. This was already an unusual start. I felt that I had 24 hours of contemplative work before starting with Microsoft Office and Power Point.

It was in this first hour that I heard Ginn Fourie speak for the first time in her broken voice. Her daughter Lyndi was killed in an attack by an anti-apartheid organization in 1993. Later on, Ginn Fourie would also present her reconciliation work formally in one of the sessions, as she took part in a series of dialogues organized for the conference, in which we participants could listen to victims speaking out about their trajectories since the end of apartheid and how they met with a perpetrator of the crime against their relative (child, father, husband).

This was not all about 'forgiving', and many of the victims speaking out here had decided to meet the perpetrator outside the context of the TRC and many years later. As Lindiwe Hani, daughter of Chris Hani, then leader of South Africa's Communist Party and second-best-known politician after Nelson Mandela, said after meeting with the killer of her father several times: "I did not forgive him. But after many years, I allowed myself to accept his apology." After Ms Hani's talk, she and Chris Hani created an enormous emotional response in the auditorium.

Music also played a central role at the conference. Once more it became clear to the stiffest academic how important an element of opening up and healing it is. I wish everybody could hear a lecture by Homi Bhabha at 8:30 in the morning, preceded by the strong voice of Yanga Sobetwa, who had won South Africa's Idol contest just days before.

Anniversaries and dates became increasingly important in the course of this meeting as well: Alex Boraine, former Deputy President of the TRC, passed away on 5 December 2018. It was also the anniversary of Nelson Mandela's death five years earlier. And an initial thought of the conference organizers was to tie the event to the submission of the TRC's final report 20 years ago, in 1998. Thus, Desmond Tutu was invited to a final but internal celebration that the wider group of participants was unfortunately not able to witness. The University of Stellenbosch itself celebrated its 100th anniversary. Much has changed and much has not in Stellen-

Radsaal Room, Stellenbosch University

Prof. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela and Lindiwe Hani

bosch since then. Most international participants and first-time visitors to South Africa were unprepared for the post-apartheid realities in the country, the blatant inequalities and the obvious on-going segregation.

Though the university had made efforts to transition from a white *Kaderschmiede* to a national university, the student body was far from representing the country – which would be unthinkable at the University of Johannesburg (UJ), as we learned from one student. Of South Africa's population, 80% identify themselves as Black Africans, which is certainly reflected at UJ, she stressed. This looks very different at SU: of its 31,765 students, currently only 20% are Black Africans, whereas 58% are White. Names of auditoriums and meeting rooms were still in Afrikaans here, while the country had seen a nation-wide movement that demanded the use of one of the indigenous languages and English simultaneously. From a group of student friends, we learned that not until 2014 did a movement calling itself *Open Stellenbosch* come into being to address the on-going whiteness on campus and its anachronistic language policy. The movement demanded:

- "No student should be forced to learn or communicate in Afrikaans and all classes must be available in English.
- The institutional culture at Stellenbosch University needs to change radically and rapidly to reflect diverse cultures and not only White Afrikaans culture.
- The University publically needs to acknowledge and actively remember the central role that Stellenbosch and its faculty played in the conceptualization, implementation and maintenance of Apartheid."

Stellenbosch University reacted in 2016 by giving English equal status in teaching and acknowledging the users of Xhosa at the same time.

During the conference, while learning about grave human rights violations around the globe, portraits of old white Dutch males with white perukes looked down on us. As the meeting was held at the Department of Theology, an alumnus stressed that it was exactly here, in the very same venue, where the religious underpinnings of apartheid were laid down: "We were taught false theology here!", he exclaimed. The Dutch Reformed Church was an important backbone of the apartheid state, and is still far from having overcome its legacy.

Stellenbosch's colonial character was all too widely felt during this week in town, and participants were not prepared for that. Many felt and unfortunately also experienced racial tensions all over town. It was at this point that the programme was interrupted to discuss exactly where we were and to speak out about aggressions. Thus, there was a demand that

the conference should have given more advance back-ground on the historical circumstances of the town and university. Though among the 128 presentations this certainly was discussed, it was scattered over the programme: three White future priests talked about a retreat they had initiated to critically engage with their own Whiteness and privilege in preparation for their positions as clerics. Furthermore Juliana Claassens, Professor for the Old Testament at the Faculty, talked about the university's response to Open Stellenbosch and student action to make its history of violence visible on campus, which involves memories of the broader communities around.

Beyond an amazing hospitality and warmness that radiated from the individuals of this university and the country, the conference was about post-apartheid year 24. In the beginning, it had asked: "What is the appropriate response to the echoes of historical wounding that extend far beyond the generation that experienced the trauma directly?" At its end it had lived through these ›echoes of historical wounding‹ itself. It had blatantly become a showcase of multidirectional memory of apartheid as well as the Shoah. When we split up once in a Black caucus and a non-black caucus, one person was reminded of a *Selektion*. Many South Africans present saw the country at a crossroads and felt that, sooner rather than later, the nation will need to take a new path to address the blatant social inequalities and its divisions carried over from the apartheid era.

This conference report developed as a spontaneous idea in response to the intensity of the conference and in recognition of the amazing effort the organizers, and especially Prof. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, carried out. I thank Regina Sarreiter for her comments on an earlier version.



Norman Saadi Nikro, Sonja Hegasy (eds.): The Social Life of Memory. Violence, Trauma, and Testimony in Lebanon and Morocco (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)

This edited volume addresses memory practices among youth, families, cultural workers, activists, and engaged citizens in Lebanon and Morocco. In making a claim for 'the social life of memory,' the introduction discusses a particular research field of memory studies, elaborating an approach to memory in terms of social production and engagement. The Arab Spring is evoked to draw attention to new rifts within and between history and remembrance in the regions of North Africa and the Middle East. As authoritarian forms of governance are challenged, official panoramic narratives are confronted with a multiplicity of memories of violent pasts. The eight chapters trace personal and public inventories of violence, trauma, and testimony, addressing memory in cinema, in newspapers and periodicals, as an experience of public environments, through transnational and diasporic mediums, and amongst younger generations.

Normality and Crisis

Memories of Everyday Life in Syria as a Chance for a New Start in Germany

Katharina Lange

Turning the pervasive rhetoric of the "refugee crisis" as a crisis for Germany and Europe on its head, this project asks what refugees from Syria frame as "crisis" and what they experience as "normality". Responding to a perception that much of public, but also scholarly discourse about the current "refugee crisis", frames refugees as subjects who only become visible once they leave their original homes, the project expressly asks about their lives and experiences during the time before fleeing and before the widespread experience of displacement and war, in the years before 2011. Directed by Katharina Lange, the project comprises one post-doctoral position ("Paper Trails and Dislocated Bureaucracies", Veronica Ferreri) as well as two doctoral positions ("At Home in Aleppo: Experiences and Memorie", Lisa Jöris; "Conviviality in Homs between Space, State Institutions and Inter-confessionality: Schools as an Interactive Shared Space", Inana Othman).

The project began in March 2018 with an introductory phase marked by intensive methodological and conceptual discussions during regular weekly meetings as well as a number of one-day training workshops open for project members as well as ZMO staff. In particular, the tension between the desire for "archiving", that is, documenting and publicising personal experiences of life in Syria on the one hand, and the need for privacy and data protection on the other, emerged as a major methodological issue and was discussed at length within the group as well as with external audiences.

The second phase is still ongoing. Commencing in October 2018, so far it has been characterized by focused fieldwork in all three component projects, by presentations at international conferences and different forms of outreach activities (among others, a film screening and discussions) in addition to contributions to non-academic media. Regular exchange with activists of Syrian background who are based in Berlin and engaged in different projects concerned with memory and documentation of life in Syria is another important feature of this continuing work.

Damascus 2008 / Berlin 2019

Cities

Cities as Laboratories of Change

André Chappatte

Conversations on cities in the Muslim world from Karachi to Tripoli have unfolded according to conceptual concerns. At the same time, we have not been able to ignore current developments and international news related to the urban in all its dimensions, notably as the group brought together political scientists, anthropologists and historians. In other words, members of the group worked on theoretical debates about the urban while attempting to link them with contemporary issues when possible. These linkages were mostly elaborated on socio-historical and political grids of analysis. The work of the group was therefore characterized by a dialogue between the twin concerns of thickening the headlines and questioning the classics. This was particularly pertinent as classical texts in urban sociology assume a fundamental nature of the urban which, almost by definition, excludes many cities in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. The development of our themes over the years illustrates this wish to inform present-day political issues and their socio-historical constructions.

In 2017 the group explored the theme "The City and the State". In a world fascinated by the increasing "metropolization" of the urban, the motivation here was to grasp what is left to urbanites following the ongoing advancement of the state as *the* urban planner. The group therefore discussed articles that examine urbanites' subjective experience of the state and the spatiality of the state in an urbanizing world. The group debated the following questions: How do monuments built by the state shape the nation? To what extent can the state "silence the past" in the management of historic buildings and landmarks? Does the capital city depict, through specific state interventions in the urban, a kind of idealization of the nation? What is the image of the modern city in Muslim worlds? Can we speak of the existence of urbanity without having state interventions in urban spaces? All of this implies already that there is not one single type of "Islamic city" and that we find it problematic to approach cities from a typological perspective.

The line of inquiry raised by the concept of urbanity led to the collective writing of "In Search of Urbanity". Published in 2018, this ZMO Programmatic Text documents that urbanity from below, although fragmented, is about shared sensory experiences and belongings that go beyond disciplinary and regional discrepancies. The group also discussed questions around the concept of the "global city". How far is formal citizenship related to citizenship as a space

of participation? To what extent has globalization turned the initial concept of citizenship into an abstract concept? Can we consider the city as an open space of belonging? Does the term "global city" really mean "neoliberal politics"? Which colonial interventions still imprint the contemporary urban planning of former colonial towns? These debates over macro-concepts have revealed the need also to take into account what happens at the scale of street life (or in society from below) when considering these possible global changes. For instance, the group asked what kinds of street life happen in a shopping mall? It then decided to organize in autumn 2018 an international workshop on lives and activities in neighbourhoods.[1] In a provocative way, the group simply asked whether there is a legitimate place for Neighbourhood Studies insofar as it brings up questions and stresses certain realities that Urban Studies does not. In parallel, the group opened up a new theme: "Sensory Understandings of Urbanity". This theme also accompanied the collective writing of "In Search of Urbanity" published in the ZMO Programmatic Texts series.

The group thus inquired as to how urbanites feel in emotional and/or sensory terms. Some key questions included: How can we move beyond the use of metrics (such as population size and density) to understand what urbanity is? How are forms of urbanity constituted and transformed through sensory experiences, such as sound, smell, sight, touch and emotions? For instance, one member of the group made a documentary film called *A Day at Night: Dialogues between Darkness and Light in Odienné, a Provincial Town of Northern Ivory Coast*. The film documents this sensorial dimension of urbanity. The group also asked how differences in these subjective experiences can tell a story about gender, religion, inequality or social cohesion in the urban context. How can the senses be employed as a guide for fieldwork and as a means to understand the urban contexts in which we work as historians, anthropologists and political scientists? How are cities described and understood as living organisms, with personalities, and affecting their inhabitants? This focus on the senses helped the group consider the urban as a relational and living entity. In mid-2018, the group began to work on a further new theme: "Identity Politics and Places of Meeting in the City". This emerged out of a meeting during which group members gave an update on their current research project(s). Moved by the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, most of its members were exploring identity formation in politicized urban spaces, such as Martyrs' Square in the Libyan city of Tripoli. Articles discussed during meetings explored identity formation in terms of coexistence and claims of belonging within the confines of the urban. By linking such concerns with the ongoing issue of immigration in Europe, the group also debated the link between religious practices and urban space, such as in the integration and transformation of religious buildings in the city. "The Urban Spatialities of Religion in the Middle East, Africa and South-East Asia", the Urban Studies Seminar 2018–2019, was the outcome of these discussions about the political morality of religious spaces in cities.

Some individuals in the cities group were (and are still) involved in two projects funded by the VolkswagenStiftung: "Spaces of Participation" (until October 2017) and the follow-up "Liminal Spaces as Sites of Socio-Cultural Transformation and Knowledge Production in the

1 https://www.zmo.de/veranstaltungen/2018/workshops/Workshop_Neighbourhoods_at_Times_of_Change_and_Crisis.pdf

Arab World" (January 2018–December 2020). Both are collaborative projects with partners in Egypt, Palestine and Morocco. In the first project phase, different space-related initiatives – from cultural and youth centres to art collectives to forms of political protests and virtual spaces – were analysed. The follow-up project is dedicated to the investigation of liminal spaces at the threshold of socio-cultural transformation along three main axes of research: 1) creative/artistic spaces; 2) virtual spaces/citizen media; 3) migrant/refugee spaces. Questions of contested urban spaces and participation thus remain as crucial links to the group's work. Thematic discussions within this subgroup regarding questions of urbanity, spatial politics and participation enriched the ZMO-based cities group, as the case studies of individual members were discussed within the wider group.

In March 2019, group members started to present individual publications (available or forthcoming) put together during their time at ZMO. This decision to share individual outcomes reflected the fact that this research group will not exist in the post-2019 ZMO programme. Thanks to the multidisciplinary identity of its members, the group considered a wide variety of theoretical issues – for instance the coexistence of contesting narratives of an urban shrine, the temporary and relational nature of religious space in town, and urban infrastructure from below. In autumn 2019, the group hosted its last workshop, on "Cinema and the City". Using the power of imagination, it asked: if some cities vanished with no trace and the only thing we had left was films that depicted them or used them as a backdrop for their cinematic stories, then what kind of history would we write? This poetic ending is a powerful way to stress that the urban is a peculiar built space whose main beams remain human beings.

Alexandria, Egypt

Urban Encroachment is a Historical Trigger for Shiʿi Outrage in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Metropolis Qatif

Claudia Ghrawi

Qatif metropolitan area with the Rams in the upper left quarter

Increased sectarian politics in the Arab Gulf countries have prompted researchers to take sectarianism more seriously as an analytical category "without reducing sectarian identity politics either to an already given essence or explaining it away by factors exterior to sectarianism itself." [1] Current Shiʿi outrage over the wholesale destruction of neighborhoods in the Qatif metropolitan area, the largest center of Saudi Arabia's Shiʿi population, which is situated along the Saudi littoral of the Persian Gulf, is usually interpreted within the framework of the regional conflict between Sunni Arab governments and Shiʿi Iran as well as the internal politics of the Saudi regime. However, it may be also understood as a symptom of the worldwide phenomenon of unrestrained urban expansion and profit making in the age of neoliberalism, which ties in with questions of citizenship, human livelihood, and cultural identity. The Qatif area has for more than seventy years suffered from the havoc that oil industry and urban encroachment wreaked on local environment and society. Since the discovery of oil in 1938, land has become an object of large-scale price speculation by members of the royal family and local investors. In the process, the former oasis environment gave way to sprawling suburban growth. During the last seven decades, the area's population grew from approximately 30,000 inhabitants prior to oil industrialization to over 500,000 in 2010.

Rapid urbanization, underdevelopment, and environmental damage featured prominently among the motivations for the Qatif uprising of 1979, which occurred under the banner of Shiʿi Islamism. Present day unrest began with demands for civil rights and legal equality brought forward primarily by Qatif's youth during the so-called Arab Spring of 2011. It has its local center in the town of ʿAwwamiyya and has emerged around the prominent local leader Shayk Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, whose arrest in July 2012 and execution by the Saudi regime in January 2016 have further fueled the protesters' outrage. The conflict reached its present peak in May 2017 when the Saudi military began with the bombardment and deconstruction of ʿAwwamiyya's old quarter al-Musawara, resulting in the displacement of more than 20,000 people and the ongoing siege of the neighborhood. While the Saudi government argues that

1 Helle Malmvig, "Coming From the Cold: How We May Take Sectarian Identity Politics Seriously in the Middle East Without Playing to the Tunes of Regional Power Elites", *POMEPS Briefings* 28 (January 2016), 8–12.

the destruction of al-Musawara has become a question of security, local activists see this operation as an erasure of local architectural heritage and identity. The question of identity is significant for the sectarian argument: Since the 1979 uprising the town has been stylized as a historical center of Shi'i resistance, whose struggle against Saudi rule dates back to the rebellion of the local Shaykh Muhammad al-Nimr against Saudi taxation in 1929/30. All this feeds into the logic of sectarian politics which is often stressed by journalists and scholars who see the local trajectory in tandem with the increased conflict between Sunni governments and Shi'i populations in the region since 2011. However, a look into the more recent history of the town reveals a more complex dynamic which entwines Shi'i discrimination and identity politics with the global phenomenon of neoliberal urban restructuration.

In the first half of the twentieth century, 'Awwamiyya was still a smallish oasis village, located between palm groves and farmland not far from the coast, which was overgrown by mangrove forests. The people of 'Awwamiyya lived mainly on agriculture and fishing. 'Awwamiyya's local economy survived oil urbanization largely unscathed well into the 1990s. This remarkable exception to the prevailing situation in the area became possible due to an astonishing historical circumstance. Already in the late nineteenth century, during the last phase of Ottoman rule over large parts of the Arabian Peninsula, a local leader by the name of Shaykh Salman b. Muhammad b. Husayn al-Faraj al-'Awwami bought the land that surrounded 'Awwamiyya from the Ottoman state and turned it into a vast religious endowment (*waqf*). The endowment secured the people of 'Awwamiyya the right to live on and cultivate the land, which is known as Rams, during times of dwindling imperial rule. In the course of the following century, the descendants of Shaykh Salman have repeatedly defended the endowment, and by extension their own role as its administrators, against land claims by the oil company (today's Saudi Aramco), Saudi princes, and urban investors. Saudi law supported them, as it acknowledged the hitherto unchanged status of the Rams and the prerogatives created by the endowment.

This situation changed in 1996 when members of the royal family in a violation of Saudi law sold a large part of the Rams coastal strip to Saudi Aramco. The oil company immediately began with landfilling works along the shore. The ecological destruction of the Rams mari-

Qatif 2013, last remains of the old town

time strip created a strong local outcry against the responsible princes and Saudi Aramco, which resulted in the withdrawal of the oil company from the land reclamation project. One participant in the protest of the enraged people of ʿAwwamiyya, many of whom were fishermen who had lost their source of income literally overnight, was Shaykh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, great grandson of Shaykh Salman and grandson of Shaykh Muhammad al-Nimr. During the following years, the case went on trial until a Saudi court confirmed the superior claim of the people of ʿAwwamiyya to their land. The court decision stipulated the convocation of a committee of local dignitaries, all of whom belonged to the descendants of Shaykh Salman, whose role is to serve as legal guardian of the Rams and to preserve the nearly 1.5 million square meter large endowment against external claims.

However, the burial of the coast under millions of tons of cement has not only severely endangered the old role of Qatif as a regional marketplace for fish and shrimp, it has effectively robbed the people of ʿAwwamiyya of a vital source of income. Furthermore, urban encroachment into the remaining parts of the Rams has accelerated during the past ten years. The northwards growth of Qatif's suburban area, halted by the Rams for half a century, has finally gained momentum. Municipal governments have repeatedly cut through the complex water irrigation networks and turned former palm groves into wasteland that according to municipal regulations can be claimed for urban construction. In response to local protest, the Saudi government called in a moratorium for the future development of the Rams agricultural area in 2015. Rumours of the sum of 400 million Rial for investment in the preservation of local heritage circulated on the internet. Yet, the situation changed again when the new government of King Salman gained control over Saudi internal politics shortly afterwards.

Around that time, two Saudi real estate enterprises appeared at the scene as new investors for the development of the Rams maritime strip. In September 2015, they began auctioning the newly declared real estate property. Bidders in Riyadh paid up to 1,500 Rial per square meter, several times the price that local people can afford to pay in the highly sought after coastal area. In early 2016, the Saudi government executed Shaykh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr. The execution of a Shiʿi cleric had not happened in the kingdom for a long time and surprised many. Consequently, local protest in Qatif rose to new heights. As an answer to continuing civil disorder, the Saudi military began with the systematic destruction of local farms in the

Dhow fishing boats in Qatif in 2013

Rams under the pretext that they served as hideouts for terrorists. The destruction of al-Musawara began shortly afterwards and since then, the Saudi government has claimed that the neighbourhood had become a refuge for terrorist as well. To no surprise, the investors that aim at rebuilding the destroyed quarter are already ready to take over. In the hometown of some of the most impoverished citizens of the oil rich kingdom a shopping mall and newly built apartment blocks will generate high-end rents for their proprietors in the near future.

Urban encroachment, land price speculation, and the relentless destruction of human livelihood in the Qatif metropolitan area are closely linked to a conflict over ownership and access to land. The latter are stipulated both in customary and Shari'a law. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the mobilization for the most current protests of Saudi Shi'a happened around local clerics who take the role of defending what people regard as lawful Muslim practice. While the ongoing conflict gains specific national and regional significance through sectarian claims from various sides, it is essentially rooted in the unhindered and to various degrees state-sponsored profit making in the age of neoliberal urbanization. As such, the case of 'Awwamiyya is not part of a seeming historical exceptionalism of the Middle East, but bears resemblance to urban resistance movements in other parts of the world.



Nora Lafi : Esprit civique et organisation citadine dans l'empire ottoman (XVe–XXe siècles) (Brill, 2018)

This book proposes a study of the old regime forms of Ottoman municipal urban governance that were progressively built between the 15th and the 18th c. on the basis of various heritages (Byzantine, Medieval Islamic, Seljukid, Sassanid, medieval Ottoman) as well as an interpretation of the reforms of the Tanzimat era under the light of this re-evaluation of the previous system. This allows the author to propose innovative ideas on the very nature of civic life, social organization and modernity in the Islamic world.

The research is based on original archives from Istanbul (BOA) and various cities of the Empire, from Aleppo to Tunis, Thessaloniki to Alexandria or Damascus and Cairo to Tripoli.

Constructing the Capital of Peace

Changing Branding Strategies for Istanbul's Eyüp Quarter

Annegret Roelcke

Introduction

On a sunny day in November 2016, I visited Pierre Loti Café on the cemetery hill in Istanbul's Eyüp quarter to enjoy the view across the Golden Horn to the Historic Peninsula's mosques. I found myself in the midst of people of various backgrounds from Istanbul, Turkey, and abroad who were visiting Pierre Loti Café. Many of them had never entered the adjacent quarter. Others had come after visiting the Eyüpsultan[1] Mosque and the shrine in Eyüp's centre, places crowded on religious holidays. In the vicinity, shops offered religious paraphernalia to visitors and so-called historical Ottoman cuisine.

Although people experience Eyüp in very different ways, many of their impressions have been shaped by the Eyüp Municipality. Since the mid-1990s, it has launched a broad range of activities to construct and promote an identity for Eyüp through interventions into the quarter's physical fabric, so-called cultural events, and the propagation of narratives through publications (Hammond 98–144). This article shows that since the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP), the predecessor[2] of today's Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP), took office locally in 1994, these parties' activities for branding Eyüp have been closely linked to their narratives legitimizing their political power not only locally, but also regionally and nationally by portraying Eyüp as a symbol of a larger imagined community's identity (Anderson). Tourists, who have become another important target of these policies, are attracted both for economic profit as well as in order to adapt and spread the AKP's identity narratives. This points to the political nature of tourism branding (Broudehoux; Gotham).

The AKP and its predecessors have attempted to transform Istanbul's image into one of Ottoman glory and to attract global capital at the same time, primarily through mega-projects and the large-scale transformation of existing quarters (Akcan; Öncü). Their rhetoric changed from being anti-establishment to supporting the ruling elite (Tuğal); and they shifted from catering to the urban poor to addressing the growing Muslim middle and upper classes, promoting a lifestyle that combines consumerism with Islamic aspects (Çavdar). More generally, the AKP changed its rhetoric on the international level based on shifting contexts, adopting certain categories for collaboration with the European Union (EU) (Girard and Scalbert Yücel) but others for Turkey's policy toward countries in predominantly Muslim and formerly Ottoman regions (Insel). Based on an analysis of city guidebooks on Eyüp published by the Eyüp Municipality between 1996 and 2016, this article examines the historical changes within the narratives and branding strategies for Eyüp by the Municipality since 1994 in relation to shifting

1 "Eyüpsultan" respectfully refers to the Prophet's Companion Ebu Eyyub, whose shrine is in Eyüp. Using this term for the whole quarter stresses the saint's significance for the place's identity. The administrative district was renamed "Eyüpsultan" in 2017. As my research concerns pre-2017 times, I call the place "Eyüp".

2 The RP (1983–1998) and the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP, 1997–2001) can be considered the AKP's (since 2001) predecessors.

prospects for political and economic profit within wider political developments. Tracing these changes, the article points to the constructedness and volatility of Eyüp's identity, which stand in contrast to the essentialist rhethoric of the Municipality (Massey).

Changing Narratives about Eyüp and Political Rule

Historically, Ottoman narratives established a symbolic connection between Eyüp and political rule by claiming that the grave of the Prophet's Companion Ebu Eyyub (died ca. 669) had been rediscovered during Constantinople's Ottoman conquest in 1453. Ebu Eyyub had been part of an unsuccessful early Muslim attempt at conquering Constantinople. Shortly after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmet II built a shrine for Ebu Eyyub outside the city walls near the Golden Horn (Coşkun 47–77, 121–128). The cult around Ebu Eyyub as "patron saint of the new Ottoman capital" (Necipoğlu 25) can be seen as part of an imperial policy to establish Islamic legitimation for Ottoman rule (Necipoğlu 23–26). At least from the 17th century onwards, throne ascension ceremonies for sultans took place at the shrine, which had developed into a pilgrimage site (Coşkun 142–197).

With the foundation of the secular Republic of Turkey in 1923, Eyüp ceased to be connected to official narratives. The shrine was closed in 1925, along with most shrines in Turkey. With increasing industrialization along the Golden Horn from the 1950s, Eyüp came to be imagined as a polluted working-class suburb crowded with informal settlements (Hammond 111). Meanwhile, symbolic value continued to be attributed to the shrine of Ebu Eyyub by politicians to help connect their agenda to the Ottomans and Islam. In this context, the shrine was one of the few to be reopened by the new Democrat Party government in 1950 (Coşkun 13). The AKP and its predecessors, in office in Eyüp and Greater Istanbul since 1994 and nationally since 2002, have repeatedly displayed a connection to the Eyüpsultan Shrine.

Using the rhetoric of Ottoman and Islamic revival, they position themselves in contrast to the secular republican elites, whom they blame for westernizing Turkey and breaking with its heritage. They portray the RP's 1994 election victory as paralleling the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. As the former Ottoman capital, Istanbul is central to Ottoman revivalist narratives (Çınar; Öncü).

Due to the claimed connection of Ebu Eyyub to the Prophet and to the Ottoman conquest, Eyüp is of central importance within Istanbul. Referring to urban rehabilitation activities since 1994, the AKP and its predecessors present their taking office as a turning point in the quarter's history and themselves as the saviours of Eyüp's Islamic–Ottoman identity (Hammond 98–144).

This occurred in the context of changes in Eyüp's social fabric since the area's deindustrialization in the 1980s. Employment shifted to the service sector (Yenen et al. 103–139), and with the arrival of tourists and middle-class residents, the area started to become gentrified.

From Attractive Residential Area to Capital of Inner Peace

City guidebooks are intimately related to the construction of imagined authentic and stable larger collectivities, and of distinctions between the *Self* and the *Other*. With the composition of objects into landscapes representing these entities, guidebooks make it possible to

experience these abstract ideas and seemingly prove them true. By selecting and interpreting objects, and by interpreting the reader's relationship with them and the entity they represent, guidebooks reinforce difference and power structures, while masking their own role by using objective language (Grewal 2, 85–101; Koshar). The guides published by the Eyüp Municipality offer only a particular interpretation of Eyüp, defining the reader's relationship to the place and providing strong advice on how to approach it. However, the compositions of the routes they propose change over time, mobilize different frames of cultural and religious significance, and connect to different general identity narratives. This indicates changes in the AKP's strategies for identity politics in changing political circumstances.

In 1996, two years after the RP took power locally, the Eyüp Municipality Mayor's Office published the first city guide. Dedicating it to Eyüp's residents, Mayor Ahmet Genç states in the preface: "Eyüpsultan, where the Ottoman sultans were girded with the sword during their throne ascension ceremonies and which they found as a source of legitimation for their power, can with the determination of Eyüpsultan's people win back again the same spiritual mission" (*Eyüp Sultan Rehberi 1996* 1–2). The booklet presents the quarter primarily as being significant for the Ottoman conquest and the Ottoman state and society. Based on Eyüpsultan Shrine, it is referred to as the Ottoman sultans' "source of legitimation".

An "encyclopedic" section (*Eyüp Sultan Rehberi 1996* 21–38) of the guide lists only structures built during the Ottoman period. But "Ottoman" is mainly understood as Islamic, as is evident from the type of buildings presented: mosques, lodges and shrines. Under "Other Structures", two industrial buildings are listed. Only at the very end of the list and even after the industrial structures appear two Armenian churches. Although their existence points to the presence of Armenian residents during the Ottoman period, the text preceding the list mentions non-Muslims only concerning the Byzantine settlement of Cosmidion on the site of today's Eyüp. For the Ottoman period, only foreign visitors such as the French Orientalist writer Pierre Loti are identified as non-Muslims. Thus, only Muslims are presented as part of Eyüp's true identity.

For current and possible future residents, the guide describes Eyüp as an attractive place to live with modern infrastructure and provides information about services such as health care and education (*Eyüp Sultan Rehberi 1996* 12–15, 39–47). The RP-led Municipality's aim during this time was to promote an image of Eyüp associated with its glory during Ottoman times, as part of the party's Ottoman revivalist activism in the 1990s. In addition to portraying the new government as saving Eyüp's true identity, the guide introduces the RP's governance as resident-focused, and based on scientific and modern principles. The guide is part of the RP's project to prove itself to its electoral base while trying to institutionalize its new political power locally and nationally.

Ten years later, the Eyüp Municipality's 2006 Strategic Plan optimistically boasted about economic opportunities linked to mass tourism. It praised Pierre Loti Hill's transformation – Restaurant and hotel facilities had opened and a cable car between the suburb and the hilltop was established (Eyüp Stratejik Plan). A second guide published by the Eyüp Municipality in 2008 reprints the 1996 edition's text as a high-gloss paperback with numerous photographs. The text in Turkish and English addresses foreigners as well as locals. The turn towards visitors and towards making Eyüp more consumable is also visible in the presentation

of a visitor's route. Next to religious activities and heritage sightseeing, this includes moments framed as relaxation and enjoyment, such as having coffee at the Pierre Loti Café (*Eyüp City Guide 2008* 37).

While the 1996 guide connects Eyüp's significance to the Ottomans based on the Eyüp-sultan Shrine, the 2008 preface claims that the shrine has made Eyüp "one of the Islamic world's most visited sacred places after Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem" (*Eyüp City Guide 2008* 7). This aims at attracting Muslim tourists, especially Arabs, reflecting the AKP's regional foreign policy. Bolstered by the economic boom and the consolidation of the AKP's power since taking office nationally in 2002, by the mid-2000s the AKP was employing self-confident rhetoric about Turkey as an internationally powerful actor and about Istanbul as a "global city" (Insel; Öncü). At the same time, the AKP catered to European tourists as well, pursuing amiable relations with the EU in expectation of Turkey's accession. Thus the 2008 preface describes Eyüp also as the "shared heritage of humanity", important also for non-Muslims due to its numerous historical structures (*Eyüp City Guide 2008* 7). Possibly for this reason, Ottoman Armenian Eyüp residents are mentioned in 2008 as well.

Compared to 1996, the 2008 guide shifts Eyüp's framing both in content and scale, describing its significance for the "Islamic world" and as part of the "heritage of humanity" beyond the Ottoman realm. Tourists are now the main focus of the Municipality's branding activities rather than residents, as tourists promise economic profit and can, through their mobility, spread the image that the Municipality creates of Eyüp.

In 2009, AKP member İsmail Kavuncu replaced Genç as Eyüp's mayor. A new edition of the 2008 guide was published in 2011. In the preface, Kavuncu frames Eyüp's significance mainly in Islamic terms, stressing that "being neighbor" to Ebu Eyyub "for us carries inestimable value" (*Eyüp City Guide 2011* 7). He calls the guide a "handbook for religious tourism" (*Eyüp City Guide 2011* 7–9). More than a mere pilgrimage, a visit to Eyüp is to include heritage tourism of "our civilization" of Islam and the consumption of Eyüp's "mystical" atmosphere, catering to the growing Muslim middle and upper classes, and providing opportunities for economic profit. This renewed shift towards the Islamic identity of Eyüp occurred in the context of shifting Turkish foreign policies in the early 2010s. Following setbacks in the EU accession negotiations, internal consolidation of the AKP's power and the Arab Spring in 2010–11, the Turkish government turned more towards the Middle East and adopted Islamic rhetoric while aspiring to become a leader in the Muslim world (Insel 192).

Eyüp as the "Capital of Inner Peace" (*huzur başkenti*) – slogan on the municipal poster

"Ramadan in Eyüp with Inner Peace – [Sultans'] Enthronement Street's Gate" – municipal street sign

Since his accession in 2014, AKP Mayor Remzi Aydın has branded Eyüp as the "Capital of Inner Peace (*huzur başkenti*)" (figures 1–3). In contrast to the mass tourism envisaged in 2006, Eyüp is portrayed as a calm, peaceful and spiritual place of "escape from urban life" (Özafşar and Uyar 1). A new guide published in 2016 illustrates increased efforts to make Eyüp consumable, containing six routes and information on restaurants, hotels and souvenirs. The text is in Turkish only, intended for visitors from Istanbul and Turkey more broadly. Most of the routes' headings seem to offer objective representations of the areas by applying neutral-sounding categories according to geographical references.

The route "Eyüp Centre" suggests a spatial concentration of Eyüp's identity. It is composed entirely of Ottoman-era monumental structures, mainly tombs of religious and state authorities, mosques and lodges. The only exceptions are the Feshane factory and an Armenian church (Özafşar and Uyar 34–67). Byzantine ruins, reminders of Ottoman social history and republican structures are not included. The route propagates only a particular interpretation of Eyüp's identity related to the Ottoman state and the religious elite, one that is Islamic.

The route "Eyüp Cemetery and Pierre Loti" attempts to change the image of the hill with the panorama spot, famous also among Istanbulites and tourists uninterested in what many perceive as Islamic downhill Eyüp. The route's sites – Ottoman-era lodges and mosques, with Pierre Loti Café only appearing at the end (Özafşar and Uyar 70–78) – re-interpret the identity of the hill and downplay its association with the French Orientalist.

Eyüp's industrial past no longer features as heritage. While the guide includes factories, they are, except for the Feshane, only points on a route entitled "The Golden Horn's Opposite

Side". The fact that Eyüp's side of the Golden Horn was also lined with industry is omitted. The geographical separation implies a qualitative difference between the opposite bank and "central" Eyüp. The guide values the factories as an attractive environment regarding their current use as museums and a conference centre (Özafşar and Uyar 82–85), but by not mentioning that some were built during Ottoman times, it dissociates industrialization from the Ottoman heritage (Öztürk 41).

Eyüp as Inclusive Symbol for a Larger Imagined Community

The 2016 guide uses seemingly objective language coupled with the rhetoric of recreation, entertainment and a return to one's origins, which is common in contemporary tourism discourse. In this way, and by including elements not usually associated with Eyüp's Islamic–Ottoman image such as the area's industrial heritage and Pierre Loti, the guide also invokes feelings different from the AKP's Islamic–Ottoman rhetoric. However, for Eyüp proper, the guides and the physical environment prepared by the Eyüp Municipality direct visitors to experience the place in a way leading to a very particular interpretation of Eyüp's identity as Islamic and Ottoman.

Eyüp as the "Capital of Inner Peace" (*huzur başkenti*) – municipal poster

The notion of *huzur* (inner peace), as in Eyüp's slogan "Capital of huzur", is central to the Municipality's discourse. Visible on the widely distributed municipal information and promotional posters, the slogan is very present in Eyüp's public space. *Huzur* is a complex concept of social and inner peace that entered the Ottoman language via Islamic mysticism. Today, it can have an Islamic meaning, but it is also used without any religious connotations to refer to social or inner peace (Glassen 13–26).

In Eyüp, *huzur* can be understood as being physically close to the saint. Additionally, the Eyüp Municipality uses the notion to brand Eyüp as a positive place, in opposition to stressful modern urban life. With *huzur*, it unites the different aspects of Eyüp's image, such as its sacredness, its historical atmosphere and its natural environment, including the cemeteries' trees and the Golden Horn's water. Presented in this way, Eyüp relates to more general desires for harmony, spirituality and recreation (Öztürk 42).

I argue that the complex concept of *huzur*, connected to a mystical atmosphere, can through its ambiguity invite people from various backgrounds to experience Eyüp in a way directed by the Eyüp Municipality, and therefore promote the Municipality's narratives about Eyüp. *Huzur* acts as an "empty signifier" (Laclau 72; Laclau and Mouffe), which, through its polysemy and underdetermination, can connect to and unite different groups and help to establish cultural hegemony. Especially in the context of the rising social and political tensions in Turkey, *huzur*, while understood differently by different people, can function as a unifying signifier of something desired but absent. In promising to deliver this desired quality and to revive the "golden age" of the imagined community identified as Ottoman, of which the condition of *huzur* is promoted as a central feature, the AKP is trying to legitimize its power. As the *capital*

of *huzur*, Eyüp is constructed as a powerful centre of that imagined identity, from where the quality of *huzur* is supposed to spread. Additionally, Eyüp itself is portrayed as a symbol of the larger imagined Islamic–Ottoman community.

Conclusion

Based on a diachronic comparison of city guidebooks, the article demonstrates how the Eyüp Municipality, ruled by the AKP and its predecessors, despite its revivalist rhetoric about an essentialist quality of Eyüp's identity, has considerably modified its narratives and branding strategies for the place with changing prospects for economic benefit and political influence in shifting social and political contexts. The changing framings of Eyüp indicate the constructedness and volatility of a place's identity, which is always produced by specific actors at specific moments in time, and therefore unstable and open to change (Laclau and Mouffe 96, 99–104; Massey). The transformations in the narrative by the same party and its predecessors point to the possibility of even more varying interpretations of Eyüp by other actors.

The shifting narratives about Eyüp matter beyond the quarter, as the AKP and its predecessors present Eyüp as a concentration of a larger imagined community's essential qualities, and therefore as its symbol. By presenting themselves as the saviours of the identity of Eyüp and thereby of the imagined larger community, the AKP and its predecessors seek to legitimize their political rule at various levels. The branding activities by the Eyüp Municipality thus demonstrate the political nature of place branding targeting local residents and various groups of tourists.

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Malte Fuhrmann: Konstantinopel – Istanbul. Stadt der Sultane und Rebellen (S. Fischer, 2019)

Eine historische Reise durch Istanbul, von Justinian bis Erdoğan: Der Historiker Malte Fuhrmann lebt seit vielen Jahren in der Stadt am Bosporus – hier erzählt er von den Geistern der Stadt, die in den alten Gemäuern allgegenwärtig sind, von aufständischen Janitscharen und plündernden Kreuzrittern, von Hofintrigen und blutig aufgelösten Gewerkschaftsdemonstrationen.
Istanbul ist eine Stadt der Vielfalt und der Widersprüche, voller Geschichte und Geschichten. Dort begegnen sich Christentum und Islam, Europa und Asien, aber auch Herrscher und Rebellen, wie 2013 am Gezi-Park. Malte Fuhrmann nimmt dieses Ereignis, das er selbst miterlebt hat, als Ausgangspunkt für seine Reise durch die Zeiten, von Konstantinopel unter Justinian über die Eroberung der Stadt durch Mehmed II. bis hin zu Erdoğan.
Wer Istanbul erkunden, wer die Türkei von heute begreifen möchte, für den ist dieses Buch eine Schatzkammer der Entdeckungen. Lebendig und fesselnd wie die Stadt selbst.

Reappropriating Urban Heritage

Jeddah's Rejuvenation and Struggle Over its Past

Ulrike Freitag

Efforts at conservation in Historic Jeddah (locally known as al-Balad) must be credited, first and foremost, to the late Mayor of Jeddah, Dr Mohammad Sa'id Farsi, who held office between 1972 and 1986. Besides planning the extension of the city in a period when the oil industry was booming, he invested much time and initiative in building the Jeddah Corniche. Adorned with sculptures by international artists, this became the city's prime recreational outdoor space. However, he did not neglect the old city at a time when the local population had started to relocate to the suburbs and into modern houses, and migrants from the countryside or other countries were moving in. In 1981, Dr Farsi elicited a royal decree which designated the entire historic city of Jeddah within the old city walls as a preservation zone. Under his direction, the municipality took the first steps not only to identifying 537 houses worthy of protection but also paved the streets and installed lighting, with a view to improving public facilities and services.

Old city of Jedda

Dr Farsi would have been proud – and sad – to see Jeddah registered in June 2014 on the UNESCO World Heritage List as "Historic Jeddah, the Gate to Makkah". This success was the second attempt to have the city recognised as a world heritage site. The second application covered a much smaller area than the initial request, which had to be withdrawn in 2011. While in Saudi Arabia this was widely celebrated, Dr Farsi would have been sad because in his time a much larger area had been designated for protection.

This contribution is not concerned with the complicated issues behind this process and its outcomes. Nor will it engage with the analysis of why many parts of once-proud Jeddah nowadays look rather dilapidated, even if the state and – of late – property owners are now investing in the restoration. More importantly, urban festivals organised by local authorities have attracted not only Saudi tourists but many among the local population too, who had shunned an old city and considered it to be an urban slum. While visitors

agree on the positive cultural aspects of folkloristic festivals which offer a sight of old-fashioned dress and traditional food, the meaning attributed to old Jeddah is strongly contested.

Officially, the designation of "Jeddah the Gate to Mecca" conforms with one of the city's historic functions: it is said to have been made the official port of Mecca by Caliph Uthman in the mid-seventh century ce. More importantly, not only the rule over Mecca but also guardianship of Islamic pilgrimage from anywhere in the Muslim world was a central concern of Muslim rulers. In late Ottoman times, this was closely linked to the protective functions that came with the title of caliph. When the Al Sa'ud conquered the Hijaz in the mid-1920s, better security and improved services for pilgrims were among the main arguments used internationally to justify their move and gain legitimacy. Hence, the pilgrimage – at that time also the main source of state income – has always been of great interest to the rulers of the Hijaz. Consecutive works in Mecca, including the latest locally and internationally contested expansions, have been justified as providing the best possible pilgrimage experience. The pilgrimage is also consistently used for acts of diplomacy – from the invitation of specific individuals to the negotiation of pilgrimage quotas or the boycott of the pilgrimage (hence, this is not just a Saudi tool). To present Jeddah as the Gateway to Mecca is fully in line with the quest for international Islamic legitimacy by the Saudi government. Thus, the pragmatic reduction of the protected area, resulting from real-estate developments, was presented in a convenient ideological garb.

Locally, old Jeddah is often epitomised in the saying *Jeddah Ghayr*: Jeddah is different. While polemics from Riyadh would argue that it is urban neglect that characterises this difference, Jeddawi families would rather point to the cosmopolitan heritage of the city. This heritage is connected to the waves of immigration which have made the population of "Jeddah within the walls" a mirror image of the Muslim wider world. Lists of names of the "original inhabitants" of "Jeddah within the walls", that is, families that were there in 1947, point to places such as Chinguetti in present-day Mauritania, to Fez in Morocco, to the Sudan and the African coast, to Turkey, Albania and Syria, to Iran, India and to as far as Palembang in present-day Indonesia. Of course, the Indonesians might indeed have been pilgrims who decided or were forced to stay. Many Indians, however, came as merchants under British protection in the context of the expansion of global trade in the imperial age; the Turks were often Ottoman officials who settled in Jeddah; and many of the Africans were forcibly imported as slaves. While the lists of original inhabitants tend to assume a timeless quality in local historiography, there were also distinct phases of immigration, such as in the case of Muslims fleeing first Russian expansion and then Stalinist terror. Notwithstanding such finer details (on which I have worked at length in my forthcoming book on the history of Jeddah), it is important to note that Jeddah's role in international trade was what brought many of these settlers to the city. The resultant cosmopolitanism of the inhabitants is what constitutes, in local understanding, the core of *Jeddah ghayr*. Although, naturally, this is still very much linked to the Hijaz being the "Cradle of Islam" (to quote the title of Mai Yamani's book), Yamani's narrative contains important nuances and differences from the official Saudi depiction. This relates to a history in which Hijazis feel they were not given their due. To quote the blurb of Mai Yamani's book further: "The urban, cosmopolitan Hijazis were absorbed into a new state whose codes of behaviour and rules were determined by the Najdis, an ascetic desert people, of whom the Al Saud family were part. But the Saudi rulers failed to fully integrate the Hijaz, which retains a distinctive identity to this day".

Although the Hijazi elite has not fared badly in the new Saudi state into which they were absorbed between 1924 and 1926, the feeling of difference and disadvantage remains, exacerbated by a parallel sense of superiority by cosmopolitan urbanites (with a historical fear of Bedouin) over ascetic Najdis of less urban or distinctly Bedouin origin. While many Najdis share a sense of difference, their interpretation is distinct: tribal origin holds great importance in Saudi Arabia and it is exactly for that reason that Najdis often hesitate to marry their daughters to the sons of "turshat al-bahr" (spit of the sea) or "baqayat al-hajj" (the hajj leftovers). Both terms have a strong derogative connotation and, more centrally for the argument at hand, denote the assumed non-tribal and non-Arabian background of the Hijazi population.

What has this to do with the cities? With regard to the destruction of old Mecca, the localist argument runs that this was a ploy to destroy the real heritage of Islam and of the Hijazis. Preservation of Jeddah is, in this kind of discourse, seen as highly ironic: why should the heritage of the hajj be celebrated and preserved in what is seen locally as only the *dihliz* – the mere entrance hall of and thoroughfare to the Holy City. This is perceived as an ambivalent space insofar as strangers are able to enter the house, so that the *dihliz* constitutes a semi-public space rather than a private one.

Of course, this position is mostly taken by native Meccans. Many people with stronger roots in Jeddah would take a more positive view of the conservation efforts, while still sharing scepticism regarding government intervention. Interference in private property (even if it happens to be close to collapse) by a government perceived as not trustworthy is resented. At the same time, the contradictory argument of blaming the government for the very decay it is in fact trying to prevent is also made by some parties.

People putting forward such arguments are not necessarily ardent conservationists. On the contrary, they might blame the government while hoping themselves to gain handsome profits from properties once the protected houses are destroyed by fire. This practice has only recently been stopped by government regulations, and nowadays Jiddawi families increasingly invest in houses in the old city. As for Mecca, many of those complaining about the destruction happily sold their former houses at high prices.

There is another aspect here: while claiming the cosmopolitan past as a distinctive characteristic, many Hijazis have de facto adapted to the Najdi discourse. Researching family histories, I was oftentimes told about the true origin of families in the Hijaz. Their forefathers, I was informed, had originated in Hijaz, as part of the Arab-Islamic armies or ventured as preachers or merchants elsewhere, returning centuries later. Where possible, such Arabised lineages are also linked to tribal ones, putting Hijazis on a par with the genealogy-conscious Najdis. Exogamous marriage for girls has become far more restricted than in the past. At the same time, the tightening of immigration laws and government regulations on the marrying of foreigners have also helped sharpen the boundaries between Saudis in general and Hijazis in particular on the one hand, and foreigners on the other. This has turned the practice of integration through marriage, which characterised society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, firmly into a matter of the past. We are thus confronted with a situation in which the cosmopolitan heritage is bemoaned and cited as a characteristic of a society which has, in many ways, adapted a rather uncosmopolitan and more tribally oriented discourse.

Ahaad al-Amoudi, Generator (2012)

I could end on this pessimistic note. However, the old city has also offered a space of opportunity. As in many similar urban rehabilitation projects, the question of future use was a major issue. While the current population of poor immigrants is increasingly being replaced through eviction, it is clear that most Saudis are not interested in repopulating the old houses. They are for the most part difficult to access by car and feature narrow interior staircases and rooms which were formerly airy through their big carved *roshans* (covered wooden alcoves) but which are difficult to use in the age of air conditioning – quite apart from the basic arrangement of rooms and facilities. While some galleries and souvenir shops have been established, it is in the past few years that the old city has become a space of new sociabilities. Visits to the *souq* in Ramadan by youngsters who found this an interesting alternative to the endless shopping malls might have been an early indication of change. Artists had for some time taken an interest in the decay of the old city, as is evident from works by artists such as Ahaad al-Amoudi. The text in this image translates as:

"I wanted to portray the effects al-Balad [i. e. the old city] had on the development of our culture. It is essentially our birthplace, where our parents and grandparents were housed and sheltered. The walls of the old buildings supported us. They hold our cultures and they form a part of our identity. This work represents our continuous inner struggle to reconcile modernization with tradition".

From 2014 the Saudi Arts Council, an association of businesspeople and arts enthusiasts, started to include spaces in the old city in its exhibitions.[1] In 2015, Art Jameel opened a House of Traditional Arts in Jeddah old town. For its 2016 season, the closing dinner for VIPs attending a major annual art exhibition was held in al-Balad. More importantly, that same year one of the leading artists in Jeddah, Ahmad Angawi, held a solo exhibition in an old enclosure, or *hawsh*, in which he celebrated the ancient art of *mangour*, the hidden geometry which forms an integral part of the Jeddah roshans. These activities are important because they draw a middle- and upper-class public to the old city in an increasingly regular fashion. Recently, young filmmakers have established an office in the vicinity and new coffeeshops serve this new audience, themselves celebrating the urban past with exhibits and images. When I last visited the area, it was populated not only by arts students but also by a team of

1 https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/art/21-39-launches-in-jeddah-1.284477

filmmakers. Upon enquiry, it turned out that renowned film director Mahmoud Sabbagh (*Baraka Meets Baraka*, 2016, and *Amra and the Second Marriage*, 2018) was shooting there with his team.

And indeed film: in March 2019, a film called *Roll'em* premiered in Jeddah. It is a film about the city, the space of the cinema and the role of film for urban identity. Crucially, its young director and crew present a new generation's quest for an identity combining the new ways of life with the long-neglected urban heritage.

All these developments show a new engagement with and appreciation of the space of old Jeddah, the efforts for the conservation of which began with Mayor Farsi. They show how a space that had largely degenerated into an urban slum is being re-appropriated as a recreational and educational space, one that caters for tourism but also for a reassertion of local identity. This is, at least in part, encouraged by recent policies of the Saudi state, which regards culture as an important driving force for tourism, and the latter as an essential building block for its Vision 2030. Incidentally, however, there is another twist to the story: Saudi Arabia as a whole has recently been trying to portray itself as a traditional society that is open to and interested in exchange with the rest of the world. In this endeavour, the urban heritage of Jeddah suddenly acquires the role of a national testimonial to such openness. Intent on attracting Western tourists in addition to those from the Muslim world, Jeddah has the advantage of having been open to resident non-Muslims for a long time – as a somewhat polluted entrance hall to the holy city of Mecca, which was and remains off limits to non-Muslim visitors.

This paper was given as a lecture during a colloquium "Civility in Arab Cities: Seeking Equity and Tolerance in an Era of Growth and War", held in honour of H. E. Dr. Mohamed S. Farsi at the American University in Washington on November 13, 2019.



Ulrike Freitag: A History of Jeddah. The Gate to Mecca in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge University Press, 2020)

This book constitutes the first comprehensive 'biography' of Jeddah, the port city of Mecca. Besides serving the Muslim pilgrimage, it was an important station in the international trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. This resulted in a very diverse population, comprising slaves as well as long-distance merchants and shipping magnates. Through its people, the urban history became linked to developments in the wider Muslim world. The book investigates how the different sectors of the population interacted in a changing urban space, it considers their economic activities and the changing political frameworks from the late Ottoman Empire to the present. Ironically, the cosmopolitanism of Jeddah, as well as its urban space, much maligned in the Saudi context, is being re-evaluated at a time when both cosmopolitan practices and the old city have changed dramatically in the context of modernisation and nation-building.

Connecting Themes

Alle Macht nach Moskau?

Der russische Föderalismus und das Beispiel Tatarstan

Stefan B. Kirmse

Der anarchische Proto-Föderalismus der 90er Jahre ist endgültig Geschichte. Mittlerweile ist in Russland ein höchst zentralisierter Staat entstanden, in dem die 89 so genannten „Subjekte" der Föderation nur noch geringe Machtbefugnisse haben.

Hatten sich nach dem Untergang der Sowjetunion in Russland noch viele Regionen zu semi-feudalen Lehnsgütern entwickelt, in denen die neuen Machthaber weitgehend unabhängig von Moskau und zunehmend autoritär agieren konnten, initiierte Wladimir Putin eine umfassende Reform der Beziehungen zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie. Viele Machtbefugnisse wurden seit seinem Amtsantritt im Jahr 2000 zurück ans Zentrum gegeben, während sich die Regionen mit einigen wenigen Zugeständnissen zufriedengeben mussten. Im Folgenden wird die Entwicklung – im Speziellen mit Verweis auf die Region Tatarstan – näher erläutert.

Das sowjetische Erbe und die wilden 90er

Moskaus Umgang mit den regionalen Eliten war in den 90er Jahren oft nicht mehr als Krisenmanagement. Es gab kaum konsequente, strategische Berechnung, und wo eine solche Berechnung existiert haben mag, entpuppte sich das Zentrum als zu schwach, den oftmals eigensinnigen regionalen Führungszirkeln den eigenen Willen aufzuzwingen. Zentrale Gründe für die relative Schwäche des Bundes waren die allgemeine wirtschaftliche Krise, eine gespaltene Elite und die Abhängigkeit des Zentrums von regionaler Unterstützung, gerade bei Wahlen. Der Föderalismus, der schließlich in der Verfassung von 1993 festgeschrieben wurde, entstand nicht aus einer ausgewogenen Diskussion über das beste Modell, sondern aus der hilflosen Akzeptanz der politischen Realität. Politisch oder wirtschaftlich starke Regionen bestanden auf Privilegien, die anderen Regionen vorenthalten blieben. So entstand ein System, das von Machtasymmetrien und Rivalitäten geprägt war und das in nicht geringem Maße das Ergebnis zentraler Probleme und Entwicklungen in der späten Sowjetunion war. Aber der Reihe nach.

Die letzten Jahre der UdSSR waren von fortwährenden Machtkämpfen an der Spitze gezeichnet. Diese machten es möglich, dass lokale Eliten nach dem Machtverlust der Kommu-

Kasan, Tatarstan, Russische Föderation

nistischen Partei die Kontrolle über verschiedene Regionen erlangten. Der Machtkampf führte dazu, dass sich Moskauer Eliten gegenseitig dabei übertrumpften, den neuen Führungszirkeln aus der Provinz Zugeständnisse zu machen. Hierbei ging es zunächst vor allem um das Zugeständnis der Souveränität. In der so genannten „Parade der Souveränitäten" erklärten zwischen 1988 und 1991 nicht nur die 15 Teilrepubliken der Sowjetunion (die baltischen Staaten, die Ukraine, etc.), sondern auch 24 autonome Republiken und Kreise innerhalb Russlands ihre „Souveränität" (was weithin als Vorstufe zur Unabhängigkeit verstanden wurde). Manchmal war es der Generalsekretär der KPdSU und sowjetische Präsident, Michail Gorbatschow, manchmal war es der russische Präsident, Boris Jelzin, der sie in ihrem Streben nach Autonomie unterstützte – je nachdem, wem es gerade im Kampf gegen den anderen nützte.

Den Grundstein für das Erstarken der Regionen hatte Gorbatschow bereits in seinem Reformprogramm *Perestroika* gelegt, indem er etwa die Wiederbelebung des dezentralen Rätesystems (der sog. *Sowjets*) oder die Schwächung der zentralen Bürokratie forcierte. Im Dezember 1990 berief die sowjetische Führung neben den Unionsrepubliken nun auch 20 autonome Republiken in den neu gegründeten Föderationsrat.

Dass auch Russland alsbald seine Souveränität erklärte, war für die anderen Teilrepubliken der Sowjetunion nur bedingt bedeutsam. Sechs von ihnen waren Moskau mit einer solchen Erklärung bereits zuvorgekommen, und die anderen hätten es wohl auch ohne das russische Beispiel getan. Anders sah es bei den autonomen Republiken innerhalb Russlands aus. Viele regionale Eliten waren im Laufe des Jahres 1990 an der Ausarbeitung der russischen Souveränitätserklärung beteiligt; dass sie im Anschluss die russische Erklärung als Modell übernahmen, den eigenen Umständen anpassten, zum Teil gar im Wortlaut kopierten, kann nicht wirklich verwundern. Jelzin erkannte zu spät, dass das Misstrauen weniger gegen die Sowjetunion als gegen jegliche Art von Machtkonzentration im Zentrum gerichtet war. Sein Konfrontationskurs wiederum hatte unbeabsichtigte Nachahmungseffekte: Warum sollten die autonomen Regionen Russlands gegenüber ihm nicht die gleichen Ansprüche geltend machen dürfen wie die Unionsrepubliken gegenüber Gorbatschow? 1990 hatte Jelzin bei einem Besuch in Kasan, der Hauptstadt der autonomen Republik Tatarstan, noch erklärt, dass die tatarische Führung doch „so viel Unabhängigkeit, wie sie nur schlucken könnte", reklamieren solle. Diese Aussage sollte ihn jetzt wieder einholen.

Im nun folgenden „Krieg der Gesetze" widersprachen 19 von 21 neu aufgesetzten Verfassungen in den autonomen Regionen offen der Verfassung der Russischen Föderation. Jelzin hatte den Regionen lediglich zugestanden, die Verfassung konkretisieren zu dürfen; doch bereits die Tatsache, dass die autonomen Gebiete darauf bestanden, sich selbst Verfas-

Kul-Scharif Moschee, erbaut zwischen 1996 und 2005, Kasan, Tatarstan, Russische Föderation

sungen zu geben (Tatarstan im November 1992) sowie „Präsidenten" statt Gouverneure zu wählen, zeigt einen Teil des Problems. In den ethnisch definierten Republiken, etwa Tatarstan oder Baschkortostan, war eine im Kern auf „nationale Selbstbestimmung" ausgerichtete Politik zunächst bestimmend: Die regionalen Parlamente waren von Vertreterinnen und Vertretern der jeweiligen Titularnation dominiert (in Tatarstan etwa stellten Tataren weniger als 50% der Bevölkerung, aber 70% der Abgeordneten); in Schulen wurde verstärkt in den Sprachen der Titularnationen unterrichtet, wobei regionale Geschichte und Kultur in den Mittelpunkt gerückt wurden. Dass in Kasan alsbald die größte Moschee Russlands unweit des Präsidentenpalasts errichtet und nach dem letzten Imam des 1552 unterworfenen Kasaner Khanats benannt wurde, unterstrich das neue Selbstverständnis.

Zugleich übernahmen die Exekutiven zunehmend die Kontrolle. Parlamente wurden mit Funktionären gefüllt, bei Wahlen gab es selten wirkliche Opposition, und sowohl die Medien als auch die Verwaltungen waren von den lokalen Machthabern abhängig. In Tatarstan war fast ein Drittel aller Abgeordneten vom Präsidenten bestimmt. Dass die Führungen der Regionen und Republiken zu diesem Zeitpunkt direkt gewählt wurden, machte sie effektiv zu „Mini-Präsidenten" und zu einflussreichen Gegenspielern des Zentrums. In etlichen Republiken kristallisierten sich neue Führungszirkel auf der Basis von Familien- und Klanverbindungen heraus, die nicht nur die Politik bestimmten, sondern auch den entscheidenden Wirtschaftsunternehmen vorstanden. Politik und Wirtschaft bildeten oft eine untrennbare Einheit. Starke demokratische Institutionen konnten sich so kaum herausbilden. Der tatarische Präsident Mintimer Schaimiew, in der Sowjetunion noch Vorsitzender des Obersten Sowjets der Tatarischen ASSR, wurde mehrfach ohne Gegenkandidaten als Präsident wiedergewählt – 1996 gar mit 97,1% der Stimmen. Die gesamtrussischen Präsidentschaftswahlen waren zur gleichen Zeit noch ungleich kompetitiver.

De facto war die Dezentralisierung der 1990er Jahre ein Hindernis für die Demokratisierung im Land, da die regionalen Regierungen so viel Autonomie erhielten, dass sie ihre eigenen Transformationsprozesse bestimmen konnten. Diese wiederum blockierten nicht selten demokratische Reformen auf nationaler Ebene. Unter den richtigen Bedingungen hätte Dezentralisierung sicher auch die demokratische Entwicklung stärken können; im russischen Fall jedoch ging sie nicht mit robusten demokratischen Institutionen, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Transparenz und einer freien Zivilgesellschaft einher und führte so zu eingeschränkter Regierbarkeit. Andererseits trug sie insofern auch zur Stabilisierung bei, als sie ein Gegengewicht zur zentralistischen Tradition bildete.

Die russische Verfassung von 1993 sah keine Asymmetrie vor; formell waren alle Subjekte der Föderation gleichgestellt. Andererseits enthielt sie Artikel, die den Regionen alle Rechte zusprachen, die das Zentrum für sich nicht explizit in Anspruch genommen hatte. Auch das Recht auf unabhängige Gesetzgebung in den Regionen war Teil der Verfassung. Zudem blieb vieles vage und Details waren noch durch spätere Verhandlung und Gesetzgebung zu

klären. Ab dem Frühjahr 1994 setzte daher das ein, was später als „Parade der Verträge" bekannt werden sollte. Im Kern war dies eine Regionalisierung jenseits der Verfassung. Bilateralismus, Exzeptionalismus und Hierarchie standen vor Multilateralismus, Transparenz und Gleichheit. Regionen, die erfolgreich verhandelten, erlangten fiskalische Privilegien, Ernennungsvollmachten oder Ausnahmeregelungen. Insgesamt schlossen 46 der 89 Subjekte der Föderation bilaterale Verträge mit Moskau. Von Anfang an jedoch besaßen diese Verträge ein Legitimationsdefizit, da sie nur von zentralen und regionalen Exekutiven bestätigt, nicht aber von Parlamenten ratifiziert worden waren. Damit waren sie Abkommen auf Zeit und stark von persönlichen Vereinbarungen abhängig.

Zusammen mit Tschetschenien gehörte Tatarstan in den frühen 90er Jahren zu den am vehementesten nach Unabhängigkeit strebenden Regionen. Tatarstan war auch die erste Republik, die mit dem Zentrum in Moskau ein bilaterales Abkommen schloss – im Februar 1994, kurz nach Annahme der russischen Verfassung.

Putins „Diktatur des Rechts"

Nach Putins Amtsantritt im Jahr 2000 entwickelte sich rasch eine Kampagne, um die Macht des Präsidenten zu stärken. Putin selbst nannte diese Kampagne „die Diktatur des Rechts". Neu geschaffen wurden zunächst sieben (ab 2010 acht) Föderationskreise, angeführt von so genannten „Bevollmächtigten Vertretern des Präsidenten", die die Harmonisierung von Gesetzen zwischen Zentrum und Regionen überwachen sollten. Für die nach Autonomie strebenden Regionen rächte sich nun die Tatsache, dass die mit Moskau geschlossenen Verträge zwar allgemeine Prinzipien beinhalteten, konkrete Vereinbarungen aber nur für Zeiträume von zumeist fünf Jahren getroffen hatten. Diese mussten in regelmäßigen Abständen neu ausgehandelt werden, und die zunehmende Stärke des Zentrums bedeutete, dass die Regionen bei jeder neuen Übereinkunft frühere Privilegien aufgeben mussten. Gegen Ende von Putins ersten zwei Amtszeiten waren separate Abkommen nur noch mit Tschetschenien und Tatarstan in Kraft. Entscheidungen des russischen Verfassungsgerichts, dass republikanische Verfassungen in Einklang mit der Bundesverfassung zu bringen seien, beschleunigten den Bedeutungsverlust der bilateralen Vereinbarungen. Viele Regionen waren zudem gezwungen, nun weniger die eigene Souveränität und mehr die Zugehörigkeit zur Russischen Föderation hervorzuheben.

Da sich Moskau und Kasan in dieser Frage uneinig waren und Anweisungen von Kommissionen, Gerichten und dem Bevollmächtigten des Präsidenten in der Wolgaregion weitgehend wirkungslos blieben, war es letztlich ein Vier-Augen-Gespräch zwischen Schaimiew und Putin, dass den Weg zur neuen tatarischen Verfassung von 2002 freigab. Eine begrenzte Souveränität der Republik konnte der tatarische Präsident noch heraushandeln (zusammen mit üppigen finanziellen Zusagen); die meisten früheren Ansprüche jedoch, etwa die höhere Wertigkeit von tatarischen Gesetzen im Verhältnis zu russischen und das rein assoziative Verhältnis mit Russland, mussten aufgegeben werden.

Zweifellos kam es im Verhältnis zwischen Zentrum und Regionen auch auf das unterschiedliche Ansehen regionaler Köpfe sowie die strategische Bedeutung der Regionen an. Schaimiew genoss einen Grad an Einfluss in Moskau, den Präsidenten benachbarter, innerrussischer Republiken wie Udmurtien oder Mari-El sicher nicht besaßen. Im Laufe der Zeit

waren starke regionale Machthaber dem Kreml jedoch zunehmend ein Dorn im Auge. Es ist kein Zufall, dass 2010 nicht nur Schaimiev, sondern auch die ähnlich mächtigen Präsidenten Murtasa Rachimow (Baschkortostan) und Kirsan Iljumschinow (Kalmückien) ankündigten, für eine weitere Amtszeit nicht zur Verfügung zu stehen. Alle drei waren zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits 15 bis 20 Jahre im Amt. Doch es gibt nach wie vor Unterschiede. Der „neue" tatarische Präsident Rustam Minnikhanov etwa spielt als Kopf einer rohstoffreichen, muslimisch geprägten Region nach wie vor eine wichtige Rolle im strategischen Kalkül des Kreml, zuletzt bei Verhandlungen mit krimtatarischen Delegationen im Zuge der Annexion der Krim.

Bislang hat sich die Zentralmacht erfolgreich gegen eine erneute Dezentralisierung gewehrt, auch wenn seit etwa 2012 wieder verstärkt danach gerufen wird. Zu den zentralen Instrumenten von Putins Zentralisierungspolitik wurden die Ministerien der Föderation, die im Vergleich zu den 90er Jahren deutlich mehr Geld bekamen und damit ihre Präsenz in den Regionen stärken konnten. Zwischen 2005 und 2012 wurden die Gouverneure nicht mehr direkt gewählt, was zu einer verstärkten Abhängigkeit vom Moskauer Zentrum führte; doch auch die Wiedereinführung der Direktwahl 2012 führte nicht zu mehr Wettbewerb und einer Stärkung der Regionen. Unter Putin nahmen Wahlfälschung und Wahlmanipulation auf lokaler Ebene sowie die Steuerung der Wahlergebnisse drastisch zu: in den meisten Fällen setzten sich nun die Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten des Kremls durch. Einer der Gründe dafür ist die Mobilisierung von Personen in staatseigenen Unternehmen, Schulen, Universitäten, Krankenhäusern und anderen Institutionen des öffentlichen Dienstes, die mit verschiedenen Mitteln zur Stimmabgabe im Sinne des Kremls getrieben werden.

Mit dem Wiedererstarken des Zentrums Mitte der 2000er Jahre haben sich die republikanischen Spielräume stark reduziert. Das zeigt sich auch in der Bildungspolitik. Wie zu Sowjetzeiten kann man nach wie vor zwischen Schulen, in denen auf Russisch, und Schulen, in denen in Lokalsprachen unterrichtet wird, wählen. In Tatarstan stieg die Nachfrage nach tatarischsprachigem Unterricht in den 90er Jahren stark an. Die Betonung der regionalen, ethnisch-gefärbten Identität stand jedoch im Widerspruch zum all-russischen Patriotismus, der unter Putin gefördert wurde. So wurden 2010 die ethno-regionalen Komponenten im Lehrplan, die es seit 1992 gegeben hatte, trotz heftiger Proteste aus Regionen wie Tatarstan oder Baschkortostan wieder abgeschafft. Zwar führte der Widerstand dieser Regionen dazu, dass auch russischsprachige Schulen den Unterricht von lokaler Sprache und Literatur verpflichtend aufrechterhalten mussten; zugleich verschwand jedoch die Unterweisung in regionaler Geschichte vom Lehrplan. Darüber hinaus wurde 2009 das Vereinheitlichte Staatsexamen (Russisch abgekürzt „EGE") in ganz Russland als Schulabschlussprüfung festgelegt. Mit Einführung des EGE werden alle (nicht fremdsprachlichen) Fächer ausschließlich auf Russisch abgefragt, was einen Nachteil für Jugendliche bedeutet, die zuvor in nationalsprachigen Schulen unterrichtet wurden. Es verwundert kaum, dass diese Maßnahme die Nachfrage nach tatarischsprachigen Schulen in Tatarstan nachhaltig reduziert hat.[1]

Die Unabhängigkeitsrhetorik ist in Kasan weitgehend verstummt. Die Wolgarepublik hat sich von einer Bastion gegen das Zentrum zu einer Art Musterschüler gewandelt. Damit zeigt das tatarische Beispiel aber nicht nur die zunehmende Stärke Moskaus, sondern auch

1 Dilyara Suleymanova, „Between Regionalisation and Centralisation: The Implications of Russian Education Reforms for Schooling in Tatarstan", *Europe-Asia Studies* 70(1) 2018, 53–74.

die neuen Möglichkeiten der Regionen. Öl- und Gasreserven erklären die günstige ökonomische Lage Tatarstans nur zum Teil. Kaum einer anderen Republik gelingt es derart beständig, Fördergelder des Bundes an Land zu ziehen. Das von regionalen Eliten angestoßene Projekt der Jugendolympiade 2013 ließ über 2 Milliarden US-Dollar für den Bau von neuen Straßen, Sportzentren und Wohngebieten von Moskau nach Kasan fließen. Die Finanzierung weiterer Großereignisse in der Wolgaregion folgte; so war Kasan eine der zentralen Austragungsstätten der Fußballweltmeisterschaft 2018. Wenn man von der Machtverlagerung von den Regionen zurück ins Moskauer Zentrum spricht, sollte man daher nicht vergessen, dass regionale Eliten durchaus Spielräume besitzen. Dass Kasan in den letzten Jahren viel Geld und Aufmerksamkeit in Moskau gewonnen hat, hat vor allem mit akribischer Lobbyarbeit und politischer Verlässlichkeit zu tun.[2] Letztere äußert sich aus Sicht des Zentrums gar nicht so sehr in unmittelbarer Loyalität (bei der es kaum noch Unterschiede zwischen den Regionen gibt) sondern darin, im regionalen Vergleich hohe Wahlbeteiligungen erzeugen zu können.

Im Ganzen ist von den früher ausgehandelten Privilegien jedoch wenig übrig geblieben. Im Juli 2017 lief auch Kasans bilaterales Abkommen mit Moskau aus. Tatarstan war die letzte Republik, die noch ein solches Abkommen besessen hatte. Zwar sieht es so aus, als dürfte die Region weiterhin „Republik“ und der Kopf der Exekutive weiterhin „Präsident“ heißen; doch sind dies eher symbolische Zugeständnisse. Im autoritären Föderalismus der Regierung Putin sind die einst mächtigen Regionen nicht nur *de iure* „Subjekte“ der Föderation; sie sind es nun auch *de facto*.



Stefan B. Kirmse: The Lawful Empire. Legal Change and Cultural Diversity in Late Tsarist Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2019)

The Russian Empire and its legal institutions have often been associated with arbitrariness, corruption, and the lack of a ‘rule of law’. Stefan B. Kirmse challenges these assumptions in this important new study of empire-building, minority rights, and legal practice in late Tsarist Russia, revealing how legal reform transformed ordinary people’s interaction with state institutions from the 1860s to the 1890s. By focusing on two regions that stood out for their ethnic and religious diversity, the book follows the spread of the new legal institutions into the open steppe of Southern Russia, especially Crimea, and into the fields and forests of the Middle Volga region around the ancient Tatar capital of Kazan. It explores the degree to which the courts served as instruments of integration: the integration of former borderlands with the imperial centre and the integration of the empire’s internal ‘others’ with the rest of society.

2 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova & Rostislav Turovsky, „The Politics of Federal Transfers in Putin’s Russia: Regional Competition, Lobbying, and Federal Priorities“, *Post-Soviet Affairs* 33(2) 2017, 161–175.

“Islam” as an Epistemic Field

Imperial Entanglements and Orientalism in the German-Speaking World since 1870

Interview with Nils Riecken

You are one of the conveners of the conference “‘Islam’ as an Epistemic Field: Imperial Entanglements and Orientalism in the German-Speaking World since 1870” 1. Why did you organize this conference?

“Islam” is at the center of current societal and academic debates in Germany. These highly political debates revolve around such issues as the status and rights of refugees, of migrant workers, of Muslim women and headscarves, and the question of whether “Islam” and “Muslims” can belong to a politically- and historically-constituted entity called “Germany” – a nation-state that identifies itself as secular. The idea that “Islam” itself poses a major political “problem” for German politics has important historical precedents. This German history extends beyond 2001, 1990, 1945, 1918, and even 1870. Already at the turn of the twentieth century, the German public discussed “the Islamic question” (“die Islamfrage”) and “Islamic policy” (“Islampolitik”) regarding German colonial policy. “Islam” constituted a “problem” to be analyzed, as the influential scholar of Islam (“Islamwissenschaftler”) Carl Heinrich Becker wrote in the first issue of the then newly-established journal “Der Islam” (1910). Imperial Germany had not only been concerned with Protestantism and Catholicism in the so-called “culture wars” (“Kulturkampf”), but Islam too held a central role. The same applies to larger narratives of the German polity – the notion that “German society” has successfully become “Westernized,” that it had completed its long journey to the West, and thus completely embodies a secular foundation in contradistinction to “Islam” as a completely theological one. A history of knowledge can critically address and inquire into how such narratives have shaped practices of producing knowledge about “Islam.”

We have organized this conference because there is a dearth of works concerned with a “history of knowledge” of “Islam” as a historically-constituted field of debate and state intervention in German-speaking settings that can address these historical, epistemological, and political dimensions of discursive practices and their varying degrees of institutionalization. To this end, the conference brings together for the first time historians, scholars in Islamic studies, and critical secular scholars that have been concerned with this “German” history of knowledge production on Islam in a transregional perspective.

1 Berlin, 11–12 October 2018. The conference was a collaboration of the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin and the Freie Universität Berlin.

In the call for papers, you argued that Islam can be understood as an unmarked center of what is called German history. In your opinion, what is at stake in the public und scientific debates about "Islam" and "Muslims", and what are the particularities of the German case?

> At stake in those debates is no less than the *raison d'étre* of "Germany" as a sovereign nation-state, and its very grounding in a certain understanding of the political as a "democratic", "secular", "liberal", "Western", "tolerant", polity. The question is who and whose traditions get to have a say in the continuously-needed re-articulation of this grounding – only those who are deemed "German," "secular," "liberal"? Or also those coming from elsewhere in terms of other traditions and other places? Knowledge produced about "Islam" and "Muslims" forms part of such larger, historically-situated rationalities.
>
> What we currently see is that struggles over how "Islam" and "Muslims" are seen and discursively defined in relation to what is authoritatively "German" are tied to practices of racializing Muslims. One example is Thilo Sarrazin's book *Germany Abolishes Itself: How We Are Playing with Our Future*, in which Sarrazin's "apocalyptic vision" (Meng 2015) develops a biopolitical, racialized vision of a "German population", where "Muslim migrants", in having too many children are not "productive" enough and "conquer" Germany, what he makes look like a case of settler colonialism. It is hard to stomach how such views can be circulated publicly in a nation-state whose very grounding is the claim to have overcome racism after 1945. We must therefore critically inquire into this narrative itself, the way it establishes a certain understanding of history, time, and politics. Moreover, as Gil Anidjar has pointed out, we must ask about the shared history of knowledge production about Jews and Muslims, the links between the histories of Imperialism, racism, Orientalism, and anti-Semitism before and after 1945.

What are the unique perspectives and insights that the participants might gain from attending your conference?

> Let us imagine these potential participants. If they are interested in gaining a broader and methodologically-ambitious perspective on current and past debates on "Islam" and "Muslims" as essential to questions of "German identity", and how "Islam" is *framed as* "Islam" in these debates and practices, they will probably benefit from the way the conference brings together approaches from the global history of knowledge, global intellectual history, and genealogy. They will partake in what we see as a collective experiment of discussing fourteen highly interesting case studies to think through how "Islam" has long become an epistemic and thus political object of contention, tied to certain claims and rationalities that have been essential to the contested imagination of the political in the German-speaking world.

"Allah", Transportable name of God made of electric lights at the annual festival (mulid) of al-Sayyida Fatima al-Nabawiya in Cairo, March 2008

The Power of God

Four Proposals for an Anthropological Engagement

Samuli Schielke

In the name of the All-Merciful God بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

In most Muslim-majority contexts in the world, this pious formula is the customary way to begin a speech, a work, or a transaction. This is so also in Egypt, which I know better than other contexts. But in the world of academia (including parts of the Egyptian scene), speaking and writing in the name of God can be seen as odd. Although many academics do have a relation of faith with the monotheist God of the Qur'an, He appears out of place in an academic text.

Islam without the subject of human submission and worship, the One God, makes as little sense as Christianity without Christ the Son of God. There is no doubt that anthropologists and other social scientists are fully aware of the God-centredness of Muslim faith and lives. And yet a quick glance at recent articles, books, conferences and funded projects shows a clear prevalence of "Islam" and "Muslim" and the relative rarity of "God" or "Allah" (the Arabic name of the One God) as keywords. The ethnographic works that I have consulted (see footnote 1) show that their authors are well aware of the role of God in the lives of the people they converse with and write about. God is present in ethnographies conducted among Muslims, but until recently has not been the focus of anthropological debates and theories about Islam or those about the lives of Muslims. This absence is the more striking since other disciplines such as theologies, religious studies, and intellectual history do not have a comparable blind spot regarding the divine. A similar absence or marginality has been noted by Jon Bialecki (2014) in anthropologies of Christianity, although God became a topic of enquiry earlier in that field. More recently, the One God of the Qur'an has become the subject of more systematic reflections by anthropologists. I return to these reflections below, but first we need to ask why it is that God, so central to monotheist faiths and so present in ethnographic encounters, has until recently been so difficult to include more systematically in anthropological theories. I do not mean metaphysical speculation or theological arguments about the existence, nature and essence of God. I am also hesitant to claim a phenomenological knowledge of other people's knowledge of God. Rather, I am referring to the quite tangible acts and presence of God in relations among humans whom anthropologists try to understand.

There is evidently politics involved. It is more urgent to speak about Islam and Muslims when they are the subject of Western policies and nationalist fears in a way that God is not. It

is easier to talk about religion than about God when secularism is the hegemonic political framework. Positionality matters. In a Western context, somebody who has a relationship of faith with the One God of the Qur'an, absurdly enough, is more likely to be dismissed as biased when speaking about Him than somebody who follows a competing monotheist faith or who is speaking from a position of non-faith or unbelief (in Muslim-majority contexts, the opposite is often the case).

But there is no unbiased position. Rather, each bias facilitates the perception of some things or aspects better than others. As somebody who grew up in the materialist faith of Marxist-Leninist communism (I lost the faith at around the age of seventeen, but it still structures my identity and sensibilities), I have learned to understand God as a human artefact. But as an anthropologist, I have also come to recognise that this does not make Him any less important and powerful for people who have a relation of faith with Him and who understand that humans are God's creation. In this article, I draw on the ways in which people I know in Egypt relate with the God of the Qur'an and reflect on it, and also on the ways in which I have been involved in those reflections as somebody who does not share the faith but can learn to perform some of its expressions.

This particular positionality and bias inform my key argument, namely that relations between humans and God can be understood and studied as a multitude of relationships of power. They also inspire my aspiration to think about God beyond the ontology debate in anthropology. Anthropologists should recognise theistic ontologies in their own right. But they can also consider that some of God's powers may be effective regardless of one's ontological standpoint, no matter if we see in Him our Creator or our creation, or something altogether different.

This compels me to question whether the well-proven scientific imperative of methodological atheism is always helpful. Considering perceivable, knowable causes before considering not perceivable, unknown ones has undeniably been good for scientific progress. But in social sciences, avoiding God can result in a situation where we invent new unseen entities – which goes against the principle of Ockham's razor, that is, the imperative to prefer explanations with few speculative assumptions over those that have many speculative assumptions. Methodologically, we are trained not to reckon with God, while we habitually engage with modernity, society, economy, the state, the individual, religion, traditions, neoliberalism, the secular and so on; yet none of these entities, as it were, exist in the same way that, say, a schoolteacher or a marketplace exists. In fact, they are often highly elusive, even mystified beings.

Jon Bialecki (2014) has argued that it is possible to account for God as a social actor while maintaining the imperative of methodological atheism by means of understanding Him as the effect of a hybrid network of objects. This is an important proposal, but in my view carries the risk of slipping into an unacknowledged ontological atheism – which is already a theological position, one that excludes the possibility that God speaks to the evangelical Christians studied by Bialecki because they in fact are His chosen people. Yasmin Moll (2018) has argued vis-à-vis Bialecki that although anthropologists should take talk about God seriously, they should not become involved in theological debates. Anthropological theories and debates may echo theological ones, and anthropologists can definitely learn a great deal from theological

debates; but theologies are normative, even judgemental disciplines by definition, and anthropology should better maintain a position of agnostic indecision towards them. On a different note, Rane Willerslev and Christian Suhr (2018) have called attention to the unsettling experiences of "leaps of faith" that anthropologists have faced in their fieldwork, and which we should not try to rationalise away. Mayanthi Fernando (2017) has gone a step further and proposes that we should take spirits seriously as a potential or actual part of a "supernatureculture" world. Drawing on the work of Taha Abdelrahmane, Amin El-Yousfi (forthcoming) proposes to ground the study of Islamic ethics in a theological philosophy of divine trusteeship, which implies replacing anthropology's methodological relativism with an approach that integrates commitment and analysis. I find Fernando's and El-Yousfi's proposals interesting to think with, but I hesitate to follow them. Taking intentional beings (animal, human, divine or spiritual) seriously in a full sense implies entering relations such as faith, trust, help, fear, enmity, agreement or disagreement with them. Abandoning methodological relativism and taking seriously claims about the reality of things implies an open-ended engagement with them that may result in affirming or rejecting them as true or false, helpful or dangerous, or in searching to revise and improve them. For pragmatic reasons, I prefer not to take that step. I tend to agree with Moll as well as Willerslev and Suhr, and propose that instead of methodological atheism (or methodological theism or animism, for that matter), one may, as a social scientist of any faith, also adopt a position of methodological indecision and openness, and study the presence and power of God and other unseen beings in human interactions, without having to decide *how* that reality comes to be.

In this article, I make four proposals about how anthropologists may account for the monotheist God as a social reality, embodying and enacting a form of power that makes us, and through which we make ourselves, in manifold and also contrary ways. The *first proposal* is to pay ethnographic attention to the way in which different specific powers of God are present in human interactions through linguistic references and the search for guidance and sustenance. The *second proposal* is to consider more systematically the forms of relational or relationship power that God commands over humans. The *third proposal* is to pay attention to the productive tensions and conflicts that arise from encounters with a God who is both harshly punishing and merciful, disciplining and sustaining, the Life-giver and the Death-bringer. The *fourth proposal* is to think of secularity or "the secular" as a reconfiguration of the human–God relationship in which humans are empowered, and whereby a triadic relationship in which God acts as supreme mediator between humans is weakened, transformed or partially replaced by separate relationships.

These proposals are by no means exhaustive, and the overall argument I put forward is not new. It is largely common sense in the Middle East. It is also no news to scholars in theologies, religious studies and intellectual histories who have a major record of thinking about God in various ways – so major that I cannot engage with it in the limited framework of this article, which acknowledgedly has a social scientific tunnel vision. Even Western philosophy and sociology have a record of taking God seriously. Anthropology, in contrast, has a strong record of accounting for spirits, ancestors, saints and other unseen companions, but only more recently also the monotheist God.

Anthropologies of Christianity have had a head start in thinking about God, perhaps thanks to greater attention on materiality, relationality and the theoretical influence of Bruno Latour (1993). Anthropologies of Islam have given comparably more attention to ethics, politics and identity, and have been more informed by the work of Michel Foucault (1984). This has often contributed to a primarily this-worldly analysis of discursive power, whereby the authors of discourse (whether divine or human) and the otherworldly horizons of ethical action were, initially at least, not the primary focus of attention. In a critical engagement with that line of study (Schielke 2010), I have in the past argued (among other things) that too much focus on Islam results in attributing to a conceptual entity power that properly speaking is God's. That part of my argument remained marginal, however, in a debate about how to understand ethics and everyday life. I cannot go into the details of that debate, but it is worth pointing out that while the debate brought up different understandings of everyday life and ethical becoming, it also less explicitly points at a shared interest in including the unseen and superhuman in the analysis. In her rejoinder to the debate, Nadia Fadil (2015) argues:

"Furthermore, what is not the everyday? It is indeed hard to imagine any situation mediated by human interaction that would not be part of the everyday. Are objects part of everyday life? Animals? Plants? Angels? Miracles?" (Fadil 2015: 98)

We seem to differ on the everyday. In my understanding, everyday is not a class of situations or objects. Everyday is an attribute, a qualifier that characterises the recurring, goes-without-saying, undramatic, pragmatic and regular livelihood-related qualities of actions, situations, experiences and ways of reasoning vis-à-vis their potential extraordinary, dramatic, liminal, systematically reflected qualities. Nearly all things and situations mediated by human interaction that can be everyday can *also* be exceptional and extraordinary. So in contrast to Fadil, I would argue that situations mediated by human interaction that are not everyday are manifold and easy to imagine: revolutions, weddings, accidents, romantic encounters, pilgrimages; and yet all of them can be made everyday when they become routinized, such as in established revolutionary regimes, in the work of ambulance drivers and wedding photographers or in the lives of inhabitants of Mecca.

"Don't forget to say the name God", sticker in a barber shop in northern Egypt, 2016

However, in another regard our concerns show an important convergence. Fadil mentions miracles (which are extraordinary by definition but for people serving a pilgrimage site can become routine) and angels (who can indeed be everyday companions, just as their interventions might also be extraordinary), and thinking along that line of thought I would add Resurrection Day, Paradise, Hell and most importantly God. Resurrection Day as an anticipated event is the liminal moment of ultimate truth par excellence, neither routine nor ordinary. But the anticipation of judgement can of course be routine and ordinary; and making that anticipation part of one's ordinary routines is central to the ethical project of the Islamic revival. I think that Fadil and I agree on that. This is also true of God. The power of God is inseparable from everyday living when His commandments are cultivated as part of one's life and moral being, when He is included in conversations by means of invocations and when His gifts bear fruits as material livelihood (themes to which I return in the next section). But none of this would have the compelling power of authority and promise if it weren't for the transcendent reality and truth over and above ordinary existence He claims. Ritual practice often involves searching contact with His transcendent otherworldly reality, without this conflicting with the same practice's more or less ethically formative effect in this world. God's immanent presence as a close companion dialectically coexists with His transcendent supremacy as well as the transcendent supremacy of His revelation.

This is something that Liza Debevec and I (2012) were approaching in our book *Ordinary Lives and Grand Schemes* – but we did not yet include God in our thinking, which is a main shortcoming of the book. "Schemes" tend to be systemic, ideological or idealistic more than personal. Some ways of speaking about "Islam", "the Church" or "true religion" do have that quality, but even when they do they are also about the relationships that humans have with God, prophets and saints. Just like a theory of ethics that knows of nothing outside the everyday misses something important, so does a theory of religion that deals with schemes but not with God and prophets.

Luckily, many recent anthropological contributions have come up with textured understandings of how humans live with the God of the Qur'an. […] With this essay, I follow in the footsteps of those contributions, and reflect on the power of the monotheist God as it is recognised and reckoned by Muslim Egyptians I have worked and lived with during the past two decades. This article is not based on dedicated fieldwork about God, but instead on the accumulated knowledge of many years of fieldwork and friendship in various contexts with Egyptians from different walks of life. I have learned much in situations that were not understood to be research encounters by the people involved. Some people I know in Egypt consider their relationship with God to be a highly private and intimate matter, so parts of this article are intentionally vague in their references to specific people and contexts. However, three people make an explicit appearance. Because much of my fieldwork in the past seven years has been in literary circles in Alexandria, two of them are poets, and the third is a master of improvised poetic expression in conversations. The role of poetic language and poetry is not only a fieldwork contingency. Language is a key means (but of course not the only one) of communication with and about God. Poetic language can make God's presence tangible among humans. At times it can also be involved in a heretical rethinking of that presence.

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

Samuli Schielke: Migrant Dreams. Egyptian Workers in the Gulf States (American University in Cairo Press, 2020)

A vivid ethnography of Egyptian migrants to the Arab Gulf states, *Migrant Dreams* is about the imagination which migration thrives on, and the hopes and ambitions generated by the repeated experience of leaving and returning home.

What kind of dreams for a good or better life drives labor migrants? What does being a migrant worker do to one's hopes and ambitions? How does the experience of migration to the Gulf, with its attendant economic and legal precarities, shape migrants' particular dreams of a better life? What do those dreams – be they realistic and productive, or fantastic and unlikely – do to the social worlds of the people who pursue them, and to their families and communities back home upon their return?

Based on ten years of ethnographic fieldwork and conversations with Egyptian men from mostly low-income rural backgrounds who migrated as workers to the Gulf, returned home, and migrated again over a period of about a decade, this fine-grained study explores and engages with these questions and more, as the men reflect on their strivings and the dreams they hope to fulfill. Throughout the book, Samuli Schielke highlights the story of one man, Tawfiq, who is particularly gifted at analyzing his own situation and struggles, resulting in a richly nuanced account that will appeal not only to Middle East scholars, but to anyone interested in the lived lives of labor migrants and what their experiences ultimately mean to them.

Religion, Morality and Boko

Students Training for a Good Life

Abdoulaye Sounaye

In its first year of membership in the Leibniz Association, the ZMO was granted a Junior Research Group in the Leibniz Competition for the project "Religion, Morality and Boko in West Africa: Students Training for a Good Life" (Remoboko). It started in June 2018 and examines the competition between religiosity and secular education at two African universities in Niger and Nigeria. Beyond the competition, rivalry and conflict that emerge between Salafi and Pentecostal groups, this project examines the overarching question of the student as an intellectual, social and sociocultural model. A key goal of the project is to understand how religiosity shapes moral life and affects the mission of the university as a learning and training institution.

At its inception during the colonial rule and even in the post-independence era, in the 1960s, the university in Africa was part of a nation-building project. It was designed mostly for the needs of a public service that was organized around the state institutions. Grounded mostly in secular norms, as its name suggested, it had to be modern, democratic, open and universal, while informing critical minds. Based on this vision, it was supposed to train generations of Africans who were then to ensure the independence, development and progress of their respective countries. As social and intellectual fabric, the university actually reshaped knowledge production across the continent, introduced new cultural forms and opened up the way for new intellectual life and moral references. Most importantly, it has also produced sociocultural models, including an elite that took over and in many cases is still in charge in many countries.

What is left of this vision of the university as a future-making institution in a context in which religiosity has become one of the main markers of campus life and students' life projects? How does religious activism affect the university as a secular and educational institution (*boko*, in Hausa)? How do religion-inspired views and visions interact with science, critical

Campus of Ahmadou Bello University in Zaria, Nigeria

thinking and secular epistemologies? What are the implications of such reconfigurations of the university campus? How do these dynamics cohabit, interact and inform the campus as a social fabric?

These questions are at the centre of the research project "Religion, Morality and Boko: Students Training for Good Life" (Remoboko), based at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient of Berlin, Germany[1] and funded by the German consortium of research institutes, the Leibniz Gemeinschaft.[2] Remoboko is a fiveyear project (2018-2023) that comes with funding for three PhDs and one postdoctoral fellowship. It seeks to provide insights into Pentecostalism and Salafism on university campuses, as followers of these trends promote moral values, life discipline and norms expected to supplement students' training to achieve a good life.

The project covers Niger and Nigeria, which will provide a basis for comparison in the study of a dynamic that clearly transcends academic traditions. In fact, many of the issues raised here are not exclusive to the two cases the project focuses on. On the contrary, they seem to be pervasive and are shared across countries and regions in Africa. They raise the question of the challenges that higher education faces in Africa today. As the campus also becomes the platform for Salafi and Pentecostal normative discourses, it is important to investigate how this process affects not only training, but also life trajectories. Furthermore, what do students engaging in religious activism say about their aspirations, especially in a context in which they are portrayed as the leaders of tomorrow? How is this significance of religiosity in the public arena affecting learning cultures and ultimately the social status of the university?

Thus, beyond the issues that emerge with Salafi and Pentecostal cohabitation on the campus, this project engages the overarching question of the redefinition of the student as an intellectual and sociocultural model. As the campus, site par excellence for the promotion of secular norms (*boko*), undergoes this change and transformation, a key goal of the project is to understand the re-entanglement, first of religious traditions, and then of the religious and the secular. This will allow us to look at these sources of norms in the same setting and under new light. It will also help us understand how the university becomes an arena of competition for various epistemologies, conceptions of life and visions of the future.

Put into a broader context, the problematic of Remoboko echoes preoccupations that have become central to the university in Africa, including those that point to the necessity to reform and decolonize such a major institution. Indeed, across the continent and in various contexts, reforming and decolonizing the university have become major preoccupations. Are the religionizing trends of the university part of this agenda? How can we make sense of these transformation trends? What do they say about the entanglement of values and norms that shape life in Africa today?

Remoboko seeks to contribute to a critical examination of these realities and provide insights into both the knowledge and moral economies that are transforming the university in contemporary Africa.

1 http://www.zmo.de/index_e.html.
2 https://www.leibniz-gemeinschaft.de/start/



Antía Mato Bouzas: Kashmir as a Borderland. The Politics of Space and Belonging across the Line of Control (Amsterdam University Press, 2019)

Kashmir as a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Belonging across the Line of Control examines the Kashmir dispute from both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) and within the theoretical frame of border studies. It draws on the experiences of those living in these territories such as divided families, traders, cultural and social activists. Kashmir is a borderland, that is, a context for spatial transformations, where the resulting interactions can be read as a process of 'becoming' rather than of 'being'. The analysis of this borderland shows how the conflict is manifested in territory, in specific locations with a geopolitical meaning, evidencing the discrepancy between 'representation' and the 'living'. The author puts forward the concept of belonging as a useful category for investigating more inclusive political spaces.



Stephanie Zehnle: A Geography of Jihad. Sokoto Jihadism and the Islamic Frontier in West Africa, ZMO-Studien 37 (Walter de Gruyter, 2020)

This book addresses the Jihad movement that created the largest African state of the 19th century: the Sokoto Caliphate, existing for 99 years from 1804 until its military defeat by European colonial troops in 1903. The author carves out the entanglements of jihadist ideology and warfare with geographical concepts at Africa's periphery of the Islamic world: geographical knowledge about the boundary between the "Land of Islam" and the "Land of War"; the pre-colonial construction of "the Muslim" and "the unbeliever"; and the transfer of ideas between political elites and mobile actors (traders, pilgrims, slaves, soldiers), whose reports helped shape new definitions of the African frontier of Islam. Research for this book is based on the study of a very wide range of Arabic and West African (Hausa, Fulfulde) manuscripts. Their policies reveal the persistent reciprocity of jihadist warfare and territorial statehood, of Africa and the Middle East.



In Dialogue with Society

Knowledge Transfer

Sonja Hegasy

There is great public demand for knowledge about the modern Muslim world (1800 to the present). The results of independent basic research conducted at the ZMO on non-European history and culture are central to understanding contemporary conflicts. Modern and colonial pasts are closely linked and visible in current conflicts. Ignorance of these relationships leads to serious misperceptions in the public debate and makes mutual understanding difficult. Education about the range of modern Muslim lifeworlds across the globe is therefore necessary. The pertinent basic research conducted at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient provides such background knowledge necessary for understanding current conflicts. The freedom to conduct basic research is thus an important public good. It can raise and anticipate questions that are not tied to political priorities.

One of the central concerns of ZMO is to introduce different perspectives. To accomplish this, our researchers use the methods of the *verstehende*, or interpretive, humanities and social sciences. What are central issues and debates in the regions on issues defined within the ZMO research agenda? What arguments and contradictions are to be found on the ground? And how are Germany and Europe seen from the outside? This research reveals quite a variety of voices and varying views of life, and we place a substantive focus on presenting contextual meanings and insights into the motives and rationales of the actors with whom we are concerned. At the same time, the researchers also reflect upon their own position in this context.

ZMO incorporates the knowledge of cultural, social, economic, legal (or else) practitioners and opens up its understanding of classical, academia-bound knowledge production to include other forms in order to promote dialogue between science and society. The Centre works with practitioners and multipliers in the field of knowledge transfer, including various media, public institutions, civil society actors and associations. The “headscarf debate” that has been going on in Germany for more than 25 years makes this as clear as does the rise of Islamophobia seen since the end of the Cold War. Research shows that the often-found assertion that the Muslim world has remained outside an otherwise global modernity and that they are allegedly different, misogynous and violent, misses the complicated, contradictory and regionally different ways in which Muslims encountered and encounter modernity. Instead, the centre can draw on extensive research that offers a differentiated view of Muslim life worlds. Researchers at ZMO can shed light on such historical developments, but often also comment on current conflicts and developments. The ZMO thus regards itself as taking on an enlightening function in society.

Sommerfest des ZMO, 2019

Urgent Tales of Global Crisis

A Berlin film festival is highlighting climate change in Asia and Africa

Ali Nobil Ahmad

"What a sky!" Norwegian filmmaker Julia Dahr's amazement at the stars that light up the firmament of a dry Kenyan night in the opening scene of *Thank You for the Rain* is well intended. She quickly corrects herself, however, as a string of clouds scuds tantalizingly across the constellations: "No Julia. This sky means problems. It means no rain." The admonishment is Kisilu Musya's, a farmer whose video diary provides poignant raw material for Dahr's intimate portrait of a man and his family living on the front line of global warming.

When the rains finally do arrive with crackles of thunder, Kisilu's joy is shortlived. Surveying the destruction to his property caused by extreme weather, he jokes philosophically the next day: "We have a new house." His wife Christina, adding to the black humour, exclaims: "My underwear is all over the place!"

Thank You for the Rain is one of 14 documentaries and art films at a festival of screenings and talks this month, which I curated, and that are showing at the Moviemento cinema in Kreuzberg, Berlin. *AnthropoSCENE* – the festival's title – is a pun on the popular scientific term, Anthropocene, which in its original spelling represents the current geological era of human-induced climactic instability. Coined in the 1980s by biologist Eugene Stoermer, its connotations of human vulnerability and interconnection with nature have resonated widely since the 2000s, piquing the interest of artists, philosophers and commentators.

Despite its fashionable title, the festival's use of cinema to raise awareness about climate change is hardly new. Surveys show Al Gore's *An Inconvenient Truth* played an important role in focusing public attention on global warming. But Gore's popular science narrative frames the crisis narrowly as an environmental one associated with melting ice caps, endangered polar bears and arctic fauna.

In reality, "the climate crisis is a justice crisis – it's about people", says Tadzio Müller, an expert in climate and energy issues at the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung political foundation, which is co-organising the festival. Pointing out that awareness in affluent societies about the global repercussions of privileged lifestyles remains low, Müller says: "We've done most to mess the planet up, yet it's mostly people in the global South – those least responsible for global warming – with darker skin [who are] dying".

If Hurricane Harvey served as a reminder that not even wealthy nations can be spared the ravages of climate change, sparse media coverage of recent extreme flooding in South Asia, which killed thousands, underlines the differentiated weight accorded to suffering in the North and South. So too, last month's under-reported mudslide in Sierra Leone. "The advance of the sea is a permanent threat on the African coast," says Idrissou Mora-Kpai, director of *Arlit, deuxième Paris*, one of several films set in the African continent to be screened at *anthropoSCENE*.

"In Benin, where I come from, many houses have already been swallowed up over the last couple of years", he says, pointing out that disaster victims in the Third World are still mainly unaware of the link between their plight and climate change. "Unfortunately, few



anthropoSCENE film festival at cinema Moviemento, Berlin 2017

media raise awareness, and intellectuals who do talk about it are not given a platform. Governments and multinational companies try to keep people unaware of the real causes."

Responding to this knowledge deficit, *anthropoSCENE*'s four-day programme sets out to highlight the human consequences of climate change in the Middle East, Africa and Asia through several strategies. Firstly, through works such as Dahr's, which document experiences of, and responses to, altered weather patterns and climate-related disasters. Another cluster of films investigates the fallout of energy policies falsely touted as antidotes to the problem of carbon emissions. Films from Turkey, India and South Africa expose the eco-friendly marketing used to promote hydro and atomic power for what critics call 'greenwashing'. Award-winning director Sanjay Kak, who is travelling to Berlin to attend the screening of his *Words on Water*, says: "The discredited notion that hydropower is somehow clean and green, is still popular with the Indian state." Aside from the well-documented, often irreversible ecological damage that building large dams for hydroelectric schemes cause to rivers, Kak points out that 20 million people of India's poorest and most vulnerable people have been displaced by the 3,000-plus dams built in the past 50 years: "This is more than a controversy, it's an absolute scandal."

With rural populations expelled from, or gradually abandoning agricultural areas of their own accord, the South's ecological crisis is accelerating urbanisation and migration further afield to Europe itself. Films such as *Arlit* raise the prospect of a future marked by climate refugees, a topic of particular importance given the controversies that surround migration and asylum in Germany.

For populations that cannot afford to emigrate, however, a different kind of environmental displacement results: habitats are transformed by the slow violence of toxic pollution, resulting in estrangement from place without mobility. *Legacy Warnings!* is a harrowing documentary of the reality of South Africa's so-called 'nuclear renaissance'. Long after companies leave with their profits, squatter settlements built on sites of uranium extraction are polluted by contaminated water; children are left to play amid the debris of discarded infrastructure.

And yet, from Turkey's Black Sea region to Johannesburg, affected populations are anything but passive. Farming communities uprooted by droughts and floods display strikingly similar responses to displacement – trauma followed by anger – then resistance targeted at the sources of discontent: politicians, corporations and the economic system as a whole. Critique and mobilisation often takes inspiration from the ethnic, spiritual and linguistic traditions and cultures of neglected regions. In Mohammad Ehsani's *Lady Urmia*, a mystical meditation on the slow death of the world's third largest saltwater lake, the lake herself recounts legends and myths over imagery of Azerbaijan's traditional attire and dance.

All of which is a long way from mainstream environmentalism in the affluent West, where green political consciousness remains associated with recycling, animal protection and abstract talk of 'saving' the planet. Environmentalism in the South, this festival makes clear, consists instead of immediate, highly localised battles for life, livelihoods and local ecosystems.

By depicting Kisilu Musya's remarkable journey from anonymity to activist on the global stage, films like *Thank You for the Rain* capture the dramatic narrative potential of such battles, ensuring those on the front line do not remain isolated. They do so effectively by connecting the macro problem of climate change to universal micro questions that might define any individual life: in Kisilu's case, how to be a good father, a good husband, a strong leader. At times he lapses into despondency. Following a deadlock at the 2015 climate talks in Paris, eyes moist with emotion, he laments: "COP 21 is a battlefield – you are there to be seen not heard." Soon enough, his tone switches back to determined resolution. Towards the end of the film, however, he asks, with trepidation: "Are we to fight climate change, or will climate change fight us?"

President Donald Trump's withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Accord suggests this question, in the lead up to the November's UN climate conference in Bonn, remains as pertinent as ever.

AnthropoSCENE: Film and Climate Justice in Asia and Africa' ran from 21 to 24 September 2017 at the cinema Moviemento in Berlin.

"Staying silent is a luxury that we can no longer afford" – Academic Freedom under Threat

Katrin Bromber, Katharina Lange, Heike Liebau

Academic freedom is currently being restricted to an alarming extent on a global scale. In many countries, research funding for the humanities and social and natural sciences is being cut. New policies constrain researchers' possibilities to communicate their results to a wider audience, not least by establishing a dangerous "alternative facts" discourse. We, scholars at ZMO, are especially worried about the threats to critical humanities and social science.

We stand up in solidarity with our colleagues who have been denied the very basis of their academic work. This includes countries in and with which ZMO has longstanding

research interests and collegial relations. In Turkey, anti-academic sentiments that already existed were aggravated after the attempted coup in July 2016. In the course of an ongoing wave of political purges that target academic as well as other public institutions, thousands of researchers have been removed from their jobs. Those scholars who had signed the petition *Academics for Peace* in January 2016, protesting the Turkish army's violent campaign in the country's Kurdish Southeast, were especially targeted. Despite the various acts of intimidation and harassment, and as an attempt to keep democratic Turkey alive, *Solidarity Academies* in Koceli, Izmir, Ankara, and Mersin have become a platform to teach the public about important current issues that are increasingly being eradicated from the curriculum of Turkish universities.

In India, social sciences and humanities are also being marginalized. History as a discipline is especially in the focus of public campaigns and attacks via-á-vis growing tendencies to "nationalize" historical narratives. Currently, there is a great danger that the admission of MA and PhD students will stop at the Centre for Historical Studies (CHS) at Jawaharlal Nehru University Delhi, one of the most influential centers of history teaching in India and an institution of high international reputation. ZMO researchers have cooperated with colleagues from CHS for decades. Highly qualified scholars who were trained at CHS are working in ZMO research teams.

Within the European Union, too, academic freedom has recently been threatened by oppressive legal measures: in April 2017, the Hungarian parliament passed a new university law restricting the operation of foreign-funded universities. This affects specifically the Central European University in Budapest, which has acquired an excellent scientific reputation since its foundation in 1991. However, in recent years it has also become a symbol of opposition to the current nationalist-conservative Hungarian government under Victor Orban.

These developments come along with growing populist movements worldwide that not only question trusted scientific facts, but also even foster a negative image of scholarly expertise and academic knowledge and, thus, also create a significant threat to democracy. Many colleagues at ZMO have therefore felt an increasing need to close ranks and protest against these developments. Following the call of the Alliance of Science Organizations in Germany –

March for Science,
Berlin 22 April 2017

a union of the most important German research organizations including the Leibniz Association – we participated in the *March for Science*, which took place on 22 April in over 600 cities worldwide. In Berlin, the march was joined by 11,000 people, who came to speak for the social sciences and humanities as well as natural sciences, medicine, and other disciplines. The German term *Wissenschaft*, rather than differentiating between natural sciences and humanities, is inclusive and comprises all academic fields. In this inclusive manner, Jutta Allmendinger, President of the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, emphasized in her speech that academia in its entirety is under threat. To counter the emergence of "alternative facts", we need new ways of communicating our research results to the public, on whose support we depend, in an accessible manner. This turns into a real challenge for an institute such as ZMO, which does first and foremost basic research (*Grundlagenforschung*). Furthermore, we need a democratization of academia that will give young researchers a more reliable future. The instability built into most academic careers in Germany not only leads to precarious livelihoods – it thereby also constrains academic freedom.

It is our aim at ZMO to use the impetus from the March for Science to stand up against simplistic and populist narratives, restrictions of academic freedom, and hostility toward scholarly findings by critically questioning our own practices and the structural conditions under which we conduct research and disseminate our findings.

Schwarzrotgold

15 Jahre nach dem NSU-Anschlag in Köln. Wer Keupstraße und Radikalisierung sagt, kann den Terror des NSU nicht vornehm unerwähnt lassen.

Ein Kommentar von Sonja Hegasy

Das Grundgesetz wird 70 – und die Keupstraße kennt keiner. Außer natürlich den 3 Millionen Deutsch-Türken in Deutschland. Und ein paar weiteren Deutschen mit Migrationshintergrund. Die wissen wofür die Kölner Keupstraße steht: Am 9. Juni 2004 explodierte hier am helllichten Tag in der belebten Straße eine Nagelbombe, die 22 Menschen verletzte. Ein terroristischer Hintergrund wurde ausgeschlossen. Heute wissen wir, dass es der Nationalsozialistischen Untergrund (NSU) war.

Letzten Monat wurde mir ‚Schwarzrotgold – Das Magazin der Bundesregierung' https://www.bundesregierung.de/statisch/schwarzrotgold-1902/#8 in meiner Wochenzeitung zugestellt. Eine Reportage dreht sich um Gründe für Radikalisierung von jungen Menschen und berichtet dazu aus der Keupstraße über die Initiative *180 Grad Wende*. 2012 wurde sie gegründet, um sich für die Werte und Normen des Grundgesetzes einzusetzen. Ein sympathischer Sozialarbeiter wird vorgestellt, der gefährdete junge Menschen in Köln-Mühlheim für die deutsche Demokratie zurückgewinnen soll. Der Reporter und der Coach laufen zusammen die Keupstraße hoch und runter. Mehr „Mut- statt Wutbürger", wünscht sich die Initiative, auch wenn mit „Wutbürger" bisher eigentlich das Gegenteil von jung, benachteiligt und bildungsfern gemeint war. Gründe für eine mögliche religiöse Radikalisierung werden diskutiert:

fehlende Wertschätzung, Sucht, Ausgrenzungserfahrungen, Trennung der Eltern – all das kommt vor. Aber kein Wort vom NSU-Anschlag. Oder soll die „fehlende Wertschätzung“ eine Chiffre dafür sein?

Die Keupstraße lebt. Ihre Anwohner wollen nicht ewig Opfer sein. Aber, liebe Bundesregierung, wer von Radikalisierung spricht, sollte nicht um den bitteren Kontext herumschreiben. Radikalisierung in der Keupstrasse? Könnte es dafür auch noch einen weiteren wichtigen Grund geben, über den wir sprechen müssen? Wer Keupstraße und Radikalisierung sagt, kann den Terror des NSU nicht vornehm unerwähnt lassen.

Keupstraße in Köln-Mülheim, 2007

Returning to Accra

Between Nina Simone, Ama Ata Aidoo, Fassbinder, and the Cockettes

Norman Saadi Nikro

Moving across New York and San Francisco, Paris and Munich, Accra and Lagos, artist and scholar Malik Gaines's *Black Performance on the Outskirts of the Left: A History of the Impossible* offers a lively and affirmative account of stage, dress, film and television, and music performance. Saadi Nikro reviews Gaines's recently published book, discussing its many intersections of race, theatricality, subjectivity, and sexuality.

While reading American performing artist and scholar Malik Gaines's *Black Performance on the Outskirts of the Left*, I was also reading French intellectual Didier Eribon's *Returning to Reims*. The latter predates the former by almost a decade. A colleague who has some awareness of my background recommended Eribon's memoir, which traces the tension between his working-class origins in the French town of Reims, his homosexuality, and his coming to own his modest background. Having long before come out of his "sexual closet," Eribon's book is in the main a record of his efforts to come out of his "class closet."

While both books display a keen awareness of political culture and left activism, they are very different in style and thematic preoccupation. Having a broader range than Eribon's more personal and local concerns, Gaines presents a critical study of stage, dress, film and television, and music performance, in respect to intersections of race, blackness, and sexuality, to transgender and transsexuality. Much of his subject matter derives from the 1960s, as he moves across and between New York and San Francisco, Paris and Munich, Accra and Lagos.

I briefly mention Eribon's book to put into relief what constitutes the primary conceptual contribution made by Gaines. The intersectional scope of *Black Performance* offers a critical departure from the Hegelian temperament embedded in the pores of *Returning to Reims*. Despite moving away from privileging sexuality as the driving force of his efforts to "belong to himself," Eribon maintains a lens of double consciousness. Writing about his tactics to hide his class background as he learned to inhabit academic and intellectual circles in Paris, Eribon explains his "class closet" in the following manner: "I mean by this that I took on the constraints imposed by a different kind of dissimulation; I took on a different kind of dissociative personality or double consciousness" (27). Consequently, resentment and angst tend to inform both the subject matter and stylistic temperament of Eribon's memoir.

This is not to say that resentment and angst have no productive role for the production of political subjectivities, intellectual cultures, performance and radical theatre. The point is, rather, that the existential temperament and paradigm of double consciousness remains steeped in the terms of reference and balance of power that privileges a polyphonic, rather than heterophonic, relationality. Against the reconcilable duality of master and slave, Gaines mines the work of his performers to articulate what he calls "quadruple consciousness" (22).

In studies of race and blackness the notion of double consciousness emerged from the early twentieth-century work of W.E.B. Du Bois, especially his *The Souls of Black Folk*, a critical study of slavery in the United States, first published in 1910.[1] This important, remarkably creative study laid the basis for a critique of how racial subjugation involves something like an internal mirror, or "veil," influencing (or policing) self-regard – similar to what Franz Fanon referred to as "Manichean," and what Lacan, with very different concerns to du Bois and Fanon, was to call the Imaginary, or ideal-ego. Against the underlying assumption of a reconcilable balance between ego and ideal, self and other, black and white, Gaines promotes a "provisional black subject." As an alternative to "the wholeness of black identity," he argues for a sense of "the fragmentation of black subjectivity" (35).

Accordingly, the opening chapter of *Black Performance* adapts notions of subjectivity as multi-sited, provisional, intersectional, ambivalent and proactive. Titled "Nina Simone's Quadruple Consciousness," Gaines discusses a number of the jazz singer's performances in terms of "the political dimension of Simone's theatricality" (23). Simone's performances, he argues, produce an ambivalence and precariousness of colour, sexuality, race and gender, class and nation. "Neither singular authority nor dialectical progress can be oriented around the shifting terms of quadruple consciousness," he writes. Transforming "the negativity of alienation into a productive force," Gaines goes on to explain, the "shifting terms of quadruple con-

1 W.E.B Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1994).

sciousness ... produce multiple positions, provisionally destabilizing the concrete terms around which race and gender have been putatively oriented" (22).

After this initial burst of conceptual clarification (illustrated by sprightly attention to the marvellous radicality of Simone's performances), Gaines does not spend much time on the theoretical argument. This makes for a more relaxed and enjoyable read of his book. In succeeding chapters, he provides lively discussions of stage and film work, all anchored in the 1960s.

In the second chapter, Gaines focusses on theatre and black liberation in Ghana's Pan African movements. He develops compelling readings of Efua Sutherland's play *Edufa* (1962) and Ama Ata Aidoo's *The Dilemma of a Ghost* (1964). Moving in and out of text, context, and the proactive motivations informing them, Gaines is careful enough to pick out nuances by which both playwrights entertained cross sections of feminist, decolonial, nationalist, and racial themes. Besides visiting Ghana himself, Gaines's research is broad and sensitive, noting, for example, that matrilineal traditions of Ghana's Akan communities influence Sutherland's creative work. At the same time, he canvasses "transnational entanglements" between New York and Accra – such as Rockefeller Foundation funding for the arts and culture in Ghana (75). This I found to be a particular strength of Gaines's book: put simply, he critically practices the cross-sectional theory he champions.

In chapter 3, he moves from Accra to the fringe scenes of theatre and film in Munich, concentrating on the astonishingly prolific work of the short-lived Rainer Werner Fassbinder. Discussing, in the main, one of Fassbinder's major actors and collaborators, Günther Kaufmann, he addresses a number of the filmmaker's theatrical projects and earlier films, such as *Whity* (1971). In keeping with his study as a whole, Gaines is mostly interested in cross-sections of sexuality, race, class, and nationalism that Fassbinder's work puts in critical relief. Within this oeuvre, "Kaufmann's racialized body is an agent of radical ambivalence, a critical position that meets authority with unresolved multiplicity" (97).

In contrast to Fassbinder, Kaufmann has not received much critical attention in studies of film and television in Germany. The son of an American soldier and a German woman, he had a long acting career, up until his death in May 2012. That colour and racism were absorbing issues for him is obvious from the stark title of his autobiography, *Der Weiße Neger vom Hasenbergl* (the White Negro from Hasenbergl), published in 2005. The book has not been translated into English, and although Gaines, it seems, is acquainted with the German language, he does not mention the book. Indeed, while giving attention to the somewhat neglected figure of Kaufmann in studies of race, I felt that Gaines could have provided more context in this chapter. For example, considering that his international reputation was in some respects out of kilt with his more subdued reception in Germany, I wonder what local reviewers in the 1970s made of Fassbinder's early work, and what was made of Kaufmann's racialized, sexualized figure.

However, in his following chapter, "The Cockettes, Sylvester, and Performance as Life," Gaines returns to the context-rich impulses of his study. Focussing more on the work and life of Sylvester as he moved to San Francisco and eventually joined the Cockettes, context for Gaines's more affirmative approach is always dynamic and engaging, not simply a backdrop explaining subjective motivations. This is another strength of the book – while reflecting on

circumstance, occasion, and context, Gaines manages to write about how subjects proactively engaged and worked on their circumstances. As he says in conclusion, "blackness endures, not only as a mode of subjection, but as a deeply energetic position from which to communicate" (202).

Besides including a number of photographs, the book greatly benefits from the musical and theatrical work of Gaines himself. A member of the radical troupe My Barbarian since the early 2000s, Gaines brings a personal experience of performance to his considerations. His creative experience of sound and voice informs the liveliness and affirmative spirit of his discussions.

His own trajectory informs his discussion of contemporary music performance in his *Afterword*, which serves to highlight connections between the 1960s and the present. Here, he focuses first on a music and voice performance choreographed by the Nigerian, Berlin artist Emeka Ogboh, for the 56th Venice Biennial, in 2015.

This particular sound/song installation, performing the German national anthem, works as a compelling demonstration of what I distinguished above between polyphony and heterophony, the former associated with an ultimately reconcilable dualism, the latter with a multiplicity whose dispositioning of power and desire better captures the critical impress of Gaines's notion of "quadruple consciousness." Under the subtitle "Babel," Gaines writes (181): "One voice began, and others joined, until a chorus surrounded the listener with overlapping languages, performing the same heavy tune, the 'Song of the Germans' ('Lied der Deutschen') in Douala, Igbo, Lingála, Bamun, Kilongo, Yoruba, Sango, More, Twi, and Ewondo."

Ogboh's soundscape is a telling choice on Gaines's part, considering the German genealogy of Hegel's dialectical relational paradigm. Along with, and against this influential pedigree, Gaines tracks contiguous genealogies of "performative contradictions" and "multiplicitous expressions" (193) to thwart pre-scripted repertoires of mutual oppositions.



Norman Saadi Nikro: Milieus of ReMemory. Relationalities of Violence, Trauma, and Voice (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019)

Milieus of ReMemory concentrates on how people in Lebanon situate and work on memories of violence and trauma, as well as exchanges of voice. Developing a critical phenomenology of social material practices, a relational notion of community and subjectivity outlines thematic discussions of intergenerational memory, gender, temporality, and transactions between personal and public memory. While emphasizing conduits and channels by which material and imaginary resources circulate as differential circuits of power and authority, the book focuses on how memory activism and memory projects constitute emergent milieus of social exchange and ethical responsibility to self and circumstance, to both publics and political cultures.

Claiming and Making Muslim Worlds

Across and Between the Local and the Global

3–5 April 2019, Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient, convened by Jeanine Dağyeli, Ulrike Freitag, Paolo Gaibazzi, Claudia Ghrawi, Norman Saadi Nikro, Dietrich Reetz

Our conference marks the completion of ZMO's twelve-year research programme "Muslim Worlds – Worlds of Islam? Conceptions, Practices, and Crises of the Global". Conducted over three days in April 2019, the conference consists of eight panels, a keynote lecture by Professor Seema Alavi, and a roundtable discussion, titled "Was sind muslimische Welten? Fragen an den globalen Norden", moderated by ZMO's Director Professor Ulrike Freitag.

Panellists at the conference present their perspectives on the study of predominantly Muslim societies of Asia and Africa, as well as regional interconnections. Scholars specifically address the notion of *Claiming and Making Muslim Worlds*, exploring religious affiliations and practices, extending to social, economic and cultural modalities of life. From a variety of disciplines, panellists discuss pluralities of actors, institutions, locations and world making – for Muslim subjects and non-Muslims alike.

Our plural notion of worlds encompasses local and global, or translocal, intersections. Worlds refers to varying traditions, institutions, and media, by which people go about shaping their sense of self and place, claim their connections and affiliations, religious and otherwise. Place and environment are increasingly mediatized by varying technological applications, symbolic transactions, social imaginaries, and differentiated circulations of resources. In addition, they are crisscrossed by movements of migration. While there are hardly any localities not impacted by globalizing interactions, by the same token, the global is unthinkable without a sense of the local.

The conference reflects ZMO's ongoing interdisciplinary research interest in translocal and globalizing processes from the perspective of the "Global South". It therefore goes against the grain of predominating conceptual, historical, and geographical research repertoires that assume the centrality of the global north. Such repertoires have tended to portray Islam and the Muslim world as singular and homogeneous. Accordingly, panel presentations strive to complicate any neat compartmentalizing of historiographical and geographical categories.

In her Keynote, "Muslim Cosmopolitanism and the Writing of World History", Seema Alavi adds a historical perspective on how Muslim scholars and thinkers contributed to projects of modernity. Focusing on a Muslim scholar from colonial India, Imdadullah Makki (1817–99), she discusses the imperial rivalries through which he established his own institution and discourse of Muslim cosmopolitanism.

The roundtable, "What Are Muslim Worlds? Talking Back to the Global North", takes place in the late afternoon of the second day, and is conducted in German. Participants discuss how scholarship on and in Muslim worlds relate to public debates in Europe about Muslims and Islam, and further address possible links between their research frameworks and the social forces shaping scholarly orientations, such as media reports and discussions in political and social forums.

Conference Programme, 3–5 April 2019

Day I – 3 April 2019

12.00 – 13.00 Registration

13.00 – 13.45 Opening and Introduction: Ulrike Freitag (ZMO)

Thematic Section: Religious Worlds

13.45 – 15.15 Religion and Ideas of World Order: Claims, Engagements and Transformations
Convenor: Antía Mato Bouzas (ZMO)

Antía Mato Bouzas (ZMO): Religion in the Making of Transnational Spaces
Dietrich Reetz (ZMO): Amir or Shura: How to Lead a Global Missionary Movement of Islam like the Tablighi Jama'at
Lorenzo Casini (University of Messina): Ordering Islam within the Bounds of the Novel: Religion, Modernity and the Nation

15.45 – 17.15 Governing the Sahel-Sahara: Bad Islam and Good Muslims
Convenors: Britta Frede (ZMO), Judith Scheele (ZMO), Abdoulaye Sounaye (ZMO)
Discussant: Baz Lecocq (Humboldt University, Berlin)

Britta Frede (ZMO): The Islamic Republic of Mauritania and its Governance of (Trans)local Islamic Heritage
Judith Scheele (ZMO): Islam as World Religion in Northern Mali
Abdoulaye Sounaye (ZMO): Treating Muslim Subjects: Deradicalizing the Sahel

18.00 – 19.30 Keynote Lecture

Seema Alavi (Delhi University): Muslim Cosmopolitanism and the Writing of World History
Introduction: Heike Liebau (ZMO)
Moderators: Paolo Gaibazzi (ZMO), Claudia Ghrawi (ZMO)

19.30 Reception

Day II – 4 April 2019

Thematic Section: Values in Circulation

09.30 – 11.00 Making Muslim Spaces in the Indian Ocean
Convenor: Sebastian Prange (University of British Columbia)
Chair and Discussant: Ulrike Freitag (ZMO)

Sebastian Prange (University of British Columbia): The Hindu King who loves the Muslims: Expanding the Dar al-Islam on the Sixteenth-Century Malabar Coast
Scott Reese (University of Northern Arizona): "The Ink of Understanding": The Complicated relationship between manuscripts and print within the Islamic Written tradition of East Africa and the Horn.
Tika Ramadhini (ZMO): Jawah Women's Learning Activities in Mecca, Nineteenth to Twentieth Century

11.30 – 13.00 Challenging the North/South Divide: Multicentric Flows in Muslim Worlds
Convenor and Discussant: Stefan B. Kirmse (ZMO)
Chair: Jeanine Dağyeli (Nazarbayev University, Astana)

Rebecca Gould (University of Birmingham): The Obligation to Migrate: Hijra and Cultural Memory in the Soviet Caucasus Literatures
Manja Stephan-Emmrich (Humboldt University, Berlin): Bourgeois Islam and Other Post-National Sensibilities: Tracing Im-/Material Flows Across Central Asia and the Gulf
Sumit Mandal (University of Nottingham): Music, Faith, and Commerce: The Nature, Reach, and Impact of Islamic Devotional Music in Southeast Asia

14.30 – 16.00 The Moral Economies of Resource Valuation and Extraction
Convenors: Katharina Lange (ZMO), Jeanine Dağyeli (Nazarbayev University, Astana),
Discussant: Jeanine Dağyeli (Nazarbayev University, Astana)

Patrick Schukalla (ZMO): Becoming the Nuclear Front-End – On the Uranium Frontier in Tanzania

Erdem Evren (ZMO): Negotiating Extraction

Julien Brachet (Université Paris I, IRD): The (Im)Moral Economy of Natron Mining in Northern Chad

18.00 – 19.30 Roundtable Discussion: Was sind muslimische Welten? Fragen an den globalen Norden
Venue: Leibniz-Gemeinschaft, Raum Hannover, 5th Floor, Chausseestraße 111, 10115 Berlin,
Word of Welcome: Matthias Kleiner (Leibniz Association)
Moderator: Ulrike Freitag (ZMO)

Participants: Charlotte Wiedemann (Journalist, Berlin), Mamadou Diawara (Goethe University, Frankfurt), Claudia Derichs (Humboldt University, Berlin), Bekim Agai (Goethe University, Frankfurt)

20.00 Conference Dinner

Day III – 5 April 2019

Thematic Section: Unmaking and Remaking Muslim Worlds

09.30 – 11.00 Overcoming Division: Religious and Non-Religious Norms in Global Transitional Justice Processes
Convenor: Sonja Hegasy (ZMO)

Susanne Buckley-Zistel (University of Marburg): Transnational Memorialisation of Past Atrocities

Brahim El Guabli (Williams College): Islamizing Memory: Islamist Prison Literature and Moroccan Cultural Memory

Farzana Haniffa (University of Colombo): Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka: Muslim Engagement with the National Discourse

11.30 – 13.00 Muslim Liminality in Migrant Spaces: Berlin During the Era of the World Wars
Convenor: Peter Wien (University of Maryland)
Chair: Katrin Bromber (ZMO)

Peter Wien (University of Maryland): Survival Strategies in Nazi Berlin: Husni al-'Urabi's 89 Months in Exile

David Motadel (LSE, London): Anti-Colonial Revolutionaries in Wartime Berlin

Thematic Section: Rethinking Muslim Worlds

14.30 – 16.00 Intellectual Cultures, Philosophy, and Critical Thinkers: Challenges, Pathways and Reservoirs for Decolonization
Convenors: Kai Kresse (ZMO), Nils Riecken (ZMO)

Nils Riecken (ZMO): Abdallah Laroui's Situated Universalism: Conceptual Translation and the Re-Working of the Historicity of Concepts

Anaheed Al-Hardan (American University of Beirut): On South-South Circulations, Histories and Possibilities in the Arab World

Abdulkader Tayob (University of Cape Town): Nativizing Religion between Muslim Intellectuals and the Enlightenment Project

16.30 – 18.00 Closing Discussion
Speakers: Jeanine Dağyeli (Nazarbayev University, Astana),
Norman Saadi Nikro (ZMO), Dietrich Reetz (ZMO)

ZMO Open Day in 2017 and 2019

Jamel Kerkar, Narimane Mari, and Karim Moussaoui at the film screening “The Past in the Present: Neue Filme aus Algerien”, Kino Arsenal 6 May 2018

Lunchbreak at the workshop “Libya between Saharan Routes, Urban Wars, Migration and Local Reconfigurations” organised by Suaad Al Ghafal, Adam Benkato and Nora Lafi

Claiming and Making Muslim Worlds conference
3–5 April 2019;
panel discussion with Charlotte Wiedemann, Ulrike Freitag, Mamadou Diawara, Claudia Derichs, and Bekim Agai (from left to right)

Trajectories of Change: fieldwork workshop and students conference at ZMO, 19–23 April 2017

Claudia Ghrawi presenting the film “The Poetess” in OpenAirKino at Rosengarten Berlin, 11 June 2019

ZMO New Year's reception 18 January 2019; the winners of Fritz Steppat prize Rhea Regina Schmitt and Claudia Ghrawi

Academic delegation from Tanzania at ZMO on 22 March 2017

ZMO Reads

Islam und Philosophie in der nahöstlichen Moderne

Eine Rezension von Sonja Hegasy

Wie wird das Verhältnis von Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion in der muslimischen Welt über das bekannte Diktum, der Islam regele Staat und Gesellschaft und bestimme so auch Moral und Ästhetik, hinaus diskutiert? Dieser Frage geht eine neue Reihe des Berliner Klaus Schwarz Verlags nach. Initiatorin und Herausgeberin des Werkes „Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion. Religionskritische Positionen um 1900" ist die Islamwissenschaftlerin Anke von Kügelgen – eine der wenigen, die die Beschäftigung mit zeitgenössischer Philosophie aus der islamischen Welt im deutschsprachigen Raum kontinuierlich verfolgt. „Nahöstlich" versteht sie hier allein als geographische Kategorie, wie japanisch oder indisch.

Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist zunächst einfach: Ja, es wird seit 200 Jahren eine vehemente Debatte über das Verhältnis von rationaler, natur- und sozialwissenschaftlicher sowie religiös-mystischer Welterfassung geführt. Anke von Kügelgen zeigt, wie lebendig und aktuell diese Debatte ist. Dabei macht sie drei Denkweisen im Umgang mit dem Einbruch der wissenschaftlichen in die religiöse Welt aus: Die Konfliktthese, die im Lichte neuer wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse zu einer radikalen Religionskritik führte. Ihre Vertreter sehen Gott als Entwurf des Menschen nach seinem Ebenbild. Koran- und *hadith*-fest schleudern sie dem Gläubigen entgegen, wie denn ein barmherziger Gott so rachsüchtig sein könne, dass er eine Hölle entwerfe, in der Menschen auf ewig schmorten.

Die Harmoniethese sieht keinen Widerspruch zwischen Wissenschaft und Religion, denn mit dem Koran seien auch neuzeitliche Erscheinungen wie Mikroben oder Demokratie abgedeckt. Im Konfliktfall müsse der menschlichen Vernunft gefolgt werden (denn dazu habe Gott sie dem Menschen mitgegeben), nicht dem Wortlaut der Offenbarung. Und die Autonomiethese, nach der Wissenschaft und Religion ihre jeweilige Berechtigung haben, aber keine gegenseitigen Ansprüche auf das Feld der anderen erheben dürften. Verfechter dieser durchaus verbreiteten Weltanschauung wie Farah Antun, zitiert von Kügelgen mit Aussagen aus dem Jahr 1902 wie: „Die Religionen wurden (von Gott) gestiftet, um das jenseitige Leben zu regeln, nicht das diesseitige. Wer sie aber zur Regelung des Diesseits einsetzt, ist zum Scheitern verurteilt, auch wenn er anfangs Erfolg haben mag."

Im Verlauf dieser Auseinandersetzung wurden schon im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert die zentralen Texte europäischer Philosophie ins Arabische übertragen und kommentiert. Kant, Nietzsche, Darwin, Simon, Tolstoi, Spinoza, Heidegger, Marcuse, Russell, Popper, Derrida, Foucault und Habermas – sie alle wurden rezipiert und sind zentrale Bezugspersonen in der nahöstlichen Welt. Seit 1990 gab es 58 Übersetzungen von Heidegger ins Arabische. Umgekehrt ist hierzulande kaum etwas über die Universalgelehrten aus dem Nahen Osten und Intellektuellen bekannt, die Übersetzungen, Kommentare und originäre Weiterentwicklungen angefertigt haben. So wird es viele Leser überraschen, dass schon vor 150 Jahren die Forderung nach einem „Luther des Islams" erhoben wurde und die Auseinandersetzung mit dem

Christentum dazu führte, dass einige der arabischen Universalgelehrten des 19. Jahrhunderts zwischen östlichem Christentum, Protestantismus und Islam hin und her konvertierten.

Ein Drittel des Buches nimmt die lesenswerte Einleitung der Herausgeberin mit zwanzig Kurzbiographien, der wichtigsten Vordenker ein (darunter kaum Frauen). Leider heißt es im Untertitel des Buches ‚Religionskritische Positionen um 1900', obwohl gerade die Einleitung die Zeit bis ins 21. Jahrhundert behandelt. Der zweite Teil des Buches stellt dann vier Originaltexte muslimischer Religionskritiker vor. Zum ersten Mal werden in diesem Band die Texte je zweier Vertreter der Harmonie- sowie der Konfliktthese auf Deutsch vorgelegt und jeweils mit Notizen zur Biographie der Autoren, Entstehungsgeschichte des Werks und seiner Wirkung einleitend kontextualisiert.

Manche Beobachter der Region versuchen, die Notwendigkeit der Beschäftigung mit den vorgestellten Autoren zu entkräften, in dem sie darauf verwiesen, dass Intellektuelle nur allzu häufig marginalisiert, ins Exil gezwungen oder umgebracht – in jedem Fall mundtot gemacht – wurden. Diese Annahme widerlegt der nun vorliegende Band durch die Vielfalt der Debattenbeiträge über zwei Jahrhunderte hinweg. Die Herausgeberin hat gerade die Bestseller und berühmten Texte um die Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert ausgesucht. Das Streben nach Freiheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Emanzipation der Frau sei ein gemeinsamer Nenner der nahöstlichen Philosophie, schreibt Anke von Kügelgen. Dies entspringt nicht ihrem persönlichen Wunschdenken (und wer die Autorin kennt, weiß, dass sie niemals im Sinne der guten Sache unkritische Positionen gelten lassen würde), sondern wird auf 310 Seiten argumentativ untermauert.

Drei weitere Bände sind in der neuen Reihe pnm für 2017 und 2018 geplant, unter Federführung der aktuell maßgeblichen Wissenschaftler auf diesem Feld: Kata Moser untersucht die disziplinäre Entwicklung der Philosophie in der arabischen Welt. Roman Seidel setzt sich mit der Rezeption deutscher Philosophie im Werk von Mohammed Shabestari auseinander. Und Sarhan Dhouib stellt eine Anthologie zum Thema Toleranz/Intoleranz mit bislang nicht übersetzten Essays von 15 arabischen Intellektuellen zusammen.

Es wäre dem ersten Band zu wünschen gewesen, seine Ware etwas offensiver zu Markte zu tragen. An wenigen Stellen möchte man dem Leser zurufen: Mut zur Lücke! Aber an erster Stelle möchte man ihm zurufen: Lies!

Anke von Kügelgen (Hg.): „Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion. Religionskritische Positionen um 1900", Berlin 2017, Klaus Schwarz Verlag

Wie Deutschland mit dem Islam in den Dschihad ziehen wollte

Eine Rezension von Ulrike Freitag

Diese Lektüre lohnt sich auch nach mehr als hundert Jahren: Max von Oppenheim überlegte, wie sich Deutschland muslimischer Schützenhilfe versichern könnte – doch dann wurde ihm ein Strich durch die Rechnung gemacht.

Max von Oppenheims „Denkschrift betreffend „die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde“ ist ein in mehrfacher Hinsicht interessantes Dokument: Es zeigt die strategischen Überlegungen eines der führenden Orientkenner der Epoche im Kontext des Ersten Weltkrieges, die zumindest in Teilen von der Militärführung übernommen wurden. Ihr Kernstück war die Allianz Deutschlands mit dem Osmanischen Reich, die mit der Kriegsniederlage beider Mächte und der Aufteilung des Vorderen Orients endete.


EL DSCHIHAD

El Dschihad, Zeitung für die muhammedanischen Kriegsgefangenen, Nr. 21, arabische Ausgabe

Von Oppenheims Pläne gingen weit über das Osmanische Reich und seine schon länger de facto selbständige, von Großbritannien seit 1882 besetzte ägyptische Provinz hinaus. Sie umfassten auch die Muslime Indiens, Afghanistans und, zu einem geringeren Teil, die von Frankreich kontrollierten nordafrikanischen Länder. Die Denkschrift zeigt in ihrer Argumentation ferner das deutsche Kalkül, Muslime zum Aufstand gegen insbesondere die Briten, aber auch die Franzosen sowie, im Kaukasus, die Russen zu motivieren. Dabei sollten Osmanen, Perser sowie Afghanen und die lokalen Bevölkerung mit deutscher finanzieller und militärischer Unterstützung kräftig Schützenhilfe leisten.

Viele Muslime in den genannten Regionen hegten durchaus einen erheblichen Groll gegen die britische, französische und russische Herrschaft. Im späten neunzehnten Jahrhundert hatten viele das Osmanische Reich als mögliche Schutzmacht gegen die europäische Ausdehnung betrachtet. Darauf aufbauend, ging es von Oppenheim darum, sie zur Entlastung der deutschen Truppen gegen die jeweiligen Kolonialherren anzustacheln.

Eine reine Zweckgemeinschaft

Im Erfolgsfalle eröffnete diese Mobilisierung die Perspektive auf erhebliche Absatzgebiete und Bodenschätze – insbesondere Erdöl, das in diesem Krieg erstmalig eine wichtige Rolle spielte. Orientalische Interessen nahmen demgegenüber einen dezidierten zweiten Rang ein. Man werde, so von Oppenheim, „in vorsichtigster Weise abzuwägen haben wieweit wir uns in politischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht für die Zukunft engagieren können“.

Eine genaue Lektüre des instruktiven Textes entlarvt die in der Region häufig vernommene Einschätzung, Deutschland sei ein historischer Freund muslimischer Gesellschaften, als das, was sie war: eine reine Zweckgemeinschaft. Wenn nordafrikanische Kriegsgefangene sich gegenüber deutschen Offizieren beklagten, sie seien von den Franzosen nur als Kanonenfutter eingesetzt worden, so sahen die deutschen Pläne nichts anderes vor, nur eben an der Seite der mit Deutschland alliierten Osmanen. Insofern muss die deutsche Politik – ebenso wie die osmanische, die in der „Denkschrift" nur eine passive Rolle spielt – im gleichen imperialen Kontext gesehen werden wie die anderer europäischer Mächte.

Die Mobilisierung im Namen eines „Heiligen Krieges" im Kontext des Ersten Weltkriegs war, wie neuere Untersuchungen Tilman Lüdkes, Mustafa Aksakals, Ernst Zürchers und anderer gezeigt haben, keine rein muslimische – oder auf diese bezogene – deutsche Idee: Auch christliche Würdenträger unterstützten dezidiert ihre jeweiligen Kriegsherren, und die Osmanen hätten der deutschen Inspiration wohl nicht bedurft. Zwar waren die seit 1908 an der Macht befindlichen Jungtürken nicht besonders religiös, aber die Mobilisierungskraft der Religion spielte auch für sie eine wichtige Rolle. Die Kritik seines holländischen Kollegen Snouck Hurgronje, von Oppenheim habe eine durch die Modernisierung überholte Macht wiederbelebt, war insofern eher verfehlt.

Die lange Historie zwischen Deutschen und Muslimen

Die „Denkschrift" wird mit einem Text des Schriftstellers Steffen Kopetzky eingeleitet, der den Weltkriegsroman „Risiko" publiziert hat. Sie ist für alle instruktiv, die sich mit deutscher Orientpolitik im Zeitalter des Imperialismus und Weltkriegs beschäftigen. Wenn heute der Dschihad zu Recht als Gefahr für den Westen betrachtet wird, ist die Erinnerung daran, dass der Islam und speziell der Heilige Krieg im vergangenen Jahrhundert immer wieder von westlichen Mächten zu instrumentalisieren versucht wurde – beispielsweise in Afghanistan gegen die Sowjetunion –, durchaus wichtig.

Bedauerlich ist, dass sich der Herausgeber nicht etwas mehr Mühe mit der Edition gemacht oder Fachleute konsultiert hat. Die Anmerkungen sind nur bedingt hilfreich – „Maghsen" etwa erklärt von Oppenheim selbst im Text als Bezeichnung für das marokkanische Königreich und seinen Herrschaftsradius, es ist also keine Anspielung auf die Amazigh (Berber). Auch das Nachwort läse sich ohne modische Analogien zwischen Deutschen und Chinesen und englische Einsprengsel („scoren") besser, selbst wenn es treffende Beobachtungen enthält.

Hundert Jahre nach seinem Erscheinen ist von Oppenheims Schrift eine lohnende Lektüre. Sie verweist nicht nur auf die langen Verbindungen zwischen Deutschland und muslimisch geprägten Ländern, sie zeigt auch die Anfänge westlicher Indienststellung des Islams. Schon im Ersten Weltkrieg zeigte sich, dass die Verbündeten sehr wohl ihre eigenen Interessen vertraten, auch zur Irritation der Deutschen. Diese Lehre wurde nicht aufgegriffen, wie etwa die Vereinigten Staaten in Afghanistan bitter erfuhren. Bis heute beschäftigen die Folgen des Ersten Weltkriegs den Vorderen Orient. Auch wenn Großbritannien und Frankreich für die anschließende Mandatsherrschaft kritisiert werden: es war deutsches Drängen, das die Osmanen bewegte, in den Krieg einzutreten.

Max von Oppenheim: „Denkschrift betreffend die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde", Verlag Das Kulturelle Gedächtnis, Berlin 2018

Es geht nicht um Hass

Samuli Schielke

Die Anthropologin Susanne Schröter behauptet, von nahöstlichen Migranten gehe eine von Frauenhass motivierte sexuelle Gewaltwelle aus. Sie sei Teil ihrer „Kultur“ und in Deutschland dürfte man nicht darüber sprechen. Das ist Unfug. Eine Replik.

Seit bald zwanzig Jahren forsche ich als Kulturanthropologe in Ägypten und anderswo im Nahen Osten, und einen beträchtlichen Teil meiner Forschung habe ich unter jungen Männern durchgeführt. Vor knapp zehn Jahren habe ich schon mal über sexuelle Übergriffe in Ägypten geschrieben. Deswegen habe ich die in Deutschland geführte Debatte seit den Übergriffen am Silvesterabend 2015 in Köln mit Interesse und einigem Befremden verfolgt.

Ich habe auch versucht, mich in die Diskussion einzumischen und war ernüchtert, wie schwierig es war, zwei Dinge gleichzeitig zu sagen. Erstens: Während sexuelle Gewalt ein leider weltweites Phänomen ist, sind die spezifischen Formen, die sie annimmt, oft kulturell und gesellschaftlich strukturiert – darunter auch diejenigen Formen, die einige junge Männer 2015 mit nach Deutschland gebracht haben. Sie haben Schrecken und Empörung hervorgerufen, weil sie in der Gestalt ungewohnt für die meisten Menschen in Deutschland waren. (Häusliche Gewalt hingegen ist altbekannt und verursacht keine vergleichbare gesellschaftliche Aufregung.) Zweitens: Rassismus und Stigmatisierung funktionieren dadurch, dass tatsächliche oder angebliche Taten oder Charakterzüge von Mitgliedern einer Minderheit zur Grundlage und zum Vorwand für Vorurteile, Diskriminierung und Hass gegen sie werden. Das Thema Sexualität ist eine besonders fruchtbare Grundlage für die Ausgestaltung solcher Vorurteile.

Aber um das eine ernst zu nehmen, muss man das andere nicht klein reden.

Anthropologen, die mit ihrem Fachwissen verantwortlich umgehen, reden heute ungern über „Kultur“. Denn in öffentlichen Debatten spricht man heute von „Kulturen“, als wären sie Computerprogramme, die das Verhalten von Menschen determinieren: kollektivistisch oder individuell, frei oder autoritär. Anthropologen halten solche „Kulturen“ schon lange für eine Fiktion – mitunter eine gefährliche Fiktion, die eine Grundlage für Rassismen und Vorurteile bietet.

Kulturen als kollektive Computerprogramme gibt es nicht. Was es hingegen sehr wohl gibt, ist Kultur im Sinne der Kultivierung: wie ich mir unterschiedliche Fähigkeiten und Empfindsamkeiten (und auch Unfähigkeiten und Mängel an Empfindsamkeit) im Laufe meines Lebens aneigne. Kultur ist ein lebenslanger Lernprozess, komplex und oft widersprüchlich, und meist im Wandel. Ein solcher Lernprozess ermöglicht es mir, spezifische Formen von Gewalt und Missbrauch für normal zu halten und auch auszuüben – bietet mir aber auch spezifische Möglichkeiten, sie zu überwinden.

Unter den wichtigen Fragen, die sich aus meiner Sicht stellen, sind: Wie kommen spezifische Formen sexueller Gewalt zu Stande? Und was hilft dagegen? In meiner Forschung habe ich erfahren, wie manche Menschen in Ägypten sowohl zu Hause als auch von moralischen Instanzen wie Lehrern und Predigern lernen, dass soziale Kontrolle und Hierarchien die besten Mittel gegen die gefährlichen Triebe der Sexualität und Gewalt sind. Männer lernen dabei einerseits, dass sie die Verantwortung über das Verhalten anderer – zum Beispiel von Kindern,

Frauen, Gästen – innehaben. Andererseits lernen sie aber, dass sie selbst schwach sind gegen die Versuchung, die von Frauen ausgeht.

Dies hat aber zur Folge, dass manche Männer sich in der Abwesenheit von hierarchischer Kontrolle gehen lassen und sich unverantwortlich und aggressiv verhalten. Genau das ist bei einigen sexuellen Angriffen geschehen, deren Zeuge ich sein musste. Nicht Hass, sondern eine übertriebene, fast euphorische Aufregung war die vorherrschende Stimmung. Die Täter waren oft sehr jung. Insofern scheinen sexuelle Übergriffe der Art, wie ich sie in Ägypten gesehen habe, und was sich offenbar auch in der Silvesternacht in Köln abspielte, eine gesellschaftlich spezifische Form des moralischen Scheiterns: Eine auf hierarchische Kontrolle der Versuchung gerichtete moralische Erziehung versagt, wenn die Kontrolle ausfällt und die Versuchung überwiegt.

Die Täter können sich dabei wohl bewusst sein, dass sie falsch handeln. Aber sie können es sich umso mehr erlauben, je mehr sie gelernt haben, dass sie für das Verhalten anderer verantwortlich sind, selbst aber schwach sein dürfen – und keine Konsequenzen fürchten müssen.

Ein solches Muster des moralischen Scheiterns ist auch in Europa und Nordamerika zu finden – etwa in der Freiheit von mächtigen Männern, zu tun, was sie wollen, in einer Welt, die Erfolg vergöttert, was von der #MeToo-Kampagne endlich thematisiert wurde. Ein anderes Beispiel wären Einsamkeit und Selbstmord: Sie können das spezifische moralische Scheitern einer Gesellschaft sein, die das Glück in radikaler Individualität und Selbstverantwortung verspricht.

Dies ist der Anthropologie gut bekannt. Nun aber meldete sich die Fachkollegin Susanne Schröter zu Wort und warnte im Juni in der *Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung* (12. 6. 2018) vor einem nicht genauer definierten, aber ihrer Aussage nach mächtigen Bestreben, alle zum Schweigen zu bringen, die den Frauenhass der Islamisten und der Patriarchen anprangern. Schröter richtet sich dabei offensichtlich auch gegen Autorinnen, die sich selbst stark und aktiv in Bewegungen gegen sexuelle Gewalt engagiert haben. Sie klagt an, richtet den erhobenen Zeigefinger auf das islamische Patriarchat und seine angeblichen Verbündeten, und sagt uns: Die sind nicht von uns, so etwas gehört nicht zu uns. Sie schreibt gegen das angebliche Verschweigen oder passive Gutheißen sexueller Gewalt durch muslimische Migranten an. Aber wer verschweigt das eigentlich? Und gibt es eigentlich jemanden, der sie gutheißt? Schröter nennt keine Namen und bietet keine Zitate.

Ja, nach der Silvesternacht 2015 in Köln gab es einen Moment, da es vielen unangenehm war, darüber zu sprechen, dass viele Migranten (und Migrantinnen) auch die destruktiven Seiten und die Widersprüche ihrer Gesellschaften und Lebenserfahrungen mitbringen. Aber seitdem wird in Deutschland durchaus auch eine differenzierte Diskussion in den Medien und der Politik darüber geführt, und in der Jugendarbeit werden lösungsorientiert konstruktive Ansätze gesucht und auch gefunden. Immer wieder sind Täter von sexueller Gewalt identifiziert, verklagt und verurteilt worden. Dies ist wichtig, denn nach meiner Forschungserfahrung besteht der wichtigste Grund dafür, dass Männer sich erlauben, Frauen zu belästigen und anzugreifen, einfach darin, dass sie keine Sanktionen und Strafe erwarten. Und das Bewusstsein, nicht ungestraft davonzukommen, hilft Männern, sich verantwortlicher zu verhalten.

Das heißt nicht, dass man nicht über Patriarchat und Normen zu reden braucht. Eine der interessantesten Entwicklungen in der arabischen Welt seit der Jahrtausendwende ist die Ent-

Bild aus der Kampagne “Dein Schweigen ist Belästigung” von Marwa Ragheb, die Männer auffordert, sexuelle Belästigung von Frauen nicht stillschweigend hinzunehmen

stehung eines neuen, alternativen Männlichkeitsideals, das auf kommunikative Fähigkeiten und partnerschaftliche Beziehung mit der Ehefrau (es ist ein überaus heteronormatives Ideal) statt Stärke und Autorität als wichtige männliche Eigenschaften setzt.

Dieses Ideal setzt freilich kulturelle und gesellschaftliche Ressourcen voraus. Nicht jeder kann es sich leisten. Es ist gewissermaßen ein Distinktionsmerkmal der mittleren und bürgerlichen Klassen. Es ist zudem ein durchaus patriarchales Ideal, denn es setzt nach wie vor den Mann als den Brotverdiener und die Frau als die Mutter in den Vordergrund. Auf jeden Fall bedeutet das aber, dass die Idee, man könne Männer in sympathische Gegner und gefährliche Anhänger des Patriarchats teilen, nicht weit trägt.

Patriarchat – die „Herrschaft der Väter“ – ist eine intime gesellschaftliche Hierarchie, in der Männer über Frauen und Alte über Junge bestimmen. Wenn sie gut funktioniert, lernen alle, ihre eigene Rolle in der Hierarchie mehr oder weniger gut zu spielen. Solche Hierarchien wandeln sich am Ehesten dadurch, dass Menschen anfangen, ihre Rollen anders (oder auch schlechter) zu spielen. Es ist viel schwieriger und unwahrscheinlicher, die Rollen und Hierarchien in ihrer Gesamtheit einfach aufzuheben.

Was Susanne Schröter mit ihren alarmierenden Wortmeldungen jetzt beizutragen hat, scheint mir folglich sehr fragwürdig. Ganz offensichtlich ist ihre Stimme ja nicht zum Schweigen gebracht worden. Immerhin hat sie in kurzem Abstand Interviews und Essays in anerkannten Tageszeitungen, zuletzt in der *Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung* und der *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung*, veröffentlicht. Denjenigen Feministinnen, denen sie vorwirft, kritische Stimmen zum Schweigen zu bringen, ist das seltener gelungen. Deswegen kann ich ihren Beitrag schwerlich als etwas anderes als Demagogie verstehen.

In einem Interview kürzlich in der NZZ [16. 6. 2018] sagte Schröter: „Kritik an meinen Aussagen kommt dabei nie von Fachkollegen, sondern aus linken Kreisen.“ Das stimmt nicht. Ihre Thesen gelten in Fachkreisen als übertrieben zugespitzt, analytisch schwach, und zum Teil als sachlich falsch.

Ja, Gewalt gegen Frauen nimmt gesellschaftlich und kulturell spezifische Gestalten an. Die Kölner Silvesternacht war nicht dasselbe wie Harvey Weinstein oder die Incel-Bewegung. Gewalt bei Volksfesten ist nicht dasselbe wie Gewalt zu Hause. Schröters Analyse, wenn man von einer Analyse reden kann, ist allerdings schwach. Sie schreibt unterschiedlichste Formen von Gewalt gegen Frauen einer einzigen Ursache zu: Hass. Doch wenn wir uns konkrete Ausprägungen von Gewalt gegen Frauen anschauen – sei es im Nahen Osten, in Deutschland, oder anderswo – scheinen sexistische Geringschätzung, männlicher Selbstbestätigungsdrang und unkontrollierte Macht oft ausschlaggebender zu sein. Und auch gefährlicher.

Weinstein hat mit Missbrauch von Macht zu tun, Incel mit Hass. Auch im Nahen Osten gibt es leider viele mächtige Missbraucher und gekränkte Frauenhasser, auch hier bestehen viele gesellschaftliche Machthierarchien aufgrund der direkten Androhung von Gewalt (Gewalt innerhalb von Familien hat oft das direkte Ziel, solche Hierarchien aufrechtzuerhalten). Nach meiner wissenschaftlichen Kenntnis sind aber weder Hass noch Machterhalt der Beweggrund von Männern, die – von geradezu festlicher Freude angetrieben – gemeinsam Frauen begrapschen und angreifen.

Einiges, was Schröter über sexuelle Gewalt in Ägypten schreibt, ist sachlich falsch. Es gibt in Ägypten keine neuerliche Epidemie der sexuellen Gewalt, sondern ein seit langem bestehendes strukturelles Problem. Es kann sein, dass solche Attacken in den letzten Jahren schlimmer geworden sind, aber ich habe kollektive sexuelle Angriffe persönlich schon in den 1990er Jahren beobachtet und einen Pressebericht darüber aus dem Jahr 1929 gefunden. Die Anthropologin Arlene Macleod, die in den 1980ern über die damals neue Bewegung der Verschleierung von Frauen forschte, berichtete, dass Ägypterinnen, die außer Haus arbeiten gingen, das Kopftuch als einen Schutz gegen die schon damals allgegenwärtige sexuelle Belästigung ansahen. Geholfen hat es allerdings nicht.

Neu ist aber, dass Frauen sich wehren. Dass viele Menschen (Frauen wie Männer) wütend über sexuelle Gewalt sind und dies öffentlich artikulieren, und dass es Versuche gibt, etwas dagegen zu tun. Die schlechte Nachricht ist, dass das Problem noch lange nicht gelöst ist, und viele Männer nach wie vor ungestraft davonkommen. Eine gute Nachricht wiederum, dass es nicht mehr als normal gilt, und dass in der ägyptischen Gesellschaft unterschiedliche Strömungen zusammenkommen, um das Problem anzugehen. Das passt aber nicht in Schröters Erzählung von einem allgegenwärtigen Angriff, der seit kurzem gegen Geschlechtergleichheit und Frauen zugange sei.

Schröter hat am Ende auch keine Lösungen anzubieten, wie Männer lernen können, sich verantwortlich zu verhalten. Stattdessen scheint sie sich vor allem dagegen zu wehren, das Problem der Stigmatisierung von migrantischen und muslimischen Männern ernst zu nehmen. Ihr konkreter Vorschlag, sofern einer erkennbar ist, läuft auf eine aggressive Assimilationspolitik hinaus, die nach ihrer Ansicht muslimische Migranten aus ihrer kulturellen Isolation bringen soll. Mit so etwas kann man gut Wahlkampf machen, aber ich möchte doch daran erinnern, dass es in Frankreich, das schon seit Langem die aggressivste Assimilationspolitik Europas betreibt, trotzdem arg segregierte Wohnverhältnisse und viele aktive Dschihadisten gibt.

Solche Probleme dürften durch Schröters Vorschlag aber eher verschärft werden. Denn Stigmatisierung hilft nicht. Im Gegenteil: Sie hält Hierarchien aufrecht und zerstört Potenziale zur Verbesserung. Sie legitimiert institutionellen Rassismus, also eine Situation, in der Menschen trotz erfolgreicher Assimilation von Erfolgschancen ausgeschlossen werden. Das ist ein guter Nährboden für identitär-konservative Abschottungsideologien – und ebenso wie Rassismus wird auch identitäre Abschottung oft sexuell artikuliert. Wenn wir das Ziel haben, eine gespaltene und gettoisierte Gesellschaft zu verwirklichen, sollten wir Schröters Vorschlag folgen. Ansonsten gibt es in Deutschland aber zahlreiche und konstruktive Initiativen und Ansätze, die das Problem der Gewalt angehen, ohne dabei zu einer polarisierenden Panik beizutragen.

Yuval Ben-Bassat, Petitioning the Sultan

Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine

A Review by Nora Lafi

Yuval Ben-Bassat's *Petitioning the Sultan* explores the archival corpus of petitions (*arzuhal*) sent from Palestine (mostly Jaffa and Gaza) to Istanbul between the mid-1860s and 1908. It discusses the nature of this kind of document and examines, through their interpretation, crucial questions such as the Ottoman identity of the region, the relationship between rulers and the population, intercommunal relations, as well as the tensions and ambiguities between bureaucratic modernization in an age of reform and the continuation of old practices. One of the most interesting features of this book, in contrast with other studies that tend to anachronistically apply categories and paradigms, is to consider Palestine "from an Ottoman perspective" (p. 6).



Ben-Bassat analyzes the role of petitions in late-Ottoman procedures with great precision and situates the nature and usefulness of these sources in contrast with other archival resources, like the records of qadi courts (*sicill*). The author also proposes stimulating reflections on petitioning as a social practice and as an instrument of governance. Even if some of his conclusions on this matter can be debated – as when he argues that petitions were an instrument of centralization and that they reinforced the position of the ruler, although they were also an institutionalized expression of locality and a guarantee of the respect of all the decentralized features of governance at the scale of urban, rural, communal, and professional communities – the author's precise work at deciphering the administrative process and political treatment of the petitions, recognizing them as a complex element, is innovative.

As for the content of the petitions, Ben-Bassat proposes a reading of both urban, rural, and Bedouin societies under an original lens. The texts of the petitions allow access to the voices of the people. The passages on petitions sent by Ottoman officials are valuable additions, as they reveal previously underdocumented dimensions, such as the negotiation of Ottoman imperiality and the complexity of the personal identity and careers of such officials. Passages are also dedicated to petitions sent by Templer colonists and proto-Zionist migrants. They limn interactions with Ottoman authorities and the complexity of the categories and identities that other approaches in historiography tend to reify. This book hence constitutes an important contribution not only to the history of Palestine but also to the understanding of the nature of the Ottoman empire and of the dynamics of change that were enacted during the era of the Tanzimat.

Ben-Bassat, while proposing innovative interpretations on this later period, does not insist on the link between practices of this period and the Ottoman classical age in regard to

petitions as a crucial tool of governance. Petitions, indeed, were a central feature of governance in the Ottoman empire and represented an institutionalized tool of negotiation. The petitioning dialogue (each petition opening a procedure and calling for an administrative treatment and a political answer) was a key feature of imperial governance and its interpretation is a way to relativize visions of a distant Empire. The author shows this with great acuity for the late 19th century but might underestimate the consistency of the imperial heritage that other resources at Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA) in Istanbul illustrate. What was new during the Tanzimat era was a reform of the functioning of the office of petitions. Petitions from the whole Empire were no longer treated together, but classified according to the geography of the Empire. Hence Ben-Bassat found these petitions together, in contrast with researchers working on previous periods, who have contended with a mix of petitions from the whole empire.

Ben-Bassat also argues that there was, in addition to a technological change that introduced the telegraph to the petitioning system, a quantitative change in the number of petitions received in the capital city of the Empire. Having personally seen the millions of petitions of the previous periods at BOA, I think this may be an overstatement.

In his conclusion, the author discusses the question of the specificity of petitions from Palestine. Introducing this argument is a way for him to reconnect with debates on the historiography of the region, capitalizing on his study of both the Ottoman normality of the petitioning system and the emergence of new questions in early 20th-centuryPalestine. Another important issue, evoked in the introduction, pertains to petitions as possible "forerunners of modern public opinion" (p. 19). This interpretive impulse is fascinating as it again breaks with culturalist visions of the region that suggest that there was no such dimension in local societies. Its exploration however might require Ben-Bassat's vision to reconnect more intimately with the previous periods in which, I suspect, the petitioning system was already the expression of a local form of civic conscience.

As it uses, presents, and interprets petitions in a way that challenges many static visions of the Ottoman history of Palestine, *Petitioning the Sultan* is thus a very valuable contribution to the current trend in historiography that discusses the inertia of previous analytical postures and builds upon an innovative reading of largely ignored sources in order to propose reinterpretations and paradigmatic changes.

Role play exercise at the "To transfer, but not to serve?" workshop in 2018

Cooperation

Diktaturen als Alternative Ordnungen

Julian Sandhagen

Die Vorstellung eines ungebrochenen Siegeszugs der liberalen Demokratie, wie sie etwa der US-amerikanische Politologe Francis Fukuyama vertritt, stellt sich mit jedem weiteren Tag als Fehleinschätzung heraus. Autoritäre politische Systeme erfreuen sich im Moment größter Beliebtheit und auch die einst stabilen Vorkämpfer freiheitlicher Ordnungen wanken unter dem Druck autokratischer politischer Akteure. Diese Tatsache stellt die Frage nach der Funktionsweise von Diktaturen. Woraus resultiert ihre Stabilität und Attraktivität? Welche Angebote können sie der Bevölkerung unterbreiten? Welche Rolle spielt Repression? Und wie arrangieren sich Menschen mit nicht-freiheitlichen politischen Ordnungen?

Diese Fragen wurden Anfang Oktober 2017 auf der Auftaktkonferenz des interdisziplinären Verbunds für vergleichende Diktaturforschung an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin diskutiert. Eröffnet wurde die Tagung durch Michael Wildt (Berlin) und Jörg Baberowski (Berlin). Hauptredner des Abends war allerdings György Dalos (Budapest). Der mehrfach ausgezeichnete Romancier und Historiker (u. a. Adelbert-von-Chamisso-Preis), der in den 1960er-Jahren in Moskau Geschichte studierte und später zu den Gründungsmitgliedern der demokratischen Opposition in Ungarn gehörte, sprach über seine langjährige Erfahrung mit dem Leben in, mit und gegen Diktaturen. Dalos' Schilderung seiner Wandlung vom überzeugten Kommunisten, der durch ein Stipendium die Möglichkeit zu einem Studium in Russland erhielt, zum oppositionellen Systemkritiker, zeigten die verschiedenen Facetten der Diktatur auf und bildeten so einen gelungenen Auftakt der Tagung.

Die Panels der Konferenz waren in Themenbereiche, die die jeweils zentralen Aspekte von Diktaturen in das Zentrum der Debatte stellten, aufgeteilt. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Konferenzen gab es keine Vorträge der Panelteilnehmer. Stattdessen handelte es sich um moderierte Diskussionen, in die auch das Publikum eingreifen konnte. Das erste Panel trug den Titel „Herrschaftsdurchsetzung: Furcht und Teilhabe" und setzte sich mit der Frage nach diktatorischen Herrschaftspraktiken auseinander. Welche Rolle spielten oder spielen plebiszitäre Praktiken wie Wahlen in Systemen, in denen sie oberflächlich keine Bedeutung haben? Wie schaffen und instrumentalisieren repressive Ordnungen Angst in der Bevölkerung? Diskussionsteilnehmer waren Birgit Aschmann (Berlin), die sich in ihrer Forschung vornehmlich mit der franquistischen Diktatur in Spanien befasst, Aloys Winterling (Berlin), ausgewiesener Experte für das römische Imperium, Jörg Baberowski (Berlin), dessen Forschungsschwerpunkt der Stalinismus bildet, und Sebastian Lange (Berlin), Experte für islamistische dschihadistische Bewegungen im Nahen und Mittleren Osten. Die Panelteilnehmer sollten über ihr jeweiliges Spezialwissen hinaus auf einer allgemeineren Ebene miteinander ins Gespräch kommen. Diese Aufgabe, eigene Beobachtungen kurz zu präsentieren und zu abstrahieren, meisterten die Podiumsgäste zum größten Teil mit Bravour. Über die zentrale Rolle der Furcht in Diktaturen herrschte unter den Diskussionsteilnehmern große Einigkeit. Sie warben aber auch für eine genauere Analyse von verschiedenen Formen der Furcht und der milieuspezifischen Dimension von Repression. Unterschiedliche gesellschaftliche Gruppen waren, so die Diskussionsteilnehmer, von verschiedenen Formen der Angst erfasst. Angstfreie Diktaturen seien aber nicht

"In the 20th century, the rockets race to the stars, the trains are going to the lands of achievements", Soviet poster, ca. 1958-63

denkbar. Der Begriff der Teilhabe sorgte indes für Diskussionen, die den neuen Ansatz des Forschungsverbundes offenbarten. So äußerten mehrere Diskutanten die Beobachtung, dass das normative Begriffspaar „Demokratie – Teilhabe" nicht absolut zu setzen sei. So gäbe es durchaus Diktaturen die großen Wert auf eine Integration der Bevölkerung legten und auf der anderen Seite Demokratien mit repressiven Elementen, beispielsweise dem Ausschluss von Minderheiten. Diese Auflösung der klar definierten Grenze zwischen Demokratien und Diktaturen sowie die Ablehnung der normativen Betrachtungsebene sind Alleinstellungsmerkmale des neuen Forschungsverbunds. Dass dieser Ansatz durchaus zu Kontroversen führen kann, zeigte sich während der Diskussion. Das erste Panel offenbarte zudem die enorme Varianz von Themen, die in einer vergleichenden Diktaturforschung untersucht werden könnten. Zugleich wurde deutlich, dass eben dieses Angebot an Forschungsoptionen eine Eingrenzung des interdisziplinären Projekts erfordert. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde auch die Begriffsgeschichte der Diktatur, ihre Wandlung von der ehrenvollen Selbstbezeichnung für eine kommissarische Tätigkeit in der Antike und frühen Neuzeit zu einer pejorativen Fremdbezeichnung in der Moderne, debattiert.

Das zweite Panel mit dem Titel „Wohlfahrt und Sicherheit" befasste sich im Anschluss an die vorige Diskussion mit den Versprechen, die Diktaturen ihren Gesellschaften unterbreiten. Denn ob Diktaturen Wohlfahrt und Sicherheit garantieren konnten, entschied oftmals über Wohl und Wehe, über Legitimation und Delegitimation von autoritären Regimes. Die Diskussionsrunde, setzte sich aus Historikern mit Forschungsschwerpunkten zusammen, die bei einer öffentlichkeitswirksamen Diskussion über Diktaturen mitunter übersehen werden. So trafen mit Hannes Grandits (Berlin), Stefan B. Kirmse (Berlin), Daniel Hedinger (München) und Stefan Rinke (Berlin) Spezialisten für den jugoslawischen Sozialismus, zentralasiatische postsowjetische Systeme, japanischen Faschismus und lateinamerikanische Diktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert aufeinander. Die Debatte offenbarte den Druck unter dem autokratische Herrscher trotz der Möglichkeit furchterregender Repressionsmaßnahmen laufend standen und stehen. Die Volkssouveränität galt auch für die moderne Diktatur. Dauerhaft konnte sich nur etablieren, wer ausgeschmückte Zukunftsvisionen mit handfesten Ergebnissen unterfüttern konnte. Dabei etablierte sich bei der Überprüfung des jeweiligen „Fortschritts" der transnationale Vergleich als besonders wirksam. Sowohl die Machthaber als auch die Untertanen konnten mit der sozialen, ökonomischen oder auch politischen Lage in angrenzenden Ländern oder Syste-

men argumentieren. Die Diskutanten erläuterten Erfolge und Misserfolge in den von ihnen untersuchten Systemen und zeigten die unterschiedlichen Herangehensweisen an die Schaffung von Sozialsystemen, aber auch von ökonomischer Stabilität auf. Dabei kam auch die zeitliche Dimension zur Sprache. So war und ist der Modernisierungsdiskurs gerade in Staaten, die innerhalb von kurzer Zeit den Schritt von einer Agrargesellschaft zu einer Industriegesellschaft gegangen sind, ein enorm wichtiges Element für die Akzeptanz von Diktaturen. Der Ausblick und das Erleben von Entwicklung und Fortschritt spielte für die „Untergebenen" eine wichtige Rolle.

Das dritte Panel, das zugleich die Abschlussdiskussion darstellte, trug den Titel „Legitimität und Öffentlichkeit". Zur Debatte stand, wann und warum diktatorische Regimes von der Bevölkerung als legitim angesehen werden. Wie argumentieren repressive Ordnungen für ihre eigene Rechtmäßigkeit? Geführt wurde die Diskussion wiederum von Repräsentanten sehr unterschiedlicher Forschungsfelder. Neben den Historikern Martin Sabrow (Berlin), Klaus Mühlhahn (Berlin) und Michael Wildt (Berlin), der bei der Diskussion auch als Moderator fungierte, saßen mit Sonja Hegasy (Berlin) und Benjamin Lahusen (Berlin) auch eine Politikwissenschaftlerin, deren Forschungsschwerpunkt die nordafrikanischen Gesellschaften sind, und ein Jurist mit rechtsgeschichtlichen Forschungshintergrund auf dem Podium. Die Diskussion kreiste zunächst um den Begriff der Legitimität, den die Teilnehmer der Debatte nicht als ihrerseits angelegten Maßstab betrachten mochten, sondern ihn vielmehr als Einschätzung der in diktatorischen Regimen lebenden Bevölkerung verstehen wollten. Alternativ wurde daher der Begriff der Loyalität in den Raum gestellt, der sich empirisch besser nachweisen ließe. Im Laufe der Debatte ging es anschließend um die Frage wie Diktaturen ihre Rechtmäßigkeit formulieren und ein auch von der Bevölkerung als legitim betrachtetes Regime aufbauen. Neben dem Hinweis Benjamin Lahusens, dass auch Diktaturen langfristig nicht auf ein gültiges Rechtssystem verzichten können, war ein zentraler Debattenbeitrag Martin Sabrows These, dass man nur dann zu einem besseren Verständnis von autoritären Systemen kommen könne, wenn man die eigenen normativen Vorprägung reflektiert und sich bemüht die Eigenlogik von Diktaturen ernst zu nehmen. Nur so könne man auch Legitimationsmuster erkennen, die der rationalen Matrix der liberalen Demokratie entgegenlaufen. Diktatorische Regime haben andere Werteordnungen, eine andere Erzählung und eine eigene Logik. Sich den Bewohner solcher Systemen als den ewig Unterdrückten, als den in frustrierter und selbst empfundener Unfreiheit Leidenden oder als von simpler Propaganda Überzeugten vorzustellen, führe in die Irre, so Sabrow.

Ein weiterer Themenkomplex, der während der Tagung immer wieder zur Sprache kam, war die enorme Bedeutung der internationalen Verflechtung von diktatorischen Regimen im 20. Jahrhundert. Erfolgreiche autoritäre Ordnungen waren gut vernetzt, suchten und fanden Verbündete und bemühten sich um einen Platz in der Welt. Hinzu kommt der internationale Wissenstransfer: Diktatoren beobachteten und erlernten Herrschaftspraktiken und zogen eigene Schlüsse aus dem Scheitern oder Gelingen anderer politischer Systeme. Im Laufe der Tagung wurde allerdings deutlich, dass das zentrale Alleinstellungsmerkmal des Zentrums für vergleichende Diktaturforschung nicht so sehr die Herrschaftspraxis verschiedener Diktaturen ist. Vielmehr soll versucht werden die Alltagswelt derjenigen zu ergründen, die Objekt und Subjekt dieser Praktiken sind, die in repressiven politischen Systemen leben, sich arrangieren, Unfreiheiten akzeptieren. Diese Menschen seien letztlich das Rätsel.

Die Tagung lieferte einen insgesamt differenzierten Blick sowohl auf die Funktionsweisen und Praktiken von Diktaturen als auch auf die Möglichkeiten und Schwierigkeiten einer vergleichenden Diktaturforschung, die den oben aufgezeigten Fragestellungen nachgehen soll. Die genaue Betrachtung von Diktaturen, das haben die angeregten Debatten gezeigt, offenbart neue Fragen, die über das simple Zusammentragen von Herrschaftspraktiken hinausgehen. Vielmehr tauchen ahistorische anthropologische Fragen auf: Was priorisieren Menschen in ihrem Leben? Was bedeutet Freiheit und wann ist sie für wen wichtig? Gibt es vielleicht doch das „richtige" Leben im „Falschen"?

Why Do Elections Matter?

Analyzing the 2019 Elections in Indonesia, India, Tunisia, and Turkey

A lecture series organized by the Research Group "Secularity, Islam, and Democracy in Indonesia and Turkey" and the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient

Saskia Schäfer

2019 is a year of giant elections. The Indian general election was held in seven phases from April to May. About 900 million people were eligible to vote. Turnout was more than 67 per cent. In Indonesia, over 190 million were eligible to vote, and the turnout was a record 80 percent. Indonesia carried out the presidential and general elections in a single day on 17 April, a huge logistical exercise for the vast archipelago. Elections were also, inter alia, held in Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey.

At the IAAW, a series on elections brought together country specialists to discuss the elections in Indonesia, India, Turkey, and Tunisia. In our first session, Dr. Gülay Türkmen (University of Göttingen) and Dr. Ergün Özgür (ZMO) discussed the municipal elections in Turkey. Many, including President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, saw these elections as a test for the popularity of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The elections hurt the AKP more than many anticipated, but they also highlighted the fragmentation of the opposition. Nevertheless, different factions put their differences aside and managed to wrestle Istanbul from the AKP, which after 25 years of ruling was so unwilling to give up the city that they cited irregularities. They repeated the election in June. The support for the candidate from the opposition was even higher, so that the AKP finally felt forced to concede Istanbul. It was Erdoğan himself who once famously said "Whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey." Hence, this defeat was a particularly bitter one.

In our discussion of the elections coming up in Tunisia, Dr. Eva Schmidt (FU Berlin) explained how trust in the electoral system has eroded. PD Dr. Nora Lafi (ZMO) emphasized the influence of global network of Islamists in national elections.

Discussing the general elections in Indonesia, Dr. Luthfi Assyaukanie (Paramadina University Jakarta) and Dr. Saskia Schäfer (HU) highlighted the rise of religious actors. Prof. Dr. Claudia Derichs (HU) cautioned against premature enthusiasm about the gender quota. Prof. Vincent Houben (HU) historically contextualized the elections.

General elections in Tunisia, 13 October 2019

In the session on India, Dr. Anandita Bajpai (ZMO/HU) analyzed Prime Minister Narendra Modi's campaign and Prof. Dr. Nadja-Christina Schneider (HU) emphasized the crucial role that fake news and digital networks played in shaping Modi's success. Visitors and students evaluated the analytical usefulness of the concept of "populism" and concluded that more comparative efforts to understand the dynamics and diverse meanings of elections are necessary. Where would be a better place than the IAAW?

To Transfer, but not to Serve? Central Asian Studies Inside Out

Florian Coppenrath, Lena Heller, Kyara Klausmann, Elizaveta Kucherova, Davlatbegim Mamadshoeva, Mariya Petrova, Björn Reichhardt

Introduction

"Central Asian Studies should be relevant, but not at the price of their independence" – such could be, in one sentence, the result of the two-day workshop "Central Asian Studies Inside Out" (CASIO). On February 8–9, 2018, the workshop brought together master and PhD students from different European universities at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient and the Institute for Asian and African Studies at Humboldt University Berlin, to discuss knowledge transfer between Central Asian Studies actors outside of academia.

The workshop addressed a structural problem faced by Central Asian Studies: scholars of area studies produce knowledge of high social and political value, which remains within very concise circles. Save for a few exceptions, research on Central Asia in Europe is marginalized within wider disciplines and poorly interconnected, not to speak of the limited access to expertise produced within the region itself.

Thus, what can Central Asian Studies offer? As Botakoz Kassymbekova underlined in her keynote speech, they participate in challenging the grand narratives on the region. In giving voice to previously unheard people and highlighting the unexpected, scholars can point to

realities missed out on by problem-oriented research. To do this, scholars need to get out of the "comfort zone" of their area studies. Given the funding threats that institutions like the Central Asian seminar at Humboldt University face, scholars of area studies should underline the relevance of their work for a wider audience.

What role can knowledge transfer play in this context?

Knowledge transfer is certainly not a new topic and it is being increasingly advocated in the humanities. However, the scattering of Central Asian Studies makes it difficult to connect to previous discussions. We hope that by discussing some of our core arguments in this report, we can engage in further conversation with other interested actors. We also want to emphasize the importance of the engagement of all relevant actors in the discussion: knowledge transfer is an important topic not only for academia, nor for just one discipline.

Political actors taking part in the workshop were interested in the topic. Heidrun Tempel, Deputy Director-General for Research and Academic Relations Policy and Cultural Relations Policy of the German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin, emphasized the demand of her administration for more connection with academia, however hampered this engagement is by the need to translate findings into one-page policy notes. Also, independent research should always be a premise of knowledge transfer. Communicating more about the relevance of Central Asian Studies may help to solve its funding issues, but the humanities should not be forced to justify their existence.

With these challenges in mind, the workshop was an open floor to think about knowledge transfer both theoretically and practically. We both discussed the relevance of our own research for a broader audience and listened to those "on the outside." The aim of the workshop was not to solve the problems of knowledge transfer in two days, but rather to create a platform for an exchange of ideas.

The present report consists of three parts (written by three participants – Reichhardt, Petrova, Mamadshoeva – of the workshop), each representing a "target" for knowledge transfer: business; politics and development cooperation, and media. Each part reflects the view of its author and does not represent all of the opinions voiced during the workshop. Together, the three parts give an idea of the scope of the discussion.

Academic knowledge as an answer to the ramifications of business interests and their impact on local societies

The European Union and European states have recently shown increasing interest in political and economic dynamics in Central Asia. Multinational enterprises, operating in Central Asian countries, have an interest in the region's mineral resource wealth. Parallel to this, academia working on the region – particularly in the social sciences – is facing drastic cutbacks. In this essay, I argue that through holistic and proactive research strategies, Central Asian Studies can meet challenges created from the ramifications of business interests and their impact on local societies. However knowledge transfer sincerely needs to be questioned. This section aims to discuss knowledge transfer by considering power relations and hierarchies among the different actors, with a focus on mining enterprises in Kyrgyzstan.

Beril Ocaklı was invited to the workshop as a guest speaker to give a presentation on knowledge transfer between business and academia. A doctoral researcher at the Integrative

Research Institute on Transformations of Human-Environment Systems (IRI THESys) at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, she independently researches the dynamics of mining conflicts in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, she was working at the German Committee on Eastern European Relations (OA) until April 2018. With her expertise in both academia and international relations, she introduced the participants to her transdisciplinary research as well as to German business interests in Central Asia.

In Kyrgyzstan, different actors see mining as a major key for development. In fact, during the 1990s, the reactivation of the Kumtor gold mine by Centerra Gold, a controversial Canadian mining company, significantly decreased the inflation rate of the first years of free market economy. On the other hand, conflicts have arisen around Kumtor and other mining projects. Resource wealth, accordingly, cannot only be understood as bliss, but bears high, multidimensional ecological and social risks. Mining activities always go hand in hand with environmental destruction, social disruptions, and, provide "a source of state resources for plunder by both national and international elites" (Doolot and Heathershaw 2015: 97).

Ocaklı embarked on conducting empirical research in Kyrgyzstan to strengthen the involvement of local population groups in mining policies and international cooperation programs. She stressed how the country fails to generate sustainable development from its mineral wealth, and focused on the rules and legal settings that influence mining, asking "how do institutional dynamics encompassing the perceived properties of mining transactions and actors' beliefs reinforce or mitigate conflict?"

Ocaklı then invited the participants to split into groups and think of a scenario in the mining or business sector that bears potential for conflict, then find strategies for mediating between interest groups and to mitigate developing problems. The leading questions were 1) where and why do I come in, 2) how do I methodologically approach it, and 3) whom and how do I communicate my research? While the groups did not have difficulties to draw on the first two questions, eagerly exemplifying cases of conflict or injustice, responding to the third problem developed more complex. Soon, the participants had to conclude that mediation between the multiple levels of actors and interests resembles a walk on a tightrope.

Like Ocaklı, most of the participants were interested in supporting the less powerful parties in the hypothetical mining conflicts through evidence based long-term and in-depth research. However, how can researchers successfully and sustainably transfer such evidence into the spheres of business interests in order to create balanced power relations?

Business interests manifest along value chains. In the mining sector, the extraction of resources is based on what Tsing defines as 'salvage capitalism' or "taking advantage of value produced without capitalist control" (Tsing 2015: 63). What is controllable, however, is the governance of adding value in the production process and the governance of value chain actors. Governance in value chains focuses power relations within production and controls the assignment and flow of financial, material and personnel resources (Gereffi et al. 1994: 96).

Various cases across Central Asia show how mining policies represent business interests in the first place (Gullette and Kalybekova 2014; Myadar and Jackson 2018). Matters of social responsibility and sustainability are not being addressed appropriately. The unequal distribution of power and the power relations between different interest groups often remain neglected in value chains. On the other side, local forms of civil protest against extractive in-

Workshop participants in front of ZMO

dustries and mining policies in Central Asian countries are often stigmatized as 'resource nationalism' to discredit public grievances "by those who promote neoliberalism and open markets" (Myadar and Jackson 2018: 3).

Speaking as a workshop participant, far from the lived realities affected by mining in Kyrgyzstan and drawing on partially self-made scenarios in a group exercise, it is difficult to judge to what extend German international organizations successfully and sustainably implement their objectives. In any case, it can be stated that both, dialogue in the sense of international cooperation and knowledge transfer, should be extended in order to involve and empower other actors, who may promote civil society interests in an independent manner. Indeed, there is no constructive dialogue without diverging positions and, eventually, it is opposed positions that lead to more comprehensive and constructive results.

It is important to not stigmatize public protest nor to promote 'resource nationalism' but to put things into perspective: "Events are unquestionably important indicators of social conditions, but they need to be considered against the backdrop of long-term realities and processes" (McChesney 1996: 8). This is what academic research does. Its strength lies in the in-depth analysis and understanding of local, regional, and transregional realities and processes. Studying the issues arising from the interaction of contrasting interests in detail, academia creates the actual material to tackle the conflicts at stake. But to do that, we need to rethink knowledge transfer as it is practiced and to provide an appropriate space for it.

Central Asian Studies between self-confidence and political agenda

Cooperation between academia and politics is not easy: As our discussions have shown, there is antagonism and reluctance especially on the side of academia. In this part I briefly outline these discussions and retrace the reasons for the concerns of many scholars regarding their cooperation with politics, as I understand them as an early-career scholar.

The session "Knowledge Transfer between Central Asian Studies and Actors in Development Cooperation," was a talk with a representative from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). He presented the core programs and priority areas of his organization and highlighted cooperation possibilities for scholars. This talk left a twofold impression: In parts, it reminded me of career consultancy. Knowledge transfer options were discussed in terms of individual possibilities for scholars to enrich governmental development projects. One could always knock on the door with a research topic – it should only fit into the current priorities of the BMZ. On the other hand, many participants showed reservations about cooperation with the ministry.

The BMZ focuses mostly on topics like sustainable development, renewable energy, governance, and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A wide field of research; yet it covers only a part of the spectrum of topics in Central Asian Studies. Research topics beyond a developmental agenda remain excluded, and the amount of potentially interested researchers is reduced. On the background of the relevance-usefulness narrative, this implies that all other research interests are not relevant since they do not serve the practical aims of foreign policy.

The session was thus symptomatic of the relationship between Central Asian Studies and politics: On the one side, there is a small discipline facing financial cuts and demands for providing evidence of its usefulness and relevance. On the other side, a huge and well-financed state institution seeing scholars, as one participant summed up, "as tools for its own agenda." For Central Asian Studies, speaking of partnership in such circumstances means taking the role of petitioner.

Remarkably, institutional cooperation was barely evoked during the discussion. It seemed that it was much easier to consider cooperation and transfer as individual engagement. Existing examples demonstrate on the one side the complexity of such constructions and confirm the assumption that it works at best in the field of Political Science.[1]

Further difficulties lie in the different approaches to the production and implementation of knowledge between academia and politics. In the humanities, knowledge is usually produced out of interest in a particular topic or phenomena, influenced by scholarly trends and schools, and embedded in a specific context. It is an open-ended process without a particular utilitarian aim. In the case of politics – here foreign policy offices (diplomacy or development) – knowledge is needed to assess the situation on the ground, and eventually take political decisions. Knowledge transfer equals translation into a completely different form, language, and volume.

This critical point appeared several times during the workshop: the form and especially the volume of scholarly information that policy actors can digest. Two-to-four-pages-long policy papers are in contradiction to what an average scholarly work looks like. There is justified doubt that research compressed to this extent cannot wholly depict the complexity of its object.

Another concern relates to ethical questions: Can research produced directly for the use of politics truly remain free and independent? Will it be possible to conduct open-ended and

1 One example is the Sonderforschungsbereich 700 "Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit", www.sfb-governance.de/teilprojekte/projektbereich_t/t3/index.html.

critical research when funding is dependent on cooperation with the government? This depends not only on the personality of the researcher but also on the ethical foundations of research institutions. The BMZ's involvement in Afghanistan is a good example. As a scholar of Central Asian Studies acquainted with the situation in this country, one cannot deny the necessity of development in nearly all areas of social and political life. At the same time, notwithstanding regular bombing and huge numbers of civilian casualties, the German government continues to deport refugees back to Afghanistan. The engagement of BMZ serves as a bargaining chip to make the Afghan government accept German policy – although it is not able to provide enough help for those deported (Stahlmann 2017). Being involved in a cooperation project on Afghanistan would mean an affiliation with a policy I personally disapprove.

When promoting knowledge transfer between academia and politics these concerns should be taken seriously. There must be compromise on both sides, as well as guarantees for academic freedom. It is crucial that such cooperation does not become an instrument for solving financial problems in universities. We need self-confident Central Asian Studies provided with a sufficient amount of funding. And most importantly, academic relevance should not be measured by the number of cooperation contracts with foreign policy organizations. For now I see knowledge transfer merely as an issue between individual researchers and political institutions.

Central Asian Studies and the media: Shared responsibility

During my bachelor's degree in social sciences in Central Asia, one of my professors used to emphasize that research should discuss a specific social problem and offer practical and clear steps to solve it. The labor market was complicit in this idea as well: I could not imagine my experience and knowledge being relevant anywhere outside of policy-driven development aid projects run by various nongovernmental organizations. The call for papers for the CASIO workshop reminded me of this rhetoric.

But instead of thinking about how to justify academic work, we spoke about potential knowledge co-construction with other social and political actors. Regarding media[2], we discussed some of the following questions: What are the potentials of cooperation between media and academia? What are the obstacles, and how can communication and exchange practices be facilitated?

In both foreign[3] and local media, Central Asia is represented in essentializing frameworks, sometimes as a mere extension of Russia and/or China. Images of "backward lifestyles," "oppressed women," and "Islamic radicalization" are frames through which the so-called region of dictatorships is constructed (Morrison 2017) – and sometimes also constructs itself internationally. Such images give simplistic answers to complex questions, providing legitimation to various (international) policies aimed at the "development" and "increasing securitization" of the region. Stronger engagement between the media and academia could help to construct a more accurate picture of the region and provide a better analysis of the processes shaping it.

2 By "the media," I mostly refer to the online media and press.
3 I mostly refer here to Northern American and Western European media.

This discussion is not new. In his recent piece "Working around reductionism in Afghanistan," the photojournalist Andrew Quilty provides insights in the functioning of media agencies – especially regarding the coverage of Central Asia. According to him, audiences around the globe receive stories written through "outdated reductive lenses that transform complex issues into familiar stereotypes." Another issue is that local journalists and activists are not recognized as legitimate and equal partners in cooperation with foreign media. Valuable knowledge and experience are ignored, reducing the chances for nuanced coverage (Quilty 2017).

Again, the main obstacle for closer cooperation is a structural one. During the workshop, we approached it through a role-play facilitated by representatives of the online platform Novastan.org and the media NGO n-ost. Participants took the positions of journalists and scholars to discuss articles covering topics such as practices of "bride kidnapping" in Kyrgyzstan or the "problem of extremism" in Central Asia. The short role-play showed us not only the position of the media but also both the possibilities and limitations of dialogue. While the "scholars" in the role-play criticized generalizations and biases in the texts, "journalists" pointed out their working conditions – especially the time pressure to produce articles for a broad audience.

In the context of journalism on Central Asia, Quilty calls for a general change of attitude in the precarious environment that rewards sensationalism and speed. He claims that journalists are accountable for the pursuit of critical thinking, breaking conventions and clichés. But they are not the only ones who must change their "usual ways." Editors and audiences should also demand better and more accurate stories (Quilty 2017). Scholars, in turn, are not trained to give short answers to complex issues and may see participation in wider societal discussions as a threat for their "primary identity" as a researcher. Especially for early-career scholars, media activism is not considered beneficial for their academic profile.

There is still room for optimism. Mutual construction of knowledge and debate is taking place, while some scholars of journalism and communications suggest that academia could help a specific type of journalism that communicates in-depth analysis and investigation in accessible ways (Remler et al. 2014). Projects such as the Central Eurasian Scholars and Media Initiative (CESMI) are encouraging collaboration between media, academia, and (local) activists. Despite the reluctance of some workshop participants, we shared awareness that the media is a powerful channel to make academic works accessible to a wider public – and acknowledged the existence of platforms fit for such exchange.

Conclusion

We can draw one key point from the three sections of this report: the purpose of academia is not simply to serve politicians, businessmen, or journalists. Scholars should set their own research agenda, without pressure to sell it. There are several legitimate reasons why scholars would reject engagement in knowledge transfer. One of them is personal ethical red lines. Another is the fear of institutional dependency: while knowledge transfer could show the relevance of Central Asian Studies, it should not be the premise for funding.

Yet the sometimes defensive tone of this text does not attest to the unwillingness of early-career scholars to engage in knowledge transfer. It is rather the result of unequal power

relations, as well as our responsibility to conduct independent research. In fact, the workshop clearly showed that there is an interest in cooperation – but in the frames of our social and political responsibility. The report on journalism thus adds an optimistic note on how closer cooperation can reduce clichés about the region.

Even though appropriate ways and methods are yet to be explored, the dialogue with decision makers encouraged us to pursue this issue further. Future workshops can create platforms for continuous exchange between academia and the "outside," the first step for a better cooperation between Central Asian Studies and politics, business, and media.

As long as we are working on solutions for the challenges mentioned, we will continue to adhere to what Professor Baldauf recommended during the closing discussion of the workshop. Referring to the work of Central Asian Studies, she said: "We produce knowledge in reserve." We welcome the use of the knowledge we produce, but are not willing to serve the political or economic interests of others.

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Goethes „West-Östlicher Diwan“ wird 200 Jahre

Udo Steinbach

„Nord und West und Süd zersplittern,
Throne bersten, Reiche zittern,
Flüchte du, im reinen Osten
Patriarchenluft zu kosten;
Unter Lieben, Trinken, Singen
Soll dich Chisers Quell verjüngen.“

So beginnt Goethe seinen „West-Östlichen Diwan“, der vor 200 Jahren, im August 1819 bei der Cotta’schen Verlagsbuchhandlung in Stuttgart erschien. Er überschreibt das Gedicht „Hegire“ – eine Anspielung auf den Propheten Mohammed. Der war im Jahre 622 von Mekka in das benachbarte Yathrib ausgewandert. Daheim fühlten er und seine kleine junge Gemeinde sich von seinen mekkanischen Gegnern verfolgt. In Yathrib konnte er ein neues Leben beginnen. Die Stadt wurde später in Medinat an-Nabiy, „Stadt des Propheten“ – Medina – umbenannt.

Der Dichter ist des Schlachtenlärms im Europa der letzten Jahrzehnte müde. Auch in Weimar waren die Auswirkungen der napoleonischen Kriege zu spüren gewesen. Wohin entweichen, um Ruhe zu finden? Da öffnet sich der „reine Osten“; die „Hegire“ (arabisch: *hidschra*), die Auswanderung aus dem Kontinent des Schlachtenlärms in eine Welt der Poesie, die ihm in den letzten Jahren von europäischen Orientalisten nähergebracht worden war.

Geographisch war das der Raum des Osmanischen Reiches und Persiens. Geistig war er belebt von religiös Erleuchteten vieler Religionen, von den arabischen und persischen Dichtern, aber auch von Anhängern des sprachgewaltigen Korans und seines Propheten.

Glücklicher Goethe! Zweihundert Jahre nach seiner „Hegire“ stellt sich die Welt des Ostens nicht verführerisch dar. Im Gegenteil: Gewalt und Armut treiben heute viele Menschen in die entgegengesetzte Richtung: eine „Hegire“ nach Europa. Dort freilich finden sie keine Idylle vor. Im besten Fall humanitäre Aufnahmebereitschaft; im schlechtesten eine Feindseligkeit, die besonders dem Propheten Mohammed und dem Koran gilt. Dieser sei ein faschistisches Buch, heißt es bei europäischen Rechtspopulisten. Es müsse verboten werden wie „Mein Kampf“. Wie geraten wir wieder ins Gespräch? Indem wir auf einander hören! Wie der Weimarer Dichter und sein größter orientalischer Bruder im Geiste, der persische Dichter Mohammed Schamseddin, den man Hafis nennt; und das deswegen, weil er den Koran auswendig kennt, eben bewahrt (arabisch: *hafiz*). Der neugierige Weimarer möchte das genauer wissen und der Perser aus Schiras antwortet: „Dass gemeinen Tages Schlechtnis/Weder mich noch die berühret/ Die Propheten-Wort und -Samen/Schätzen wie es sich gebühret:/Darum gab man mir den Namen“.

Da möchte der christliche Dichter nicht nachstehen: „ … und so gleich ich dir vollkommen,/ Der ich unsrer heiligen Bücher/Herrlich Bild an mich genommen, …“

Das Prophetenwort als Offenbarung rein zu halten, ja zu schützen gegen „gemeinen Tages Schlechtnis“ – darum geht es den beiden Dichtern. Die Spannung zwischen dieser

idealistisch-poetischen Verklärung der Religion auf der einen und tagespolitischen Anfeindungen auf der anderen Seite war auch in der Goethezeit und in der Epoche der Aufklärung eine Tatsache. Nur mit Widerwillen hat Goethe eine deutsche Übersetzung des „Mahomet"-Dramas von Voltaire auf die Weimarer Bühne gebracht. Erschien der Prophet Mohammed dem jungen Goethe als ein charismatisch-göttlich inspirierter Prophet, so ist er bei Voltaire ein Wüstling und Betrüger. Das Drama endet mit dem Fluch der sterbenden Palmire: „Fort! Dich nicht zu sehen, ist das größte Glück. Die Welt ist für Tyrannen – lebe du!"

Und das Zwiegespräch der beiden Dichterfürsten endet mit dem Bekenntnis des Weimarers zur „Erquickung" durch die Offenbarung „Trotz Verneinung, Hindrung, Raubens/ Mit dem heitren Bild des Glaubens."

Seit seinem Erscheinen vor 200 Jahren ist der West-Östliche Diwan das Dokument einer dreifachen Zurückweisung:

– gegen dogmatische Engstirnigkeit theologischer Autoritäten,
– gegen politische Engführung etwa in der Konfrontation mit den „Türken" sowie
– gegen philisterhaftes Moralisieren im Sinne religiöser Gebote.

Schon in den ersten Versen der „Hegire" klingt das an: Lieben, Trinken, Singen. Und auch darin weiß sich der – verliebte – Dichter in Weimar mit dem Sänger aus Schiras einig: Aus der Offenbarung geschöpfte Frömmigkeit steht zu einer sinnenfrohen Lebensweise nicht in Widerspruch. So beginnt ja auch der Diwan (die Gedichtsammlung) des persischen Bruders im Geiste, Hafis, mit den Worten: „Wohlan denn, Schenke, nimm den vollen Becher,/Kredenze ihn dem Kreise trunkner Zecher!/Die Liebe schien zuerst ein leichtes Spiel,/Bald brachte sie der Mühen nur zu viel." Und wenige Zeilen weiter heißt es: „Du sollst mit Weine, der vom jungen Schenken/ Dir wird kredenzt, den frommen Teppich tränken!" Den Gebetsteppich mit (verbotenem) Wein tränken – ein Sakrileg? Wo würde man größere Aufregung darüber vermuten als im heutigen Iran. Und doch: an Hafis kommt kein noch so frommer Bürger der Islamischen Republik vorbei. Fast jeder Iraner kennt und schätzt zuhöchst die zitierten Verse. Auf wie tönernen Füßen muss eine „Islamische Republik" stehen, wenn sich die verordnete Moral so weit von den Wurzeln der eigenen Kultur entfernt.

Das Hafis-Goethe-Denkmal in Weimar

Der iranische Staatspräsident Mohammed Khatami (1997–2005) hat diese Spannung ausgelebt, als er im Juli 2000 zum Staatsbesuch nach Berlin kam. Nach der Erledigung der politischen Geschäfte in der Hauptstadt wurde Weimar zur Bühne eines großen Auftritts. Dort versammelten sich unter anderen Bundespräsident Johannes Rau, der bedeutende Tübinger Theologe Hans Küng und eben Präsident Khatami. Thema des gelehrten Disputs war das Verhältnis von Tradition und Moderne. Khatami hatte dazu Grundsätzliches zu sagen: Für einen Muslim könne die „Moderne" nur akzeptabel sein, wenn sie nicht gegen die, sondern im Einklang mit der Tradition gedacht und implementiert wird; und umgekehrt: die Tradition kann nur Bestand haben, wenn sie sich in der Moderne immer wieder bewährt und erneuert.

Dies wurde feierlich besiegelt: Am Rande des Parks in Weimar, nahe dem Haus der Frau von Stein, Goethes geistiger Mentorin, enthüllten der iranische und der deutsche Präsident das Denkmal des Dialogs der Kulturen. Zwei leere Stühle aus dunklem Basalt – darauf werden Goethe und Hafis visualisiert. Und zwischen den beiden Stühlen Verse: darunter der bekannte aus Goethes West-Östlichem Diwan: „Wer sich selbst und andre kennt,/Wird auch hier erkennen:/Orient und Okzident /sind nicht mehr zu trennen."

In der „Hegire" hatte der Dichter Frieden gesucht. Ein frommer Wunsch hatte ihn geleitet: „Gottes ist der Orient!/Gottes ist der Okzident!/Nord- und südliches Gelände/Ruht im Frieden seiner Hände", hatte er gedichtet. War die Botschaft voreilig? Oder sollten wir sie nicht als Licht der Orientierung bei der Suche nach einer neuen Partnerschaft verstehen?

60 Jahre nach dem Aufbruch auf den südlichen und nördlichen Ufers des Mittelmeers hat sich ein dunkler Nebel über dem *mare nostrum* gebreitet. Wie im „Mahomet"-Drama des Voltaire (das Goethe verabscheute) suchen religiöse Fanatiker Vorurteile und Hass auf einander zu schüren. In dieser Situation aber hat der Goethe-Bewunderer und Dichter, Friedrich Hölderlin, dem Optimismus eine Stimme verliehen: „Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch."

Nun ist es an Europa, seine Hausaufgaben zu machen: das heißt wieder gesprächsfähig zu werden.

It's Time for an Academic Detox

Johannes Schöning, Sophia Hoffmann, Melissa Nolas, Christos Varvantakis, Hendrik Weimer

Almost every day, science is shaken by homemade scandals: bullying by professors, glossed over publication lists, mass publishing in predatory journals and even brazen falsifications of results (just to name a few examples).

These reports have shaped, and will continue to shape, the discourse in society about science and academia in the coming years, creating a less than favourable opinion of universities among members of the public, politicians and policymakers.

As a result, academia's first mission – to create knowledge for the common good – is at risk of receding from public view and falling by the wayside. In fact, the scandals that hit the headlines are only the tip of the iceberg.

In everyday academia's "business as usual", there are a number of smaller grievances that corrode science bit by bit. Many colleagues will find these situations familiar. For example, early career researchers face the problem of professors requesting to be added to the author list of a paper, even if they only wrote three sentences, if any at all. Many people understandably prefer to publish the results and share the findings, accepting implicitly that these feudal publishing strategies will help progress their careers.

Where do these academic poisons come from?

In our view, many of these poisons can be traced back to hypercompetition in academia with its inherent quantification. Resources in the scientific world are strictly limited and our science system is growing much faster than the funding that underpins it, creating a breeding ground for toxic behaviour.

Academic hypercompetition brings forth strange fruit because it is not coupled with proportional knowledge gain. As many studies show, this competition creates an immense amount of pressure to adapt and produces little autonomous research. Instead of real centres of excellence, "predatory" academic groups emerge, focused mainly on how to develop effective fund-grabbing tactics. This leads to an erosion of many existing good practices.

A little less conversation, a little more action please

Our recent initiative, Academic Detox, joins a steadily growing trend of pushing back on toxic academic culture by academics themselves. Colleagues writing in the *International Journal for Critical Geographers* sign up to the notion of "slow scholarship" to counteract a hyperproductive university. Others at the University of Aberdeen attempted to "reclaim their university" calling on management to support a university that serves the academic community rather than business interests.

In creating Academic Detox we wanted to collect good practices to fight the toxic behaviours in academia, as we believe that they may damage the system beyond repair. On our website we are currently collecting good practices and actions that can fight these poisoning practices. A large share of the work that is needed to detox science will have to rest on the shoulders of more senior colleagues who are in more authoritative and less precarious positions than their junior colleagues.

In fact, acknowledging the precariousness and the associated existential fears of more junior colleagues would be a good place for senior academics to start. The toxic authoritative structures characterised by seniority and patriarchy have been criticised by those more precariously employed, yet in order to overturn such structures, established scholars will have to act much more responsibly.

Existing antidotes

There is already some great work being done towards this mission. The computer scientist Andy Ko recently published a blog post on how to de-quantify the short biographies academics typically put on their websites, CVs and grant proposals. The goal of this is to emphasise the quality of academic output over quantity, and also to give weight to activities such as teaching and outreach.

Two of us, Melissa Nolas and Christos Varvantakis, started a new journal to detox the reviewing system (among other things) and engage authors and reviewers in a deep and productive conversation. Detoxing the review process is even possible for established journals. We should stop calling for flat rejections, but rather give constructive advice to the authors, wherever possible, of how a paper could be made acceptable. And senior colleagues should actively disengage from the growing malpractice of awarding short-term contracts purely out of habit or convenience: why not, instead, hand out contracts for as long a period as possible, according to the available funding?

Further small steps include abandoning quantitative metrics when evaluating scientists for academic positions or awards.

We should again aim for Alexander von Humboldt's ideal of holistic science. If not, the brutal economic conditions of modern-day science will suffocate academic freedom sooner or later. We need to take action to disseminate the antidote to this poison.

Installation from the exhibition *Digging Deep, Crossing Far_ 3rd Encounter: Berlin*, 2016

Featured Visitors

Zur aktuellen Situation türkischer Wissenschaftler*innen

Ein Interview mit Nazan Maksudyan

Nazan Maksudyan, Gesine Rodewald, Paulina Thom

Anmerkung der Redaktion: Seit dem Putschversuch im Juli 2016 hat sich die Situation der Akademiker*innen in der Türkei zunehmend verschlechtert. Die Historikerin Nazan Maksudyan hat kürzlich das Wahlergebnis des Verfassungsreferendums in einem Interview mit dem Deutschlandfunk [18. 4. 2017 https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/nach-dem-referendum-in-der-tuerkei-es-gibt-viel-angst-und.680.de.html?dram:article_id=384051] als „nicht rechtmäßig" bezeichnet. Wir haben mit ihr über die problematische Lage türkischer Akademiker*innen, über die Auswirkungen politischer Einflussnahme auf ihre Forschungen und die Möglichkeiten zur Unterstützung einer freien Wissenschaft gesprochen. Das Interview wurde schriftlich am 7. Mai 2017 geführt.

It must have been a difficult situation for you, especially after the referendum and the following mass layoffs of academics and intellectuals. What kind of reactions did you receive after the interview with the Deutschlandfunk after criticising the political changes and considering the vote as illegitimate?

> Actually, none! I do not think that I was saying something exceptional, many observers of the politics in Turkey were also giving similar comments.

Aren't you afraid that your political position could have some negative effects for yourself and for your academic career?

> Absolutely, and that is exactly why I am now here in Berlin and not in Turkey. But honestly, I was very tired of auto-censorship in the past few years. It makes you feel very bad not to voice your genuine ideas and feelings publicly and consciously censor them, on your own. That's a terrible thing. And when I came here, I said I will not do that again.

Will it be possible for you to continue to travel to Turkey?

> There is no obstacle that I know of. I have a valid passport and I am a citizen of the country. But we are not sure of anything in this state of emergency…

How would you describe your relationship to other Turkish academics after the referendum?

> As usual. I have a close circle of academic friends. We understand each other very well and we support each other.

Do you have any contacts to academics who voted „evet“?

> No. Turkey in political terms is quite divided. Of course, you never know who votes what in that little room. But I do not think I have anyone around me who voted ‘evet’.

Since many academics left Turkey before and after the referendum, are there any networks of scientific communities abroad? And how do they participate in the current debate?

> Yes, in almost every country, people come together, discuss developments, build networks. People try to find ways of supporting friends in Turkey, or those who want to leave the country. Turkey is always a part of the debate, many academics write or speak about the developments, inform the public in their host countries, etc.

One of your research topics is about the Armenian genocide. After the putsch in July 2016 you were forced not to use the word „genocide“ in your work, which you refused to do. What does that kind of political influence mean for a critical historiography?

> The word has always been difficult to use. It was not only after 2016 that I was criticized. The biggest obstacle for my academic career was to pass the Doçentlik exam (to become a docent you need to take an oral exam, with 5 professors, selected by the Board of Higher Education [YÖK]). I had to take the test 3 times due to discussions over the genocide. The idea is to silence and scare a candidate and make him/her not ever take the exam again. But I decided to try it as much as it takes. I went to my second oral exam when I was 8 months pregnant. When I went to the third one, I had a 2 month old baby. Probably because of this resistance (or that they were tired of me coming in front of them every six months), they gave me my Doçentlik. But the pressure and humiliation they try to impose on you is not for everyone. Many people give up pursuing the title after their first attempt. But I am the great-granddaughter of a survivor, who resisted perishing in a cruel world. Unintelligent questions of quasi-academics could not make me step back. Critical historiography, especially regarding the Armenian genocide, is a rare thing in Turkey. Still, there are a dozen of very good academics, but most of them lost their jobs or were forced to leave the country.

During the interview with the DLF you mentioned that there are many learned journals in Turkey that offer resistance and still publish critical comments. Therefore, in your opinion, how could Turkish Academics be supported by the European scientific community?

> Well, first of all, material concerns, definitely. Funding opportunities are important and more of it would be more helpful. As a less tangible wish, I would say less of a ‘victim discourse’. We have become sort of exiles, that’s true, but we are not helpless, vulnerable, weak, etc. So what we need is a more empowering discourse.

"Another one of my intellectual 'homes'"

Hassan Mwakimako, Pwani University, Kenya

From mid-May to mid-June 2019, I had the opportunity to spend time at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient as a visiting fellow. It was a month of intellectual activity beyond the confines of Nikolasee. I was returning to an institution where I had spent an extended period as a postdoctoral research fellow between April 2006 and December 2008. In the interim, there had been another short stay of a week for a summer school in 2015, in which I participated as a mentor.

Since I first arrived, ZMO has truly been one of my intellectual "homes". It is a place where I have the opportunity to share in depth my research interests and outcomes with colleagues. ZMO also provides a rare opportunity to reconnect with old friends and make new acquaintances. My latest visit came almost a decade after I was last here, but it did not seem like such a long gap thanks to the constant efforts by colleagues to keep in touch. I must say that I was particularly elated that some of those I had known during those earlier years were still here and going strong, while others had of course moved on to other places.

When I first arrived in Berlin in April 2006, I was not really a stranger; in fact, I already knew a couple of colleagues, such as Katrin Bromber whom I had met in Chicago in the spring of 2002. It was Katrin who first mentioned the interesting work going on at ZMO, and she followed up our discussion with an invitation to spend a month as a visiting fellow. I had also made friends with Roman Loimeier through academic conferences in Birmingham, UK, and as a colleague in a working group on "Islam and the State in Sub-Saharan Africa" at the Centre for African Studies, Leiden. It was largely due to Roman's invitation to work with him on a broad project themed around the Swahili Coast that I had the opportunity to spend an extended period of time at ZMO. Amongst the friends with whom I have had the longest contact is Kai Kresse, one of the present vice-directors. We started at ZMO at the same time in 2006, with Kai as another new fellow, but we had known one another from back home in Kenya when both of us were just beginning doctoral studies. Kai had visited the University of Nairobi as an early doctoral student researching the Swahili Coast generally. Over the years, these initial contacts with Kai have culminated in long-term cooperation on various projects, including working on translating the works of Shaykh Al-Amin bin Ali Mazrui, one of the most prominent Swahili Islamic scholars.

Swahili Islamic scholars is my pet project and is what brought me to the ZMO again this time around. I have been engaged in translating, transliterating and editing a collection of eight *khutbah* (sermons) written by that same Shaykh Al-Amin. A short visit to ZMO enabled me to concentrate on refining this work but also provided an additional chance to make presentations on aspects of it to a group of researchers not specifically engaged in studying the Swahili coast but those working generally on Islamic societies around the globe.

The variety of critical responses available from colleagues at ZMO is always an experience to cherish: You will not only get the anticipated experts but also people who might not previously have had any idea of your research but whose humility and eagerness to learn something new will lead them to be a useful critic in a way that your familiar and already sup-

portive colleagues would not have been able. As a researcher, I find this aspect of my experiences particularly enriching during my stays at ZMO. You will always find a space for robust discussion in the larger bi-weekly research meetings but also in other, usually informal discussion groups such as the Swahili Baraza, where a small group of specialists will surely challenge your ideas in an attempt to further sharpen your focus.

Upon my return visit, I had the opportunity once again to present my work beyond Nikolassee Berlin. Taking advantage of my stay, I travelled to Bayreuth to attend the Swahili Colloquium and continue in my engagement with other colleagues. It is strange happenstance that having been in Berlin for a number of years I had not had the opportunity to attend this annual convention of Swahili and Indian Ocean scholars; I am grateful that I was able to this time.

My visit was also meant to involve exploring what the future may hold for continued networking. Together with Kai Kresse, we had several exploratory meetings looking into modalities and ways of continuing our cooperation both at the individual and institutional level. We pursued avenues such as development of joint research grant applications, joint supervision of graduate students and north–south mobility initiatives. In themselves, such initiatives are nothing new but my experience of interacting with a small group of post-graduate students from the West African region, who were also visiting ZMO at the same time, made it quite clear that cross-regional thematic research areas is the future.

During this stay I continued to learn a lot and enjoyed the discussions with Abdoulaye Sounaye and Andre Chappatte. Between my long stay at ZMO and my short return visit in the mid-2019, I have been a visiting fellow at other research centres including the African Studies Centre at the University of Cambridge, UK. Nevertheless, I always look forward to my next visit to the ZMO.

Hassan Mwakimako (third from left) with ZMO researchers Katrin Bromber (left), Kai Kresse (third from right) and Jasmin Mahazi (fourth from right) and others at a Swahili Baraza, HU Berlin, 2019

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